ContrastAPI

Query DNS, WHOIS, SSL, subdomains, and threat intel for a domain in one call. By default dns.txt is filtered to security-relevant entries (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT) and dns.total_txt_records reports the honest pre-filter count; pass include_all_txt=true for the raw TXT list. Use as a starting point for domain investigations; use audit_domain for live headers + tech stack. Response carries next_calls — chain with subdomain_enum (always emitted), ssl_check + tech_fingerprint (when an A record resolves) for the standard recon depth without re-prompting. Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns domain report with DNS records, WHOIS data, SSL cert, risk score, email config, threat status, recommendation, and next_calls.

• domainstringrequiredRoot domain to analyze, without protocol or path (e.g. 'example.com', 'shopify.com')
• include_all_txtbooleanReturn every TXT record (default: False, only SPF/DMARC/DKIM/MTA-STS/TLS-RPT kept). dns.total_txt_records is always emitted with the honest pre-filter count. Default filter strips vendor verification strings (google-site-verification, ms=, facebook-domain-verification, etc.) that bloat the response without security signal. Set True only when you need the raw TXT inventory.

Perform comprehensive domain audit: combines domain_report + live HTTP security headers + technology fingerprinting. By default report.dns.txt is filtered to security-relevant entries (SPF, DMARC, DKIM, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT) and report.dns.total_txt_records reports the honest pre-filter count; pass include_all_txt=true for the raw TXT list. Use when you need the full picture (recon + active checks); use domain_report for passive-only assessment. Response carries next_calls — chain with subdomain_enum (always emitted) and ssl_check (when an A record resolves) for the residual recon depth (tech_fingerprint already inline as `technologies`). Free: 30/hr (costs 6 credits), Pro: 500/hr. Returns {domain, report, technologies, live_headers, summary, next_calls}.

• domainstringrequiredRoot domain to audit, without protocol or path (e.g. 'example.com', 'shopify.com')
• include_all_txtbooleanReturn every TXT record under report.dns.txt (default: False, only SPF/DMARC/DKIM/MTA-STS/TLS-RPT kept). report.dns.total_txt_records is always emitted with the honest pre-filter count. Default filter strips vendor verification strings (google-site-verification, ms=, facebook-domain-verification, etc.) that bloat the response without security signal. Set True only when you need the raw TXT inventory.

Active website security scan: runs the ContrastScan C engine (11 modules — HTTP security headers, SSL/TLS, DNS, redirect chain, information disclosure, cookie flags, DNSSEC, HTTP methods, CORS, HTML hygiene, deep CSP analysis) against the live site and enriches the raw result with severity-ranked vulnerability findings and a letter grade. Use for a hands-on misconfiguration scan; use audit_domain for passive recon (DNS/WHOIS/SSL/threat intel) and scan_headers for headers only. Active outbound fetch — a per-target eTLD+1 throttle (60 req/min) applies. Free: 30/hr (costs 6 credits), Pro: 500/hr. Returns {domain, resolved_ip, total_score, max_score, grade, findings, findings_count, headers, ssl, dns, redirect, disclosure, cookies, dnssec, methods, cors, html, csp_analysis, enterprise, summary, next_calls}.

• domainstringrequiredRoot domain to scan, without protocol or path (e.g. 'example.com'). Bare IPs and private-resolving domains are rejected.

Composite tech-stack + CVE audit (MCP-only, no REST endpoint). Detects technologies on the target domain, queries CVE database for known vulnerabilities per product, enriches top-10 CVE candidates with CISA KEV federal patch deadlines, and checks public exploit / PoC availability. Identical for every tier — all data is sourced from local DB mirrors (no Shodan/AbuseIPDB), so there is no tier gating. CVE candidate batch: 50. Cost: 10 credits per call — Free 30/hr ≈ 3 audits, Pro 500/hr ≈ 50 audits. Returns {domain, technologies, cves_by_tech, kev_findings, exploit_findings, summary, next_calls}.

• domainstringrequiredTarget domain to fingerprint and CVE-audit (e.g. 'example.com'). IPs and internal hostnames are rejected.

Query comprehensive threat profile for an IP: Shodan host data, AbuseIPDB reputation, ASN/geolocation, and open ports. Use for IP investigation and SOC alert triage; for domain data use domain_report. Note: nested asn block always returns at most 50 IPv4/IPv6 prefixes — call asn_lookup with include_full_prefixes=True for the full announced-prefixes list. enrichment.vulns is severity-aware list[VulnInfo] (cve_id + severity + cvss_v3) — Phase 2 v1.16.0 BREAKING; pre-1.16 it was list[str] of CVE IDs. Free: 30/hr (costs 6 credits), Pro: 500/hr. Returns {ip, enrichment, abuseipdb, shodan, asn, threat_level}.

• ipstringrequiredPublic IPv4 or IPv6 address to investigate (e.g. '8.8.8.8', '1.1.1.1'). Private/reserved IPs are rejected.

Query all DNS record types (A, AAAA, MX, NS, TXT, CNAME, SOA) for a domain. Use for mail routing inspection, nameserver verification, or SPF/DMARC checks; for full overview use domain_report. TXT records are returned raw (no filter) — `total_txt_records` always carries the honest count (use domain_report for the security-only filtered TXT view). Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {domain, records: {a, aaaa, mx, ns, txt, total_txt_records, cname, soa}, summary}.

• domainstringrequiredRoot domain to query, without protocol or path (e.g. 'example.com', 'cloudflare.com')

Retrieve WHOIS registration data: registrar, creation/expiry dates, nameservers, status. Use to verify domain ownership, age, expiration; for full audit use domain_report. Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {domain, whois: {registrar, creation_date, expiry_date, updated_date, name_servers, status, raw_length, error}, summary}.

• domainstringrequiredRoot domain to query WHOIS for (e.g. 'example.com', 'github.com')

Analyze SSL/TLS certificate: grade (A/B/C/D/F), protocol version, cipher suite, chain, expiry, Subject Alternative Names, and structured validation findings. Invalid certs (expired, self-signed, hostname mismatch, untrusted root) are reported as findings via valid=false + validation_errors[] rather than as endpoint failures, so an unreachable cert still returns useful intel. Grade D = cert readable but invalid; F = expired, legacy TLS, or probe failure. Use to audit certificate validity and detect expiring certs; for full domain audit use audit_domain. Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {grade, valid, validation_errors, protocol, cipher, issuer, subject, not_before, not_after, days_remaining, chain, san, warnings}.

• domainstringrequiredDomain to check SSL/TLS certificate for (e.g. 'example.com', 'api.stripe.com')

Discover subdomains using passive methods: Certificate Transparency logs + DNS brute-force (no active probing). Use to map organization's attack surface; non-intrusive. Response carries next_calls — capped at 5 ssl_check hints (one per first-five subdomain) so triage scales to large enumerations without token bloat; pull tail entries by name when needed. Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {domain, count, subdomains, sources, found_via_wordlist, found_via_crtsh, crtsh_status, warnings, summary, next_calls}. Always check crtsh_status: 'ok' means the CT lookup completed (so a low count is real); 'timeout' / 'rate_limited' / 'unavailable' / 'error' means CT logs did not respond and the count is wordlist-only — the actual attack surface is likely larger, retry later or surface the limitation to the user.

