
Ai Security Hardening
- 76 installs
- 44 repo stars
- Updated May 22, 2026
- bagelhole/devops-security-agent-skills
ai-security-hardening is a Claude skill that hardens LLM deployments against prompt injection, data exfiltration, model theft, and supply-chain attacks.
About
ai-security-hardening is a skill that secures LLM and AI systems against prompt injection, jailbreaks, data leakage, and supply-chain threats in production. A developer uses it when deploying an LLM app handling sensitive data or pursuing SOC 2 or ISO 27001 compliance. It provides an AI threat model, injection-detection code, NeMo Guardrails config, PII scrubbing, and rate-limited API security.
- Hardens LLM deployments against prompt injection and data exfiltration
- Adds input validation, output PII scrubbing, and content moderation
- Secures model API endpoints against theft and abuse
Ai Security Hardening by the numbers
- 76 all-time installs (skills.sh)
- Ranked #1,143 of 2,203 Security skills by installs in the Skillselion catalog
- Data as of Jul 28, 2026 (Skillselion catalog sync)
ai-security-hardening capabilities & compatibility
- Capabilities
- llm hardening · prompt injection defense · pii scrubbing · security audit
- Works with
- openai
- Use cases
- security audit
- Pricing
- Free
What ai-security-hardening says it does
Secure LLM and AI systems against prompt injection, jailbreaks, data leakage, and supply chain threats in production environments.
Remove PII from LLM output before returning to user.
Achieving SOC2 or ISO 27001 compliance for AI systems
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| Installs | 76 |
|---|---|
| repo stars | ★ 44 |
| Last updated | May 22, 2026 |
| Repository | bagelhole/devops-security-agent-skills ↗ |
What it does
Harden LLM deployments against prompt injection, data leakage, model theft, and supply-chain attacks in production.
Who is it for?
Teams deploying LLM apps that handle sensitive user data or need SOC 2 / ISO 27001 compliance.
Skip if: Agent-specific tool-abuse and multi-tenant leakage concerns, which ai-agent-security covers in more depth.
When should I use this skill?
You are deploying an LLM app with sensitive data, adding output filtering, or securing model API endpoints.
What you get
LLM inputs are validated, outputs are PII-scrubbed and moderated, and API endpoints are rate-limited and access-controlled.
- Prompt-injection detection and sanitization
- NeMo Guardrails config
- PII scrubbing and rate-limited API endpoints
By the numbers
- Injection detector ships 10 pattern rules
- Threat model table covers 7 AI-specific threats
- Scrubs 8 PII entity types including US_SSN and CREDIT_CARD
Files
AI Security Hardening
Secure LLM and AI systems against prompt injection, jailbreaks, data leakage, and supply chain threats in production environments.
When to Use This Skill
Use this skill when:
- Deploying an LLM-powered application handling sensitive user data
- Protecting against prompt injection attacks in AI agents
- Implementing output filtering and content moderation
- Securing model weights and API endpoints from theft
- Achieving SOC2 or ISO 27001 compliance for AI systems
AI-Specific Threat Model
Threat Risk Control
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Prompt injection System prompt override Input sanitization, separate context
Data exfiltration PII in model outputs Output filtering, DLP scanning
Jailbreaking Policy bypass Content moderation, guardrails
Model theft Weight extraction via API Rate limiting, access controls
Training data poisoning Backdoored fine-tuned model Dataset validation, provenance
Supply chain attack Malicious model weights Signature verification, scanning
Insecure output XSS/SQLi from LLM response Output encoding, parameterized queriesPrompt Injection Defense
import re
from typing import Optional
INJECTION_PATTERNS = [
r"ignore\s+(all\s+)?(previous|prior|above)\s+instructions",
r"you\s+are\s+now\s+",
r"new\s+instructions?:",
r"system\s+prompt",
r"forget\s+everything",
r"act\s+as\s+",
r"jailbreak",
r"dan\s+mode",
r"<\s*system\s*>",
r"\[INST\]",
]
def detect_prompt_injection(user_input: str) -> tuple[bool, Optional[str]]:
"""Return (is_suspicious, matched_pattern)."""
normalized = user_input.lower().strip()
for pattern in INJECTION_PATTERNS:
if re.search(pattern, normalized, re.IGNORECASE):
return True, pattern
return False, None
def sanitize_user_input(user_input: str, max_length: int = 4000) -> str:
"""Sanitize input before passing to LLM."""
# Truncate
user_input = user_input[:max_length]
# Remove null bytes and control characters
user_input = re.sub(r'[\x00-\x08\x0b\x0c\x0e-\x1f\x7f]', '', user_input)
# Check for injection
suspicious, pattern = detect_prompt_injection(user_input)
if suspicious:
raise ValueError(f"Potential prompt injection detected: {pattern}")
return user_inputGuardrails with NeMo Guardrails
# guardrails.yaml
from nemoguardrails import RailsConfig, LLMRails
config = RailsConfig.from_path("./guardrails-config")
rails = LLMRails(config)
async def safe_llm_call(user_message: str) -> str:
response = await rails.generate_async(
messages=[{"role": "user", "content": user_message}]
)
return response["content"]# guardrails-config/config.yml
models:
- type: main
engine: openai
model: gpt-4o-mini
rails:
input:
flows:
- check jailbreak
- check sensitive data
output:
flows:
- check output for PII
- check output for harmful contentOutput Filtering & PII Scrubbing
import re
from presidio_analyzer import AnalyzerEngine
from presidio_anonymizer import AnonymizerEngine
analyzer = AnalyzerEngine()
anonymizer = AnonymizerEngine()
PII_ENTITIES = ["PERSON", "EMAIL_ADDRESS", "PHONE_NUMBER", "CREDIT_CARD",
"US_SSN", "IBAN_CODE", "IP_ADDRESS", "LOCATION"]
def scrub_pii_from_output(text: str) -> str:
"""Remove PII from LLM output before returning to user."""
