Now liveThe Skillselion MCP - thousands of ranked skills, loaded into your agent mid-task. No install.Get it →
bagelhole avatar

Ai Security Hardening

  • 76 installs
  • 44 repo stars
  • Updated May 22, 2026
  • bagelhole/devops-security-agent-skills

ai-security-hardening is a Claude skill that hardens LLM deployments against prompt injection, data exfiltration, model theft, and supply-chain attacks.

About

ai-security-hardening is a skill that secures LLM and AI systems against prompt injection, jailbreaks, data leakage, and supply-chain threats in production. A developer uses it when deploying an LLM app handling sensitive data or pursuing SOC 2 or ISO 27001 compliance. It provides an AI threat model, injection-detection code, NeMo Guardrails config, PII scrubbing, and rate-limited API security.

  • Hardens LLM deployments against prompt injection and data exfiltration
  • Adds input validation, output PII scrubbing, and content moderation
  • Secures model API endpoints against theft and abuse

Ai Security Hardening by the numbers

  • 76 all-time installs (skills.sh)
  • Ranked #1,143 of 2,203 Security skills by installs in the Skillselion catalog
  • Data as of Jul 28, 2026 (Skillselion catalog sync)
At a glance

ai-security-hardening capabilities & compatibility

Capabilities
llm hardening · prompt injection defense · pii scrubbing · security audit
Works with
openai
Use cases
security audit
Pricing
Free
From the docs

What ai-security-hardening says it does

Secure LLM and AI systems against prompt injection, jailbreaks, data leakage, and supply chain threats in production environments.
SKILL.md
Remove PII from LLM output before returning to user.
SKILL.md
Achieving SOC2 or ISO 27001 compliance for AI systems
SKILL.md
npx skills add https://github.com/bagelhole/devops-security-agent-skills --skill ai-security-hardening

Add your badge

Show developers this skill is listed on Skillselion. Paste this into your README.

Listed on Skillselion
Installs76
repo stars44
Last updatedMay 22, 2026
Repositorybagelhole/devops-security-agent-skills

What it does

Harden LLM deployments against prompt injection, data leakage, model theft, and supply-chain attacks in production.

Who is it for?

Teams deploying LLM apps that handle sensitive user data or need SOC 2 / ISO 27001 compliance.

Skip if: Agent-specific tool-abuse and multi-tenant leakage concerns, which ai-agent-security covers in more depth.

When should I use this skill?

You are deploying an LLM app with sensitive data, adding output filtering, or securing model API endpoints.

What you get

LLM inputs are validated, outputs are PII-scrubbed and moderated, and API endpoints are rate-limited and access-controlled.

  • Prompt-injection detection and sanitization
  • NeMo Guardrails config
  • PII scrubbing and rate-limited API endpoints

By the numbers

  • Injection detector ships 10 pattern rules
  • Threat model table covers 7 AI-specific threats
  • Scrubs 8 PII entity types including US_SSN and CREDIT_CARD

Files

SKILL.mdMarkdownGitHub ↗

AI Security Hardening

Secure LLM and AI systems against prompt injection, jailbreaks, data leakage, and supply chain threats in production environments.

When to Use This Skill

Use this skill when:

  • Deploying an LLM-powered application handling sensitive user data
  • Protecting against prompt injection attacks in AI agents
  • Implementing output filtering and content moderation
  • Securing model weights and API endpoints from theft
  • Achieving SOC2 or ISO 27001 compliance for AI systems

AI-Specific Threat Model

Threat                    Risk                          Control
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Prompt injection          System prompt override         Input sanitization, separate context
Data exfiltration         PII in model outputs           Output filtering, DLP scanning
Jailbreaking             Policy bypass                  Content moderation, guardrails
Model theft               Weight extraction via API      Rate limiting, access controls
Training data poisoning   Backdoored fine-tuned model    Dataset validation, provenance
Supply chain attack       Malicious model weights        Signature verification, scanning
Insecure output           XSS/SQLi from LLM response     Output encoding, parameterized queries