• domainstringrequiredRoot domain to enumerate subdomains for (e.g. 'example.com', 'tesla.com')

Detect website technology stack: CMS, frameworks, CDN, analytics tools, web servers, languages (via HTTP headers + HTML analysis). Use for passive reconnaissance; for full audit use audit_domain. Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {technologies: [{name, category, confidence%, version}]}.

• domainstringrequiredDomain to fingerprint (e.g. 'example.com', 'shopify.com')

Check domain against abuse.ch URLhaus for known malware-distribution URLs (single source — for multi-feed correlation use ioc_lookup which adds ThreatFox and, for IPs, Feodo Tracker). Use for fast domain-level threat assessment; use phishing_check for specific URLs. Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {malware_urls, threat_tags, threat_status, summary}.

• domainstringrequiredDomain to check for threats (e.g. 'suspicious-site.com', 'example.com')

Retrieve Wayback Machine snapshots for a domain: first capture, latest, total count, snapshot list. Use to investigate domain history and age; for full audit use domain_report. Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. status='ok' means the count is authoritative (even when 0 → confirmed no archives). status='unavailable' means CDX timed out/rate-limited/5xx — total_snapshots is OMITTED (unknown, NOT zero) and the agent should NOT report "no snapshots"; the warnings[] array carries the cdx_* error code (cdx_timeout/cdx_rate_limited/cdx_unavailable/cdx_error/cdx_parse_error/cdx_body_too_large). Heavy domains (kernel.org, microsoft.com, archive.org itself) frequently time out the CDX endpoint despite having millions of snapshots — fall back to archive_url for manual inspection. Returns {domain, status, total_snapshots, first_seen, last_seen, years_online, snapshots, archive_url, summary, warnings}.

• domainstringrequiredDomain to look up in web archives (e.g. 'example.com', 'archive.org')

Perform live HTTP GET and analyze security headers: CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Permissions-Policy, Referrer-Policy. Use to audit live website headers; use check_headers to validate headers you already have. Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. By default header values are truncated to 500 chars (CSP can exceed 4 KB on large sites); pass include='full' for the full raw value. Returns {headers_present, headers_missing, findings, total_score}.

• domainstringrequiredDomain to scan live HTTP headers for (e.g. 'example.com', 'api.github.com')
• includestringDetail level. Default ('') returns slim findings — raw header values capped at 500 chars with total_value_length carrying the honest pre-truncation length. Pass 'full' to restore the full raw value (useful for inspecting full CSP directives on sites like GitHub where the CSP header exceeds 4 KB). Allowed: '' or 'full'.

Analyze email security: MX records, SPF policy, DMARC policy, DKIM probe across common+date-based selectors, mail provider, grade. Use to verify email-auth setup and phishing risk; for full audit use domain_report. Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. email_security.dkim_status reports honest evidence: 'verified' iff at least one selector responded, else 'unverifiable' (custom selectors cannot be discovered without prior knowledge). Grade: when DKIM verified, A=SPF+DMARC+DKIM/B=2of3/C=1of3; when DKIM unverifiable, A=SPF+DMARC/B=one/F=neither — DKIM absence is NOT penalized because it is unprovable in DNS. Returns {mx_records, mail_provider, email_security:{spf, dmarc, dkim_selectors, dkim_status, grade, issues}, summary}.

• domainstringrequiredDomain to analyze email configuration for (e.g. 'example.com', 'google.com')

Analyze domain email authentication posture: SPF, DMARC, DKIM with numeric score and findings. Dual-use: red-team (spoofing feasibility) + blue-team (posture audit). Score 0-100, grades A+-F. DKIM probing tests common selectors + recent dates; custom selectors must be supplied. Passive DNS-only; no SMTP probe. Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr.

• domainstringrequiredDomain to audit email authentication posture for (e.g. 'example.com')
• selectorsOptional comma-separated custom DKIM selectors to probe

Check if email address uses a known disposable/temporary provider (Guerrilla Mail, Temp Mail, Mailinator, etc.). Use for input validation to detect throwaway signups; for domain reputation use threat_intel. Companion email-investigation tools: email_mx (deliverability + MX trust), domain_report on the email's domain (full recon), threat_intel (malware-distribution signal on the domain). Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {disposable, domain, provider}.

• emailstringrequiredFull email address to check (e.g. 'user@tempmail.com', 'test@guerrillamail.com')

One-call email validation combining syntax + MX records + disposable check + role-address detection (admin@/info@/...) + free-provider classification (gmail/outlook/yahoo/...). Use BEFORE adding an email to a contact list, sending an outbound message, or auditing a lead-list dump — replaces 2-3 tool calls (email_mx + email_disposable + manual role parse) with one structured response. Deliberately does NOT do SMTP `RCPT TO` deliverability probing — Hunter.io / NeverBounce-style mailbox enumeration is an ethical grey area we declined; use those services if you need that specific signal. role_address=true on `admin@`, `info@`, `noreply@`, `support@`, etc. (Gmail-style `+tag` is stripped before classification). free_provider=true on consumer-mailbox domains (B2B detection signal — a 'work' email at `@gmail.com` likely isn't a corporate user). Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {email, domain, syntax_valid, mx_records, disposable, disposable_provider, role_address, role_type, free_provider,

• emailstringrequiredFull email address to verify (e.g. 'admin@example.com', 'user@gmail.com'). Must contain '@'.

Fetch + parse the target domain's robots.txt — sitemaps, per-User-agent allow/disallow rules, crawl-delay, Host directive. Use BEFORE crawling/scraping a target site (seo_audit, brand_assets, redirect_chain) to honour the site's published rules. status_code=404 means no robots.txt exists = implicit allow-all per RFC 9309 §2.4. ContrastAPI fetches with `User-agent: ContrastAPI/<version> (+https://contrastcyber.com/bot)` so site operators can identify + opt out via robots.txt; we honour `Disallow: /` for our UA in seo_audit and brand_assets. Per-target eTLD+1 throttle (60 req/min) prevents weaponising this endpoint against a single site; subdomain rotation collapses to the same bucket. Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {domain, fetched_url, status_code, sitemaps, user_agents:{ua:{allow,disallow,crawl_delay}}, host, truncated, summary}. Returns 502 ErrorResponse if the target rejected the connection (DNS/TCP/TLS failure); the agent should NOT assume "no robots" in that case — it's an upst

• domainstringrequiredRegistrable domain to fetch robots.txt for (e.g. 'example.com', 'github.com'). No scheme, no path, no port. Subdomains accepted; the bot fetches https://<domain>/robots.txt with HTTP fallback.

