
Aml Compliance
- 29 installs
- 7 repo stars
- Updated May 20, 2026
- daemon-blockint-tech/agentic-enteprises-skill
Design a risk-based AML program: KYC/CDD/EDD, sanctions and PEP screening, transaction-monitoring scenarios, SAR narratives, and exam readiness.
About
Guides risk-based AML/CFT programs covering KYC/CDD/EDD, sanctions and PEP screening, transaction monitoring, SAR narratives, and exam readiness. A developer or analyst uses it when designing or maturing an anti-money-laundering compliance program.
- Risk-based program with three lines of defense and inherent/residual risk
- Covers KYC, CDD, EDD, PEP/sanctions screening, and transaction monitoring
Aml Compliance by the numbers
- 29 all-time installs (skills.sh)
- Ranked #667 of 1,106 Finance & Trading skills by installs in the Skillselion catalog
- Data as of Jul 29, 2026 (Skillselion catalog sync)
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| Installs | 29 |
|---|---|
| repo stars | ★ 7 |
| Last updated | May 20, 2026 |
| Repository | daemon-blockint-tech/agentic-enteprises-skill ↗ |
What it does
Design a risk-based AML program: KYC/CDD/EDD, sanctions and PEP screening, transaction-monitoring scenarios, SAR narratives, and exam readiness.
Files
AML / Compliance
When to Use
- Design or mature a risk-based AML/CFT program (policies, roles, three lines of defense)
- Scope and execute KYC, CDD, EDD, periodic refresh, and PEP/sanctions screening workflows
- Conduct AML risk assessment (customer, product, channel, geography) and map controls
- Define transaction monitoring scenarios, thresholds, alert triage, and escalation paths
- Draft SAR/STR narrative structure, supporting facts, and internal escalation (not filing legal advice)
- Plan recordkeeping, audit trails, and exam readiness (requests, walkthroughs, sampling)
- Map obligations at a high level to FATF Recommendations, BSA/USA PATRIOT concepts, EU AMLD/AMLA, UK MLR
- Address crypto/virtual asset AML, blockchain analytics touchpoints, and travel rule operational design
- Support correspondent banking and wire due diligence, MLRO and board reporting packs
- Scope training, independent testing, and AML analytics model validation (conceptual)
When NOT to Use
- Implement SOC 2, ISO 27001, HIPAA, or PCI technical controls and evidence automation only →
compliance-engineer - Cloud shared-responsibility, FedRAMP/PCI-in-cloud evidence packages →
cloud-compliance-specialist - GRC program charter without AML/financial-crime lens →
compliance-specialist - Legal advice, regulatory interpretation as counsel, contract redlines, or DPA negotiation →
commercial-counsel - Internal/IT audit workpapers, COSO walkthroughs, ITGC testing without AML program focus →
auditor - Cloud billing, tagging, and FinOps cost optimization →
finops-analyst - Build SIEM rules, IdP, or TM software implementation (primary) →
information-security-engineer - On-chain investigation for law enforcement or victim tracing narratives → blockint /
on-chain-investigator-agentskills - Sanctions oracle/API integration engineering only →
chainalysis-sanctions-screening(pointer), then route AML context here
Related skills
| Need | Skill |
|---|---|
| Technical SOC/ISO evidence, CCM, control automation | compliance-engineer |
| Cloud framework evidence, residency, CSPM mapping | cloud-compliance-specialist |
| GRC scope, gap plans, vendor questionnaires (non-AML) | compliance-specialist |
| Contracts, DPAs, regulatory interpretation as counsel | commercial-counsel |
| IT audit testing, workpapers, ITGC/SOX-adjacent | auditor |
| Cloud spend analysis and allocation | finops-analyst |
| SIEM/EDR deployment, logging architecture | information-security-engineer |
| Enterprise security strategy (non-AML primary) | cybersecurity |
| Security risk registers and treatment | security-risk-analyst |
| Cyber threat intel briefs and IOC packages | cti-analyst |
| Blockchain investigation and tracing reports | on-chain-investigator-agent, solana-tracing-specialist |
| Public sanctions API/oracle (engineering pointer) | chainalysis-sanctions-screening |
| FATF glossary definitions (authoritative terms) | fatf-glossary-reference |
| Address/transaction screening UI concepts | address-screening-workflow-concepts, transaction-screening-workflow-concepts |
| Behavioral monitoring heuristics (educational) | behavioral-risk-screening-concepts |
Core Workflows
1. Program scoping and risk assessment
1. Inventory legal entities, licenses, products, channels, and geographies 2. Document inherent risk by customer type, product, delivery channel, and geography 3. Define residual risk after controls; align appetite with board 4. Prioritize gaps with owners, due dates, and evidence of remediation 5. Refresh on trigger events (new product, corridor, enforcement action, exam finding)
See `references/aml_compliance_scope.md` and `references/risk_assessment_and_program_governance.md`.