Prompt Injection Defense

import re
from typing import Optional

INJECTION_PATTERNS = [
    r"ignore\s+(all\s+)?(previous|prior|above)\s+instructions",
    r"you\s+are\s+now\s+",
    r"new\s+instructions?:",
    r"system\s+prompt",
    r"forget\s+everything",
    r"act\s+as\s+",
    r"jailbreak",
    r"dan\s+mode",
    r"<\s*system\s*>",
    r"\[INST\]",
]

def detect_prompt_injection(user_input: str) -> tuple[bool, Optional[str]]:
    """Return (is_suspicious, matched_pattern)."""
    normalized = user_input.lower().strip()
    for pattern in INJECTION_PATTERNS:
        if re.search(pattern, normalized, re.IGNORECASE):
            return True, pattern
    return False, None

def sanitize_user_input(user_input: str, max_length: int = 4000) -> str:
    """Sanitize input before passing to LLM."""
    # Truncate
    user_input = user_input[:max_length]

    # Remove null bytes and control characters
    user_input = re.sub(r'[\x00-\x08\x0b\x0c\x0e-\x1f\x7f]', '', user_input)

    # Check for injection
    suspicious, pattern = detect_prompt_injection(user_input)
    if suspicious:
        raise ValueError(f"Potential prompt injection detected: {pattern}")

    return user_input

Guardrails with NeMo Guardrails

# guardrails.yaml
from nemoguardrails import RailsConfig, LLMRails

config = RailsConfig.from_path("./guardrails-config")
rails = LLMRails(config)

async def safe_llm_call(user_message: str) -> str:
    response = await rails.generate_async(
        messages=[{"role": "user", "content": user_message}]
    )
    return response["content"]
# guardrails-config/config.yml
models:
  - type: main
    engine: openai
    model: gpt-4o-mini

rails:
  input:
    flows:
      - check jailbreak
      - check sensitive data
  output:
    flows:
      - check output for PII
      - check output for harmful content

Output Filtering & PII Scrubbing

import re
from presidio_analyzer import AnalyzerEngine
from presidio_anonymizer import AnonymizerEngine

analyzer = AnalyzerEngine()
anonymizer = AnonymizerEngine()

PII_ENTITIES = ["PERSON", "EMAIL_ADDRESS", "PHONE_NUMBER", "CREDIT_CARD",
                "US_SSN", "IBAN_CODE", "IP_ADDRESS", "LOCATION"]

def scrub_pii_from_output(text: str) -> str:
    """Remove PII from LLM output before returning to user."""
    results = analyzer.analyze(text=text, entities=PII_ENTITIES, language="en")
    if not results:
        return text
    anonymized = anonymizer.anonymize(text=text, analyzer_results=results)
    return anonymized.text

def validate_output_safety(output: str) -> bool:
    """Check output doesn't contain prompt injection artifacts."""
    dangerous_patterns = [
        r"<\s*script\s*>",         # XSS
        r"javascript:",             # XSS
        r";\s*(DROP|DELETE|INSERT)",# SQLi
        r"\$\{.*\}",               # template injection
        r"`.*`",                   # command injection in some contexts
    ]
    for pattern in dangerous_patterns:
        if re.search(pattern, output, re.IGNORECASE):
            return False
    return True

API Security for LLM Endpoints

from fastapi import FastAPI, HTTPException, Depends, Request
from fastapi.security import HTTPBearer, HTTPAuthorizationCredentials
import jwt
import time
from collections import defaultdict

app = FastAPI()
security = HTTPBearer()

# Rate limiting (per API key)
request_counts = defaultdict(list)

def rate_limit(api_key: str, max_requests: int = 100, window_seconds: int = 60):
    now = time.time()
    requests = request_counts[api_key]
    # Remove old requests outside window
    request_counts[api_key] = [t for t in requests if now - t < window_seconds]
    if len(request_counts[api_key]) >= max_requests:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=429, detail="Rate limit exceeded")
    request_counts[api_key].append(now)

async def verify_token(
    credentials: HTTPAuthorizationCredentials = Depends(security)
) -> dict:
    try:
        payload = jwt.decode(credentials.credentials, SECRET_KEY, algorithms=["HS256"])
        rate_limit(payload["sub"])
        return payload
    except jwt.ExpiredSignatureError:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Token expired")
    except jwt.InvalidTokenError:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Invalid token")