Walk an HTTP redirect chain hop-by-hop, returning per-hop {url, status_code, location, latency_ms}. Use to deobfuscate URL shorteners (bit.ly / t.co / lnkd.in), audit suspicious links from phishing investigations, or trace marketing tracking redirects. SSRF-guarded: each redirect target's resolved IP is re-validated before connecting (private IPs and non-HTTP schemes rejected). Up to 10 hops; loop_detected=true if a hop would revisit a previously-seen URL (we abort before the duplicate fetch); truncated=true if the chain still had a 30x at hop 10. Per-target eTLD+1 throttle (60 req/min) consumed once for the start host AND once per new host reached — a chain across 11 unrelated domains cannot bypass the cap. Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {start_url, final_url, hops, hop_count, final_status, loop_detected, truncated, summary}. Returns 502 ErrorResponse on hard fetch failure (timeout / TLS / connect); 429 with Retry-After if a hop's eTLD+1 throttle is exceeded mid-chain.

• urlstringrequiredFull URL whose redirect chain to walk, e.g. 'https://bit.ly/3xyz' or 'http://example.com/old-path'. Must start with http:// or https://. Pass the URL exactly as you'd `curl -L` it; the server handles encoding.

Scrape a domain's homepage `<head>` for public brand assets — favicon, og:image, theme-color, og:site_name, JSON-LD `Organization.logo`. Use to enrich CRM records, build company-card UIs, or correlate a lead's site to their visual identity (no manual screenshot required). Strictly homepage-only (path `/`); we do NOT crawl. Ethical floor: target's robots.txt is honoured — `Disallow: /` for ContrastAPI OR `*` returns 403 `error.code = robots_txt_disallow` and we DO NOT fetch. `Cache-Control: no-store` / `private` from the target is respected (response is built but NOT written to our cache; `cache_respected=false` flags this). Per-target eTLD+1 throttle (60 req/min) prevents weaponising via subdomain rotation. All URL fields are absolute and `_untrusted` (DO NOT execute or shell-out — the target controls these strings). Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {domain, fetched_url, status_code, favicon_url_untrusted, og_image_url_untrusted, theme_color, site_name_untrusted, logo_url_untrusted, c

• domainstringrequiredRegistrable domain to scrape brand assets for (e.g. 'github.com', 'stripe.com'). No scheme, no path, no port. The bot fetches https://<domain>/ with HTTP fallback.

One-shot SEO audit of a domain's homepage with a 0-100 composite score + a `missing_signals` list of concrete fixes. Use BEFORE pitching SEO work to a prospect, when triaging a lead's marketing maturity, or as a structured pre-flight before deeper auditing tools (Lighthouse / SEMrush). 10 audit rules each worth 10 pts: title present, title length 30-60 chars (Google SERP truncation window), meta description present, meta description length 50-160, exactly one H1, canonical link, >=3 OG tags, JSON-LD present, image alt-text coverage (proportional), HTTPS. Strictly homepage-only — we do NOT crawl the site. Ethical floor: target's robots.txt is honoured — `Disallow: /` for ContrastAPI OR `*` returns 403 `error.code = robots_txt_disallow` and we DO NOT fetch. `Cache-Control: no-store`/`private` skips our cache write (`cache_respected=false` in the response). Per-target eTLD+1 throttle (60 req/min) prevents weaponising via subdomain rotation. All target-derived strings/lists are `_untrusted

• domainstringrequiredRegistrable domain to audit SEO for (e.g. 'example.com', 'shopify.com'). No scheme, no path, no port. Strictly homepage-only — the bot fetches https://<domain>/ with HTTP fallback and audits that single page (we do NOT crawl).

Validate and analyze phone number: country, region, carrier, line type (mobile/landline/VoIP), timezone, formatted versions. Use to verify phone legitimacy and detect fraud risks. Requires E.164 format (+1234567890). Companion OSINT identity-investigation tools: username_lookup (social-platform handle correlation), email_disposable (throwaway-mail signal on associated email). Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {valid, country, region, carrier, carrier_status, line_type, timezone, formats}. carrier is omitted from the wire when libphonenumber has no mapping for the region (US/CA/GB and other MNP-restricted regions); always read carrier_status — 'known' means carrier is present, 'unsupported_region' means we cannot identify the carrier (do not infer the number lacks one).

• numberstringrequiredPhone number in E.164 format: + followed by country code and number, no spaces or dashes. Examples: '+14155552671' (US), '+905551234567' (TR), '+442071234567' (UK). Wrong: '0555-123-4567', '(415) 555-2671'

Query comprehensive IP intelligence: reverse DNS, ASN + holder name + country inline (RIPE Stat, Phase 1), open ports, hostnames, vulnerabilities (Shodan InternetDB enriched with severity + cvss_v3 from local cve.db — Phase 2 v1.16.0 BREAKING; vulns is now list[VulnInfo] {cve_id, severity, cvss_v3} dicts, pre-1.16 it was list[str] of CVE IDs; unknown CVEs emit severity='UNKNOWN' / cvss_v3=null — do NOT infer benign), cloud provider, Tor exit status, and reputation. cloud_provider uses two-tier detection: published cloud CIDR ranges (AWS/GCP/Cloudflare) first, then an ASN-to-provider fallback map for anycast/public-service IPs outside published ranges (e.g. 8.8.8.8 → AS15169 → 'Google'). Reputation: FireHOL level1 blocklist on Free tier; +AbuseIPDB + Shodan on Pro (Phase 4). Use for IP investigation; for orchestrated IP+reputation use threat_report. Response is null-explicit: every field is always present (cloud_provider=null when neither tier matches; tor_exit=false when not listed or

• ipstringrequiredIPv4 or IPv6 address to investigate (e.g. '8.8.8.8', '2606:4700::1111')

Look up Autonomous System Number (ASN) for a domain or IP: AS number, organization, IPv4/IPv6 prefixes. Use to identify network operator and IP range ownership. Default returns first 50 prefixes per family — set include_full_prefixes=True for full list. Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {asn, asn_name, ipv4_prefixes, ipv6_prefixes, ipv4_count, ipv6_count}.

• targetstringrequiredDomain or IP address to look up ASN for (e.g. 'cloudflare.com', '8.8.8.8')
• include_full_prefixesbooleanReturn the full announced-prefixes list (default: False, returns first 50). ipv4_count and ipv6_count are always honest pre-truncation totals. Set True for network mapping or BGP route audits — Cloudflare AS13335 announces 2500+ prefixes.

