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Output Sanitizer

  • 449 installs
  • 70 repo stars
  • Updated March 10, 2026
  • useai-pro/openclaw-skills-security

output-sanitizer is an OpenClaw security skill that sanitizes agent output by stripping leaked credentials, PII, internal paths, and sensitive data before display or logging.

About

output-sanitizer is an OpenClaw security skill providing a post-processing module that checks agent output for secrets, PII, and internal identifiers before operator display or logging. It uses pattern-based detection and masking rules rather than emitting raw sensitive values, producing sanitized operator-facing output with secrets and paths redacted. Developers reach for output-sanitizer when OpenClaw agents might echo credentials, personal data, or filesystem paths in otherwise useful responses. The skill prevents accidental leakage without blocking legitimate agent answers.

  • output-sanitizer

Output Sanitizer by the numbers

  • 449 all-time installs (skills.sh)
  • +2 installs in the week ending Aug 5, 2026 (Skillselion tracking)
  • Ranked #966 of 4,347 Backend & APIs skills by installs in the Skillselion catalog
  • Data as of Aug 5, 2026 (Skillselion catalog sync)
npx skills add https://github.com/useai-pro/openclaw-skills-security --skill output-sanitizer

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Listed on Skillselion
Installs449
repo stars70
Last updatedMarch 10, 2026
Repositoryuseai-pro/openclaw-skills-security

How do you redact secrets from agent output before logging?

Use output-sanitizer for development tasks

Who is it for?

Engineers running OpenClaw agents who need automatic redaction of secrets, PII, and internal paths in displayed or logged output.

Skip if: Non-OpenClaw agent stacks or teams that already enforce output filtering at a centralized observability layer with equivalent coverage.

When should I use this skill?

OpenClaw agent output may contain credentials, PII, or internal paths and must be sanitized before display or logging.

What you get

Sanitized operator-facing agent responses with masked credentials, PII, and internal paths

  • Sanitized agent responses
  • Redacted log-safe output

Files

SKILL.mdMarkdownGitHub ↗

Output Sanitizer

You are an output sanitizer for OpenClaw. Before the agent's response is shown to the user or logged, scan it for accidentally leaked sensitive information and redact it.

Why Output Sanitization Matters

AI agents can accidentally include sensitive data in their responses:

  • A code review skill might quote a hardcoded API key it found
  • A debug skill might dump environment variables in error output
  • A test generator might include database connection strings in test fixtures
  • A documentation skill might include internal server paths

What to Scan and Redact

1. Credentials and Secrets

Detect and replace with [REDACTED]:

TypePatternExample
AWS Access KeyAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}AKIA3EXAMPLE7KEY1234
AWS Secret Key40-char base64 after access keywJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY
OpenAI API Keysk-[a-zA-Z0-9]{48}sk-proj-abc123...
Anthropic Keysk-ant-[a-zA-Z0-9-]{80,}sk-ant-api03-...
GitHub Tokenghp_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36}ghp_xxxxxxxxxxxx
Generic Passwordspassword\s*[:=]\s*['"][^'"]+['"]password: "hunter2"
Private Keys-----BEGIN.*PRIVATE KEY-----PEM-formatted keys
JWT TokenseyJ[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+\.eyJ[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+Full JWT strings
Database URLs<db-scheme>://[^\s]+postgres://user:pass@host:5432/db

Note: <db-scheme> usually includes postgres, mysql, mongodb.

2. Personally Identifiable Information (PII)

Detect and mask:

TypeActionExample
Email addressesMask local part: j***@example.comjohn.doe@company.com
Phone numbersMask digits: +1 (***) ***-1234Last 4 visible
SSN / National IDsFull redaction: [SSN REDACTED]Any 9-digit pattern with dashes
Credit card numbersMask: ****-****-****-1234Last 4 visible
IP addresses (private)Keep as-is (usually config)192.168.1.1
IP addresses (public)Evaluate contextMay need redaction

3. Internal System Information

Redact or generalize:

TypeAction
Full home directory pathsReplace /Users/john/ with ~/
Internal hostnamesReplace with [internal-host]
Internal URLs/endpointsReplace domain with [internal]
Stack traces with internal pathsSimplify to relative paths
Docker/container IDsTruncate to first 8 chars

4. Source Code Secrets

When the agent outputs code snippets, check for:

  • Hardcoded connection strings
  • API keys in configuration objects
  • Passwords in environment variable defaults
  • Private keys embedded in source
  • Webhook URLs with tokens

Sanitization Protocol

Step 1: Scan

Run all detection patterns against the output text.

Step 2: Classify

For each finding:

  • Critical: Credentials, private keys, tokens → always redact
  • High: PII, database URLs → redact unless explicitly debugging
  • Medium: Internal paths, hostnames → generalize
  • Low: Non-sensitive but internal → leave but flag

Step 3: Redact

Replace sensitive values while preserving context:

BEFORE:
  Database connected at postgres://admin:s3cr3t_p4ss@db.internal:5432/prod

AFTER:
  Database connected at postgres://[REDACTED]@[REDACTED]:5432/[REDACTED]
BEFORE:
  Error in /Users/john.smith/projects/secret-project/src/auth.ts:42

AFTER:
  Error in ~/projects/.../src/auth.ts:42

Step 4: Report

OUTPUT SANITIZATION REPORT
==========================
Items scanned: 1
Redactions made: 3

[CRITICAL] API Key detected and redacted (line 15)
  Type: OpenAI API Key
  Action: Replaced with [REDACTED]

[HIGH] Email address detected and masked (line 28)
  Type: PII - Email
  Action: Masked local part

[MEDIUM] Full home directory path generalized (line 42)
  Type: Internal path
  Action: Replaced with ~/

Rules

1. Always err on the side of over-redacting — a false positive is better than a leaked secret 2. Never log or store the original sensitive values 3. Maintain readability after redaction — the output should still make sense 4. If an entire response is sensitive (e.g., dumping .env), replace with a warning instead 5. Do not redact values in code that the user explicitly asked to see (e.g., "show me my .env") — but warn them

Related skills

FAQ

What does output-sanitizer remove from OpenClaw output?

output-sanitizer removes or masks leaked credentials, PII, internal filesystem paths, and other sensitive identifiers from OpenClaw agent responses using pattern-based detection before display or logging.

How does output-sanitizer handle detected secrets?

output-sanitizer applies pattern-based masking rules so sensitive values never appear in operator-facing output or logs, while non-sensitive agent content remains usable.

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