@app.post("/v1/chat/completions")
async def chat(request: Request, token: dict = Depends(verify_token)):
    body = await request.json()

    # Input validation
    user_msg = body.get("messages", [{}])[-1].get("content", "")
    try:
        safe_input = sanitize_user_input(user_msg)
    except ValueError as e:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(e))

    # Call LLM and scrub output
    response = await call_llm(safe_input, token["scope"])
    response["choices"][0]["message"]["content"] = scrub_pii_from_output(
        response["choices"][0]["message"]["content"]
    )
    return response

Model Weight Security

# Verify model weights with SHA-256 hash before loading
MODEL_DIR="./models/llama-3.1-8b"
EXPECTED_HASH="sha256:abc123..."

# Generate hash of downloaded model
actual_hash=$(find "$MODEL_DIR" -name "*.safetensors" | sort | xargs sha256sum | sha256sum)
echo "Model hash: $actual_hash"

# Compare (automate in CI/CD)
if [ "$actual_hash" != "$EXPECTED_HASH" ]; then
  echo "ERROR: Model hash mismatch — possible tampering!"
  exit 1
fi

# Scan model files for embedded malware (ModelScan)
pip install modelscan
modelscan scan -p "$MODEL_DIR"

Network Isolation for AI Services

# Kubernetes NetworkPolicy — isolate LLM API
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
  name: llm-api-isolation
  namespace: ai-services
spec:
  podSelector:
    matchLabels:
      app: vllm
  policyTypes:
  - Ingress
  - Egress
  ingress:
  - from:
    - namespaceSelector:
        matchLabels:
          name: backend           # only backend can call LLM
    ports:
    - protocol: TCP
      port: 8000
  egress:
  - to:
    - namespaceSelector:
        matchLabels:
          name: monitoring        # metrics only
    ports:
    - protocol: TCP
      port: 9090
  # Block egress to internet — prevent data exfiltration
  # (allow only internal cluster traffic)

Audit Logging

import structlog
from datetime import datetime, timezone

audit_log = structlog.get_logger("ai.audit")

def log_llm_interaction(
    user_id: str,
    session_id: str,
    model: str,
    prompt_tokens: int,
    completion_tokens: int,
    was_filtered: bool,
    injection_detected: bool,
):
    audit_log.info(
        "llm_interaction",
        timestamp=datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
        user_id=user_id,
        session_id=session_id,
        model=model,
        prompt_tokens=prompt_tokens,
        completion_tokens=completion_tokens,
        was_filtered=was_filtered,
        injection_detected=injection_detected,
        # DO NOT log prompt/completion content — PII risk
    )

Common Issues

IssueCauseFix
False positive injection blocksOverly broad regexTune patterns; use ML-based classifier for high-traffic
PII in model outputsModel trained on PII dataAdd Presidio scrubbing to output layer
API key leakageKeys in logs or responsesMask keys in logging; use vault for key storage
Model weight tamperingUnverified downloadsAlways verify SHA-256; use modelscan
Rate limit bypassPer-IP not per-userRate limit on authenticated user ID, not IP

Best Practices

  • Never log raw prompts or completions — they may contain PII or sensitive data.
  • Treat LLM output as untrusted input — always encode before rendering in HTML.
  • Use network policies to prevent LLM pods from making outbound internet calls.
  • Rotate API keys quarterly; use short-lived JWT tokens for service-to-service auth.
  • Run modelscan on any model downloaded from the internet before serving.

Related Skills

  • hashicorp-vault - Secrets management for API keys
  • network-security - Network-level controls
  • linux-hardening - Host hardening
  • agent-observability - AI audit logging
  • llm-gateway - Centralized access control

Related skills

FAQ

How does it scrub PII?

It uses Presidio analyzer and anonymizer to detect and remove entities like PERSON, EMAIL_ADDRESS, CREDIT_CARD, and US_SSN from LLM output.

What threats does its model cover?

Prompt injection, data exfiltration, jailbreaking, model theft, training-data poisoning, supply-chain attack, and insecure output handling.

Securityappseccompliance

This week in AI coding

Five minutes, every Monday - the tools, releases and tactics for developers.

unsubscribe anytime.