Retrieve detailed CVE data by ID: description, CVSS v3.1 + vector, CVSS v2 (always emitted), EPSS score + percentile, CISA KEV status (expanded: due_date, required_action, ransomware flag, vendor_project, product, vulnerability_name, short_description, notes, cwes, date_removed when in_kev=true), NVD vulnerability_status (Analyzed/Modified/Awaiting Analysis/Deferred/Rejected/Withdrawn), cve_tags ('disputed' triggers [DISPUTED] summary prefix), affected products (CPE), references, patch availability, related CVEs. By default affected_products is truncated to the first 20 entries (total_products reports the honest count) and references to the first 10 (total_references reports the honest count). Pass include_affected_products=true and/or include_full_references=true for the complete lists. Pass include_reference_tags=true to receive structured references_full=[{url, tags, source}] (NVD upstream tags + source provenance) — also activates tag-first patch detection. Pass include_severity_br

• cve_idstringrequiredCVE identifier in format CVE-YYYY-NNNNN (e.g. 'CVE-2024-3094', 'CVE-2023-44487')
• include_affected_productsbooleanReturn the full affected_products list (default: False, returns first 20). Set True for bulk audits or dependency scanning of Log4j-class CVEs with 50+ products.
• include_full_referencesbooleanReturn the full references list (default: True, returns all references). total_references is always emitted with the honest count; patch URL detection always runs against the full list, so patch_url/patch_available are unaffected. Set False to truncate to first 10 entries when bandwidth-bound.
• include_reference_tagsbooleanReturn structured references_full field with [{url, tags, source}] objects (NVD reference tags + source provenance) (default: True). Inspects which references are vendor patches (tags=['Patch']) vs exploit PoCs (tags=['Exploit']) vs mailing list discussions. Patch URL detection is tag-first when refs_with_tags is populated; legacy cached rows fall back to regex. Set False to skip the structured shape for legacy clients.
• include_severity_breakdownbooleanReturn severity_sources, severity_consensus, and severity_disagreement (multi-source severity breakdown) (default: True). Surfaces vendor disputes (e.g. CVE-2023-38545 NVD-CRITICAL vs GHSA-HIGH). cvss_v2 and cvss_v2_vector are always emitted (additive non-opt-in). Consensus uses majority-bucket vote with highest-severity tie-break (CRITICAL > HIGH > MEDIUM > LOW > NONE). Set False to skip if downstream cannot tolerate the extra fields.

Composite CVE risk score (0-100) — fuses CVSS, EPSS, KEV, and PoC into a single agent-ready triage signal. Formula: CVSS*0.20 + EPSS*0.35 + KEV*0.30 + PoC*0.15 (each component rescaled to 0-100 before weighting). Multiplicative boosters applied in order: KEV+PoC combo (*1.15), critical-severity-with-high-EPSS (CVSS>=9 AND EPSS>0.7, *1.10), recently published (within last 7 days, *1.05). Final score clamped to [0, 100]. Label bands: CRITICAL>=90, HIGH>=70, MEDIUM>=40, LOW<40. Urgency text encodes patch SLA (immediate when KEV; 24h/72h/30d by label). Use to triage a single CVE without orchestrating cve_lookup + exploit_lookup separately. PoC signal here is the local ExploitDB mirror only — for full multi-source exploit detail (GitHub Advisory + Shodan refs + ExploitDB), call exploit_lookup separately. Methodology adapted from mukul975/cve-mcp-server (Apache-2.0): https://github.com/mukul975/cve-mcp-server. Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {cve_id, score (0-100), label (CRITICAL/HIGH/MED

• cve_idstringrequiredCVE identifier in format CVE-YYYY-NNNNN (e.g. 'CVE-2021-44228', 'CVE-2024-3094')

Parse a CVSS v3.x vector string into a per-metric breakdown plus a recomputed base score. Returns the canonicalized vector, version (3.0 or 3.1), base_score, base_severity (NONE/LOW/MEDIUM/HIGH/CRITICAL), and the eight base metrics: attack_vector (NETWORK/ADJACENT_NETWORK/LOCAL/PHYSICAL), attack_complexity (LOW/HIGH), privileges_required (NONE/LOW/HIGH), user_interaction (NONE/REQUIRED), scope (UNCHANGED/CHANGED), and the three impact metrics confidentiality_impact / integrity_impact / availability_impact (NONE/LOW/HIGH each). When temporal/environmental metrics are explicit in the vector, temporal_score and environmental_score are populated separately. Use to translate raw CVSS strings into agent-friendly attributes without re-parsing the vector grammar yourself, and to verify upstream NVD scoring against the recomputed value. v2 vectors (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/...) are rejected with 400 — read cvss_v2_vector from cve_lookup if you need v2 detail. Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {version, v

• vectorstringrequiredCVSS v3.0 or v3.1 vector string, e.g. 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H'. v2 vectors are rejected — use the cvss_v2_vector field on cve_lookup if you need v2.

Search CVE database with filters: product/vendor, severity, published date range, EPSS score, CWE, CVSS range, CISA KEV status. Default response is SLIM per-result (cve_id, summary, severity, cvss_v3, cwe_id, epss, kev, total_products, published, modified, sources) — pass include='full' for description, cvss_breakdown, affected_products, references, first_seen_*. Verdict (sources_queried, falsifiable_fields, completeness, data_age) is at the response root — applies to the whole batch, not per-row. Product/vendor filters are EXACT NVD-canonical-token matches (not the common name — e.g. nginx is 'nginx_open_source'/'nginx_plus', vendor 'f5'); a low/zero count for a well-known product means the token differs, so for dependency/package lists use check_dependencies and for a domain's whole stack tech_stack_cve_audit (both auto-normalize tokens). Use for vulnerability discovery by criteria; pass cwe_id (e.g. CWE-79) to enumerate every CVE in our database mapped to a weakness — pair with cwe_

• productstringProduct or vendor token to filter by. EXACT match (case-insensitive) against the NVD-canonical CPE product/vendor token — NOT substring/fuzzy, and NOT necessarily the common project name. Common names, vendor renames, and build-tool artifact ids often differ from the canonical token (e.g. modern nginx CVEs are under 'nginx_open_source'/'nginx_plus', vendor 'f5', not 'nginx'; Maven 'log4j-core' maps to 'log4j'). A low or zero count for a well-known product usually means the token differs — do NOT assume coverage is complete. For dependency/package lists prefer check_dependencies, and for a doma
• severitystringCVSS severity level. Must be one of: CRITICAL, HIGH, MEDIUM, LOW. Omit for all severities.
• published_afterstringInclusive lower bound on publish date as YYYY-MM-DD (UTC). Pick this when the user names a starting point, e.g. 'since 2015' → '2015-01-01', 'after March 2024' → '2024-03-01'. Omit to not bound the lower edge. Combine with published_before for ranges.
• published_beforestringInclusive upper bound on publish date as YYYY-MM-DD (UTC). Pick this when the user names an ending point, e.g. 'before 2020' → '2019-12-31', 'up to 2023' → '2023-12-31'. Omit to not bound the upper edge. Combine with published_after for ranges.
• kevbooleanIf true, return only CVEs in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog — these are actively exploited in the wild.
• epss_minnumberMinimum EPSS score filter (0.0-1.0). EPSS predicts exploitation probability. 0.5 = top ~5% most likely to be exploited. 0.0 = no filter.
• sortstringSort order for results. Must be one of: published_desc (newest first), epss_desc (most exploitable first), cvss_desc (most severe first). Omit for newest first (default=published_desc).
• limitintegerMaximum results to return. Range: 1-200.
• offsetintegerSkip N results for pagination. Use with limit to page through results.
• cwe_idstringFilter by CWE weakness ID. Exact match, case-insensitive. Common values: CWE-79 (XSS), CWE-89 (SQL injection), CWE-120 (buffer overflow), CWE-78 (command injection). Format: CWE-<number>. Omit to not filter by CWE.
• cvss_minnumberMinimum CVSS v3 base score (0.0-10.0). Default 0.0 = no filter (sentinel, not applied). Set > 0 to filter — CVEs with null CVSS are excluded when active. Use 7.0 for high+critical, 9.0 for critical only.
• cvss_maxnumberMaximum CVSS v3 base score (0.0-10.0). Default 10.0 = no filter (sentinel, not applied). Set < 10.0 to filter — CVEs with null CVSS are excluded when active. Combine with cvss_min for a range.
• vendorstringFilter by vendor name (case-insensitive). When combined with product, both must match the same CPE row — prevents cross-row false matches. Example: vendor=apache, product=struts.
• includestringPer-result detail level. Default (omit) returns slim list items (cve_id, summary, severity, cvss_v3, cwe_id, epss, kev, total_products, published, modified, sources). Pass 'full' to also return description, cvss_breakdown, affected_products, references, first_seen_source, first_seen_at — only do this when the user explicitly wants drill-down on every result. Even with 'full', per-result affected_products and references may be truncated (the per-result total_products/total_references report the honest counts); use cve_lookup for the guaranteed-complete per-CVE lists. For single-CVE detail prefe