results = analyzer.analyze(text=text, entities=PII_ENTITIES, language="en")
if not results:
return text
anonymized = anonymizer.anonymize(text=text, analyzer_results=results)
return anonymized.text
def validate_output_safety(output: str) -> bool:
"""Check output doesn't contain prompt injection artifacts."""
dangerous_patterns = [
r"<\s*script\s*>", # XSS
r"javascript:", # XSS
r";\s*(DROP|DELETE|INSERT)",# SQLi
r"\$\{.*\}", # template injection
r"`.*`", # command injection in some contexts
]
for pattern in dangerous_patterns:
if re.search(pattern, output, re.IGNORECASE):
return False
return TrueAPI Security for LLM Endpoints
from fastapi import FastAPI, HTTPException, Depends, Request
from fastapi.security import HTTPBearer, HTTPAuthorizationCredentials
import jwt
import time
from collections import defaultdict
app = FastAPI()
security = HTTPBearer()
# Rate limiting (per API key)
request_counts = defaultdict(list)
def rate_limit(api_key: str, max_requests: int = 100, window_seconds: int = 60):
now = time.time()
requests = request_counts[api_key]
# Remove old requests outside window
request_counts[api_key] = [t for t in requests if now - t < window_seconds]
if len(request_counts[api_key]) >= max_requests:
raise HTTPException(status_code=429, detail="Rate limit exceeded")
request_counts[api_key].append(now)
async def verify_token(
credentials: HTTPAuthorizationCredentials = Depends(security)
) -> dict:
try:
payload = jwt.decode(credentials.credentials, SECRET_KEY, algorithms=["HS256"])
rate_limit(payload["sub"])
return payload
except jwt.ExpiredSignatureError:
raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Token expired")
except jwt.InvalidTokenError:
raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Invalid token")
@app.post("/v1/chat/completions")
async def chat(request: Request, token: dict = Depends(verify_token)):
body = await request.json()
# Input validation
user_msg = body.get("messages", [{}])[-1].get("content", "")
try:
safe_input = sanitize_user_input(user_msg)
except ValueError as e:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(e))
# Call LLM and scrub output
response = await call_llm(safe_input, token["scope"])
response["choices"][0]["message"]["content"] = scrub_pii_from_output(
response["choices"][0]["message"]["content"]
)
return responseModel Weight Security
# Verify model weights with SHA-256 hash before loading
MODEL_DIR="./models/llama-3.1-8b"
EXPECTED_HASH="sha256:abc123..."
# Generate hash of downloaded model
actual_hash=$(find "$MODEL_DIR" -name "*.safetensors" | sort | xargs sha256sum | sha256sum)
echo "Model hash: $actual_hash"
# Compare (automate in CI/CD)
if [ "$actual_hash" != "$EXPECTED_HASH" ]; then
echo "ERROR: Model hash mismatch — possible tampering!"
exit 1
fi
# Scan model files for embedded malware (ModelScan)
pip install modelscan
modelscan scan -p "$MODEL_DIR"Network Isolation for AI Services
# Kubernetes NetworkPolicy — isolate LLM API
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: llm-api-isolation
namespace: ai-services
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app: vllm
policyTypes:
- Ingress
- Egress
ingress:
- from:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
name: backend # only backend can call LLM
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 8000
egress:
- to:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
name: monitoring # metrics only
ports:
- protocol: TCP
port: 9090
# Block egress to internet — prevent data exfiltration
# (allow only internal cluster traffic)Audit Logging
import structlog
from datetime import datetime, timezone
audit_log = structlog.get_logger("ai.audit")
def log_llm_interaction(
user_id: str,
session_id: str,
model: str,
prompt_tokens: int,
completion_tokens: int,
was_filtered: bool,
injection_detected: bool,
):
audit_log.info(
"llm_interaction",
timestamp=datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
user_id=user_id,
session_id=session_id,
model=model,
prompt_tokens=prompt_tokens,
completion_tokens=completion_tokens,
was_filtered=was_filtered,
injection_detected=injection_detected,
# DO NOT log prompt/completion content — PII risk
)Common Issues
| Issue | Cause | Fix |
|---|---|---|
| False positive injection blocks | Overly broad regex | Tune patterns; use ML-based classifier for high-traffic |
| PII in model outputs | Model trained on PII data | Add Presidio scrubbing to output layer |
| API key leakage | Keys in logs or responses | Mask keys in logging; use vault for key storage |
| Model weight tampering | Unverified downloads | Always verify SHA-256; use modelscan |
| Rate limit bypass | Per-IP not per-user | Rate limit on authenticated user ID, not IP |
Best Practices
- Never log raw prompts or completions — they may contain PII or sensitive data.
- Treat LLM output as untrusted input — always encode before rendering in HTML.
- Use network policies to prevent LLM pods from making outbound internet calls.
- Rotate API keys quarterly; use short-lived JWT tokens for service-to-service auth.
- Run
modelscanon any model downloaded from the internet before serving.
Related Skills
- hashicorp-vault - Secrets management for API keys
- network-security - Network-level controls
- linux-hardening - Host hardening
- agent-observability - AI audit logging
- llm-gateway - Centralized access control
Related skills
FAQ
How does it scrub PII?
It uses Presidio analyzer and anonymizer to detect and remove entities like PERSON, EMAIL_ADDRESS, CREDIT_CARD, and US_SSN from LLM output.
What threats does its model cover?
Prompt injection, data exfiltration, jailbreaking, model theft, training-data poisoning, supply-chain attack, and insecure output handling.