List CVEs indexed from MITRE/GHSA BEFORE NVD publication (early-warning, freshest data). By default each result is slim (no description, no cvss_breakdown, no affected_products list, no references) — pass include='full' for the same payload shape as cve_lookup; for drill-down on a single CVE prefer cve_lookup. Use for threat intelligence on emerging CVEs; use cve_search for published NVD data. Verdict (sources_queried, falsifiable_fields, completeness, data_age) is at the response root — applies to the whole batch, not per-row. Response carries a global hint pointing at cve_lookup — drill into any returned cve_id for full detail and chained pivots (exploit_lookup, kev_detail, cwe_lookup). Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {count, total, truncated, offset, summary, results, next_offset, verdict, hint}.

• limitintegerMaximum results to return. Range: 1-200.
• offsetintegerSkip N results for pagination.
• includestringPer-result detail level. Default ('') returns slim list items (cve_id, summary, severity, cvss_v3, cwe_id, epss, kev, total_products, published, modified, sources). Pass 'full' to also return description, cvss_breakdown, affected_products, references, first_seen_source, first_seen_at. Slim default avoids description/summary duplication that bloats 50-item leading lists. Verdict is at the response root, not per-row (deduplicated for ~40% payload savings). Allowed: '' or 'full'.

Search public exploits/PoC for a specific CVE across three sources: (1) GitHub Advisory Database (sources.github.advisories[]), (2) Shodan CVEDB references (sources.shodan_refs.results[] — packetstorm/seclists/vendor URLs cited by Shodan; results capped at SHODAN_REFS_LIMIT default 200, truncated=true when capped, count is the honest upstream total), (3) ExploitDB CSV mirror (exploits[] array, with edb_id + author + verified flag — these are the actual ExploitDB entries). Use to assess if a vulnerability has weaponized exploits in the wild; run after cve_lookup to evaluate real-world risk. When the CVE is also in CISA KEV (kev.in_kev=true on cve_lookup), pair with kev_detail for federal patch deadline; pair with cwe_lookup on cwe_id for the underlying weakness category and mitigations. Response carries next_calls — single cve_lookup pivot for full context (KEV status, CWE chain, CVSS, EPSS); cve_lookup's own next_calls then surface kev_detail and cwe_lookup automatically (this endpoint

• cve_idstringrequiredCVE identifier in format CVE-YYYY-NNNNN (e.g. 'CVE-2024-3094', 'CVE-2023-44487')

Batch query multiple CVEs (up to 50 per call, same for Free and Pro): retrieve full CVE details for all in 1 request instead of N. By default each CVE's affected_products is truncated to the first 20 entries (total_products reports honest count) and references to the first 10 (total_references reports honest count); pass include_affected_products=true / include_full_references=true to return full lists. Pass include_reference_tags=true to receive references_full=[{url, tags, source}] per CVE in the batch. Pass include_severity_breakdown=true to receive severity_sources/consensus/disagreement per CVE. Use for dependency audits or bulk vulnerability enrichment; use cve_lookup for single CVE. Each successful item carries next_calls — chain with kev_detail (when kev.in_kev=true), cwe_lookup (when cwe_id is present), or exploit_lookup. Free: 30/hr (1 per item), Pro: 500/hr. Returns {results, total, successful, failed, timed_out, partial, summary}.

• cve_idsarrayrequiredList of CVE identifiers in format CVE-YYYY-NNNNN (e.g. ['CVE-2024-3094', 'CVE-2021-44228', 'CVE-2023-44487']). Maximum 50 per request (same cap for Free and Pro).
• include_affected_productsbooleanReturn the full affected_products list for each CVE in the batch (default: False, each CVE returns first 20). Set True for bulk dependency audits.
• include_full_referencesbooleanReturn the full references list for each CVE in the batch (default: True). total_references is always emitted. Set False to truncate each item to first 10 entries when payload-bound.
• include_reference_tagsbooleanReturn structured references_full per CVE in the batch [{url, tags, source}]. Same shape as cve_lookup (default: True). Activates tag-first patch detection per item. Set False for legacy clients.
• include_severity_breakdownbooleanReturn severity_sources/consensus/disagreement per CVE in batch. Same shape as cve_lookup (default: True). cvss_v2 and cvss_v2_vector are always emitted (additive non-opt-in). Set False to skip if downstream cannot tolerate the extra fields.

Look up CISA KEV (Known Exploited Vulnerabilities) full record for a CVE. Returns federal patch deadline (due_date), CISA-specified required_action remediation, known ransomware association, vendor/product, the CISA-given common name (e.g. 'Log4Shell'), CISA-reported CWE list, plus lifecycle metadata: date_updated (when CISA last revised the entry), date_removed (set when CISA removed the CVE from the catalog — null while still active), and updated_at (our DB sync freshness). Returns 404 when the CVE is not in the KEV catalog — use cve_lookup for non-KEV CVEs. Best follow-up after cve_lookup or cve_search(kev=true) when an in_kev=true CVE is identified; chain with cwe_lookup on each returned CWE to investigate the weakness category. Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {cve_id, vendor_project, product, vulnerability_name, date_added, due_date, required_action, known_ransomware_use, notes, cwes, date_updated, date_removed, updated_at, verdict, next_calls}.

• cve_idstringrequiredCVE identifier in format CVE-YYYY-NNNNN (e.g. 'CVE-2021-44228', 'CVE-2024-3094')

Look up MITRE CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration) catalog record from research view 1000. Default response is SLIM (first 3 mitigations, first 3 examples; extended_description is null) — pass include='full' for the verbose record (full mitigations + examples lists, populated extended_description). Returns description, abstract type (Pillar/Class/Base/Variant/Compound), status (Stable/Draft/Incomplete/Deprecated), exploit likelihood, recommended mitigations, observed example CVEs, parent_cwe (walk up the hierarchy), child_cwes (drill down to more specific weaknesses), and cve_count (LOWER BOUND — counts only CVEs whose primary CWE matches; CVEs with multiple CWEs may not be counted). Use after cve_lookup or kev_detail to understand the underlying weakness category; chain with cve_search(cwe_id=...) to enumerate all matching CVEs. Returns 404 when the CWE is not in research view 1000. Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {cwe_id, name, description, extended_description (null on slim, populate

• cwe_idstringrequiredCWE identifier — accepts 'CWE-79', 'cwe-79', or bare '79'. Common values: CWE-79 (XSS), CWE-89 (SQL injection), CWE-78 (command injection), CWE-502 (deserialization), CWE-22 (path traversal), CWE-120 (buffer overflow).
• includestringDetail level. Default ('') returns slim record (first 3 mitigations, first 3 examples; extended_description is null). total_mitigations / total_examples are always honest pre-truncation counts. Pass 'full' to populate extended_description and return the full mitigations + examples lists.

Look up a MITRE ATLAS technique — the AI/ML adversarial attack catalog. ATLAS catalogues TTPs targeting machine learning systems: prompt injection, model evasion, training data poisoning, model theft, etc. Roughly 80% of ATLAS techniques are AI/ML-specific (no ATT&CK bridge); 20% mirror an enterprise ATT&CK technique via attack_reference_id — use that to pivot to D3FEND defenses (d3fend_defense_for_attack) and CVE search. Sub-techniques inherit `tactics` from the parent (inherited_tactics=true flag) when ATLAS upstream leaves them empty. Use this tool when the user asks about AI/ML threats, LLM red-teaming, or adversarial ML; for multiple techniques in one call (e.g. drilling into a case study's techniques_used), prefer bulk_atlas_technique_lookup. Returns 404 when the id is not in the synced ATLAS catalog. Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {technique_id, name, description, tactics, inherited_tactics, maturity (demonstrated|feasible|realized), attack_reference_id, attack_reference_url,

• technique_idstringrequiredMITRE ATLAS technique id, format 'AML.T####' or 'AML.T####.###' for sub-techniques (e.g. 'AML.T0000', 'AML.T0051' LLM Prompt Injection, 'AML.T0000.000').

Bulk ATLAS technique lookup — retrieve full records for up to 50 techniques in a single request instead of N separate atlas_technique_lookup calls. Designed as the natural follow-up to atlas_case_study_lookup, whose techniques_used array can be passed directly. Each item is the same shape as atlas_technique_lookup, including parent-tactics inheritance for sub-techniques (inherited_tactics=true flag) and per-item next_calls (D3FEND bridge when attack_reference_id present, sibling-technique search by tactic, parent lookup for sub-techniques). Free: 30/hr (1 per item), Pro: 500/hr. Returns {results [{technique_id, status (ok|not_found|invalid_format), technique, error}], total, successful, failed, partial, summary}.

• technique_idsarrayrequiredList of MITRE ATLAS technique ids in format 'AML.T####' or 'AML.T####.###' (e.g. ['AML.T0051', 'AML.T0043', 'AML.T0000.000']). Up to 50 per call. Case-insensitive; normalized + de-duplicated server-side. Each id counts as 1 request toward the rate limit.

Search the MITRE ATLAS catalog of AI/ML attack techniques by keyword, tactic, or maturity. Default response is SLIM (description truncated to 240 chars per row); pass include='full' for the verbose record. Pass exclude_id when chaining from atlas_technique_lookup to skip self in sibling-tactic searches. Use this to discover techniques matching a threat-model question, e.g. 'what techniques target LLM serving infrastructure?'. Drill into atlas_technique_lookup with any returned technique_id for the full description, ATT&CK bridge, and pivot hints. For broader cross-referencing: when a result has attack_reference_id, that bridges to D3FEND mitigations via d3fend_defense_for_attack. Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {query (echoed filters), total, results [{technique_id, name, description (truncated by default), tactics, inherited_tactics, maturity, attack_reference_id, subtechnique_of}], next_calls}.

• keywordstringSubstring match against technique name + description (case-insensitive). Min 2 chars. Example: 'prompt injection', 'model evasion', 'poisoning'. Omit to list all.
• tacticstringFilter by ATLAS tactic id, format 'AML.TA####'. Examples: 'AML.TA0002' (Reconnaissance), 'AML.TA0007' (ML Attack Staging). Omit for all tactics.
• maturitystringFilter by maturity: 'demonstrated' (observed in real attacks), 'feasible' (theoretical), or 'realized' (newer ATLAS classification, treat similar to demonstrated). Omit for all.
• limitintegerMax results to return. Range: 1-200.
• includestringDetail level. Default ('') returns slim records (description truncated to 240 chars; drill via atlas_technique_lookup for full text). Pass 'full' for full description on every row — large catalogs (167 techniques) can return ~100KB at full.
• exclude_idstringOptional ATLAS technique id to exclude from results, format 'AML.T####' or 'AML.T####.###'. Useful when chaining from atlas_technique_lookup to fetch siblings without echoing self in the same-tactic search.

Look up a MITRE ATLAS case study — a documented real-world AI/ML attack incident. Each case study links a sequence of ATLAS techniques (techniques_used) to the incident. Default response is SLIM (description truncated to 240 chars); pass include='full' for the verbose narrative. Use this after atlas_technique_search to find which incidents have exercised a given technique. Drill into the full techniques_used array via bulk_atlas_technique_lookup in a single call (next_calls emits exactly that hint). Returns 404 when the id is not in the synced catalog. Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {case_study_id, name, description, techniques_used, next_calls}.

• case_study_idstringrequiredMITRE ATLAS case study id, format 'AML.CS####' (e.g. 'AML.CS0000', 'AML.CS0014').
• includestringDetail level. Default (omit/empty) returns slim (description truncated to 240 chars). Pass 'full' for the verbose narrative — case-study descriptions can run 1-3KB.

Search ATLAS case studies (real-world AI/ML attack incidents) by keyword or referenced technique. Default response is SLIM (description truncated to 240 chars per row); pass include='full' for the verbose summary. Useful when the user has a technique in hand and wants to see incidents that exercised it. Drill via atlas_case_study_lookup for the full procedure list. Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {query, total, results [{case_study_id, name, description (truncated by default), techniques_used}], next_calls}.

• keywordstringSubstring match against case study name + description (case-insensitive). Min 2 chars. Example: 'evasion', 'data poisoning'. Omit to list all.
• technique_idstringFilter to case studies that include this ATLAS technique id, format 'AML.T####' or 'AML.T####.###' (e.g. 'AML.T0051'). Omit for any technique.
• limitintegerMax results to return. Range: 1-200.
• includestringDetail level. Default ('') returns slim records (description truncated to 240 chars). Pass 'full' for full description on every row.

Look up a MITRE D3FEND defense technique. D3FEND is the canonical defensive counterpart to ATT&CK — each defense is classified into one of 7 tactics (Model/Harden/Detect/Isolate/Deceive/Evict/Restore) and may target a specific digital artifact (e.g. 'Access Token'). Response includes attack_techniques: the list of ATT&CK T-codes this defense mitigates. Use after d3fend_defense_search for the full record + ATT&CK chain. Returns 404 when the slug is not in the synced D3FEND catalog. Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {defense_id, label, uri, parent_label, description, tactic, artifact, attack_techniques, next_calls}.

• defense_idstringrequiredD3FEND defense slug from the ontology URI fragment (CamelCase), e.g. 'TokenBinding', 'FileHashing', 'CertificatePinning'.

Search the MITRE D3FEND catalog of defensive techniques by keyword, tactic, or targeted artifact. Default response is SLIM (drops `uri` from each row — saves ~60 chars/row, ~30% on popular drills); pass include='full' for the verbose record. Pass exclude_id when chaining from d3fend_defense_lookup to skip self in sibling-artifact searches. Use to discover defenses applicable to a given threat model — e.g. 'what defenses harden access tokens?' (tactic=Harden + artifact='Access Token'). Drill into d3fend_defense_lookup with any returned defense_id for the ATT&CK technique mappings. Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {query, total, results [{defense_id, label, uri (only when include=full), parent_label, tactic, artifact}], next_calls}.

• keywordstringSubstring match against defense label, description, or parent_label (case-insensitive). Min 2 chars. Example: 'token', 'hashing', 'sandbox'. Omit to list all.
• tacticstringFilter by D3FEND tactic. One of: Model, Harden, Detect, Isolate, Deceive, Evict, Restore. Omit for all tactics.
• artifactstringFilter by exact targeted digital artifact (case-insensitive), e.g. 'Access Token', 'File', 'Process'. Omit for any artifact.
• limitintegerMax results to return. Range: 1-200.
• includestringDetail level. Default (omit/empty) returns slim rows (drops the deterministic ontology `uri` field, ~60 chars/row saved). Pass 'full' to get `uri` back on every row. The slug `defense_id` is always returned and uniquely identifies the defense.
• exclude_idstringOptional D3FEND defense slug (CamelCase, e.g. 'TokenBinding') to omit from results. Useful when chaining from d3fend_defense_lookup so the originating defense is not echoed back in its own siblings list. Omit when not needed.

Reverse lookup: given an ATT&CK T-code, return D3FEND defenses that mitigate it. This is the bridge from offensive intelligence (ATT&CK / ATLAS / CVE) to defensive playbook. Pair with cve_lookup or atlas_technique_lookup output — when those carry an ATT&CK id, call this tool to surface the mitigations. `defenses` is capped at `limit` (default 30) for token efficiency; `total` is the honest pre-truncation count and `truncated=true` flags when the cap was hit. `coverage_by_tactic` always aggregates the FULL set, not the slice. Default response is SLIM (drops `uri` from each row); pass include='full' for the verbose record. Pass exclude_id when drilling from d3fend_defense_lookup to skip self in the 'see also' list. Returns 200 with empty defenses list when the T-code has no D3FEND mapping (the gap is itself a signal). Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {attack_technique_id, total, truncated, defenses [{defense_id, label, uri (only when include=full), parent_label, tactic, artifact, attack

• attack_technique_idstringrequiredATT&CK technique id matching 'T####' or 'T####.###' (e.g. 'T1059', 'T1550.001'). Use this to bridge from CVE/ATLAS findings to D3FEND mitigations.
• limitintegerCap on `defenses` array length. Default 30; popular T-codes (T1059, T1078) map to 30-50+ defenses. `total` and `coverage_by_tactic` always reflect the honest pre-truncation count.
• includestringDetail level. Default (omit/empty) returns slim rows (drops the deterministic ontology `uri` — popular T-codes with 15+ defenses save ~900 chars). Pass 'full' to get `uri` back on every row.
• exclude_idstringOptional D3FEND defense slug to omit from the defenses list. Used when chaining from d3fend_defense_lookup so the originating defense is not echoed back in its own 'see also' results.

Batch coverage breakdown: given a list of ATT&CK T-codes, return distinct defense counts per D3FEND tactic + identify which techniques have NO D3FEND mapping (undefended_techniques). Use to assess the defensive posture of an entire attack campaign or threat model in one call. defended_techniques is the subset with at least one D3FEND defense; undefended_techniques are gaps worth flagging. Pair with cve_search per gap to identify exploit availability. Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {queried_techniques, coverage_by_tactic, defended_techniques, undefended_techniques, next_calls}.

• attack_technique_idsarrayrequiredList of ATT&CK technique ids (T#### or T####.###) to assess. Capped at 500 — extra entries are dropped server-side. Example: ['T1059', 'T1550.001', 'T1190', 'T9999'].

Look up a single Sigma detection rule by UUID from the SigmaHQ corpus (~3,200 rules, refreshed daily at 02:00 UTC). Returns the full rule with title, description, status (stable/test/experimental/deprecated/unsupported), level (informational/low/medium/high/critical), logsource (product/category/service), detection logic, tags (including attack.t#### ATT&CK technique refs and cve.YYYY-#### CVE refs), author, references, and modification date. Use to fetch a known rule for context (e.g., a SIEM detection that fired) or to inspect a rule discovered via REST sigma_rule_search. When a rule tags an ATT&CK technique or CVE, the response next_calls surfaces atlas_technique_lookup / cve_lookup as natural follow-ups. Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {rule, next_calls}.

• rule_idstringrequiredSigma rule UUID (RFC 4122, 36 chars, hyphenated). Example: '195e1b9d-bfc2-4ffa-ab4e-35aef69815f8'. Obtained from the REST sigma_rule_search endpoint or external SIEM correlation.

Bulk Sigma rule lookup — retrieve full records for up to 50 rule UUIDs in a single request instead of N separate sigma_rule_lookup calls. Designed for triage workflows where multiple rule ids are known (e.g., from a SIEM alert batch or a tagged detection bundle). Each item is the same shape as sigma_rule_lookup with status ok/not_found/invalid_format and an error field when applicable. Up to 50 rule ids per call (same cap for Free and Pro). Each rule_id consumes 1 unit of the hourly quota; ids beyond the caller's remaining quota land in skipped_due_to_rate_limit instead of failing the whole batch (parity with bulk_cve/ioc). Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {results [{rule_id, status, rule, error}], total, processed, skipped_due_to_rate_limit, successful, failed, partial, summary, next_calls}.

• rule_idsarrayrequiredList of Sigma rule UUIDs in RFC 4122 format. Up to 50 per call (same cap for Free and Pro). Each rule_id counts as 1 request toward the hourly quota. Per-item validation: invalid-format ids return status='invalid_format', unknown UUIDs return status='not_found' — the whole call does not fail.

Enrich Indicator of Compromise (IP/domain/URL/hash) by auto-detecting type and querying abuse.ch feeds. Per-type source coverage: hash → ThreatFox only (Feodo and URLhaus do not index hashes); IP → ThreatFox + Feodo Tracker + URLhaus; domain / URL → ThreatFox + URLhaus. verdict.sources_queried lists what actually ran; verdict.sources_unavailable lists what failed (timeout / upstream error). Use as primary IOC triage tool when type unknown; use threat_intel for domain-only, hash_lookup for richer MalwareBazaar hash data. Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {indicator, type, threat_level, sources, summary, verdict}.

• indicatorstringrequiredIndicator of Compromise: IP address, domain, full URL, or file hash in MD5/SHA1/SHA256 format (e.g. '8.8.8.8', 'evil.com', 'https://evil.com/malware.exe', 'd41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e')

Query MalwareBazaar for file hash (MD5/SHA1/SHA256): malware family, file type, size, tags, first/last seen, download count. Use to check if file hash is known malware; use ioc_lookup for auto-detection of all IOC types. Companion malware-investigation tools: ioc_lookup (multi-source: ThreatFox + Feodo Tracker + URLhaus), threat_intel (domain-level URLhaus check), exploit_lookup (link a known CVE to PoC code if the hash maps to an exploit binary). Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {found, malware_family, file_type, file_size, tags, first_seen, last_seen, signature}.

• file_hashstringrequiredFile hash to look up. Accepts MD5 (32 chars), SHA-1 (40 chars), or SHA-256 (64 chars). Lowercase hex only, no spaces. Example: 'd41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e'

Check if SHA-1 hash appears in Have I Been Pwned (HIBP) breach dataset using k-anonymity (5-char prefix only, full hash never leaves tool). Use for password breach audits; read-only, no data stored. Companion OSINT investigation tools: hash_lookup (file-hash malware family lookup, different namespace), email_disposable (throwaway-mail signal on associated accounts), username_lookup (social-platform exposure on associated handles). Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {found, count}.

• sha1_hashstringrequiredFull SHA-1 hash of the password as 40 lowercase hexadecimal characters (e.g. '5baa61e4c9b93f3f0682250b6cf8331b7ee68fd8' for 'password')

Query URLhaus for a specific URL and its host. is_malicious is True only when there is ACTIVE evidence — exact URL match with url_status='online' (or unknown) OR host has urls_online > 0. URLhaus retains historical records forever, so a host can have url_count > 0 with urls_online == 0; in that case is_malicious=False, is_stale=True, threat_level='low'. Use for URL-level threat assessment; use threat_intel for domain-level checks. Companion threat-investigation tools: ioc_lookup (multi-source IOC: ThreatFox + URLhaus + Feodo Tracker, auto-detect type), hash_lookup (file-hash malware family, MalwareBazaar), threat_intel (domain-level URLhaus only). Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {url, host, is_malicious, is_stale, urlhaus_host:{found,urls_online,url_count}, urlhaus_url:{found,threat,tags,status}, threat_level, summary}.

• urlstringrequiredFull URL to check, including protocol (e.g. 'https://suspicious-login.com/verify', 'http://evil.com/payload.exe')

Batch query multiple IOCs (IP/domain/URL/hash, up to 50 per call, same for Free and Pro) in 1 request: auto-detects type + queries abuse.ch feeds per-indicator. Per-type source coverage matches ioc_lookup: hash → ThreatFox only; IP → ThreatFox + Feodo + URLhaus; domain / URL → ThreatFox + URLhaus. Each result item carries its own verdict.sources_queried / sources_unavailable so partial failures are visible per indicator. Use for SOC alert triage or batch enrichment; use ioc_lookup for single indicator. Free: 30/hr (1 per item), Pro: 500/hr. Returns {results, total, successful, failed, timed_out, partial, summary}.

• indicatorsarrayrequiredList of indicators of compromise: IP addresses, domains, URLs, or file hashes (e.g. ['8.8.8.8', 'evil.com', 'd41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e']). Maximum 50 per request (same cap for Free and Pro). Each indicator type is auto-detected.

Scan source code (or snippet) for hardcoded secrets — cloud provider keys, API tokens, connection strings, private keys, passwords. Supports Python, JavaScript, TypeScript, Java, Go, Ruby, Shell, Bash. Use to detect leaked credentials before commit; for injection detection use check_injection. Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {total, by_severity, findings}. No data stored. The generic password-assignment rule is suppressed when a more-specific credential rule fires on the same line — one targeted finding per leaked secret, not two.

• codestringrequiredSource code string to scan for secrets (can be a single file or code snippet)
• languagestringProgramming language of the code. Must be one of: python, javascript, typescript, java, go, ruby, shell, bash, generic. Use 'generic' if unsure.

Scan source code for injection vulnerabilities: SQL injection, command injection, path traversal via unsafe string concatenation/unsanitized input. Supports Python, JavaScript, TypeScript, Java, Go, Ruby, Shell, Bash. Use to detect input-handling bugs; for secrets use check_secrets. Companion code-security tools: check_secrets (hard-coded credential detection), check_dependencies (known-CVE vulnerability audit), check_headers (live HTTP security-header validation), scan_headers (live HTTP scan via domain). Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {total, by_severity, findings}. No data stored.

• codestringrequiredSource code string to scan for injection vulnerabilities (can be a single file or code snippet)
• languagestringProgramming language of the code. Must be one of: python, javascript, typescript, java, go, ruby, shell, bash, generic. Use 'generic' if unsure.

Audit project dependencies (npm/PyPI/Maven/RubyGems/etc.) against CVE database: find known vulnerabilities in your package list. Bulk query up to 50 packages per call (same for Free and Pro). Use for dependency security scanning; use cve_lookup for single CVE. Free: 30/hr (1 per package), Pro: 500/hr. Returns {findings, total, by_severity, summary}. Each finding includes fixed_in (first patched version per NVD/MITRE version range) when a version range matched — omitted from wire when the range is open-ended or no input version was supplied; remediation copy then says 'Check if ... is affected ... and upgrade if so' instead of 'Upgrade to X.Y.Z or later'.

• packagesarrayrequiredList of dependency packages to audit. Each item is an object with 'name' (required, max 200 chars, e.g. 'lodash', 'django', 'log4j-core') and optional 'version' (max 100 chars, e.g. '4.17.0', '2.14.1'). Only 'name' and 'version' fields are used; extra fields are ignored. Example: [{"name": "lodash", "version": "4.17.0"}, {"name": "django"}]. Maximum 50 per request (same cap for Free and Pro).

Search for username across 15+ social/dev platforms (GitHub, Reddit, X/Twitter, LinkedIn, Instagram, TikTok, Discord, YouTube, Keybase, HackerOne, etc.). Use for OSINT investigations and identity verification. Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {username, total_found, platforms: [{name, exists, url, status_code}]}.

• usernamestringrequiredUsername string to search across platforms, without @ prefix (e.g. 'torvalds', 'johndoe', 'elonmusk')

Validate HTTP security headers you provide (JSON): CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Permissions-Policy, Referrer-Policy against best practices. Use to test header config before deployment or validate non-public servers; use scan_headers to fetch live. Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. By default header values are truncated to 500 chars; pass include='full' for the full raw value. Returns {total, by_severity, findings}. No external requests.

• headersstringrequiredJSON string of HTTP header name-value pairs to validate. Example: '{"Strict-Transport-Security": "max-age=31536000", "X-Frame-Options": "DENY"}'. Include only security-relevant headers you want to analyze.
• includestringDetail level. Default ('') returns slim findings — raw header values capped at 500 chars with total_value_length carrying the honest pre-truncation length. Pass 'full' to restore the full raw value. Allowed: '' or 'full'.