2. Customer due diligence and screening
1. Tier customers (retail, SME, corporate, PEP, correspondent, VASP) 2. Apply CDD vs EDD triggers; define refresh cadence and event-driven reviews 3. Run PEP, sanctions, and adverse media with match disposition and audit trail 4. Document beneficial ownership and control persons where required 5. Escalate true matches and inconclusive cases per policy—not ad hoc overrides
See `references/kyc_cdd_and_screening.md`.
3. Transaction monitoring and alert operations
1. Map scenarios to risks (structuring, rapid movement, high-risk geography, mule patterns) 2. Calibrate thresholds using labeled data and analyst feedback loops 3. Define alert triage queues, SLAs, investigation steps, and closure codes 4. Separate AML alerts from fraud/chargeback where systems differ 5. Track false positive burden and tune with documented approvals
See `references/transaction_monitoring_and_alerts.md`.
4. Suspicious activity reporting and records
1. Decide escalation threshold for SAR/STR consideration (internal policy) 2. Assemble narrative structure: who, what, when, where, why suspicious, amounts, accounts 3. Maintain supporting documentation index; restrict need-to-know 4. Do not advise whether to file, legal sufficiency, or regulator strategy—escalate to MLRO/counsel 5. Retain records per jurisdictional schedule; protect confidentiality
See `references/sar_str_reporting_and_records.md`.
5. Crypto, travel rule, and examinations
1. Classify virtual asset activities (custody, exchange, transfer, staking) in risk assessment 2. Integrate blockchain analytics as decision support with documented limitations 3. Design travel rule counterparty data exchange and exception handling 4. Prepare exam readiness: org chart, policies, risk assessment, sample populations, tuning logs 5. Coordinate independent test and model validation scope for AML models
See `references/crypto_travel_rule_and_exam_readiness.md`.
When to load references
| Topic | Reference |
|---|---|
| Mission, boundaries, handoffs | references/aml_compliance_scope.md |
| KYC, CDD, EDD, screening | references/kyc_cdd_and_screening.md |
| Risk assessment, MLRO, governance | references/risk_assessment_and_program_governance.md |
| TM scenarios, tuning, triage | references/transaction_monitoring_and_alerts.md |
| SAR/STR narratives, recordkeeping | references/sar_str_reporting_and_records.md |
| Crypto AML, travel rule, exams | references/crypto_travel_rule_and_exam_readiness.md |
Operating principles
- Risk-based — proportion controls to documented inherent and residual risk
- Audit trail — decisions, overrides, and dispositions retrievable with actor and timestamp
- No legal conclusions — provide fact packs and draft structures; MLRO/counsel decide filings
- Separate roles — first line owns customers; second line AML compliance; third line audit
- Tune with governance — threshold changes versioned, approved, and back-tested where possible
- Label uncertainty — screening and blockchain analytics are heuristic; document confidence
AML compliance scope
Table of contents
1. Mission 2. In scope 3. Out of scope 4. Handoffs 5. Operating principles 6. Deliverable patterns
Mission
Support AML, counter-financing of terrorism (CFT), and financial-crime compliance program design and operations: risk-based policies, customer due diligence, screening, transaction monitoring, suspicious activity workflows, governance, and exam readiness. Optimize for defensible documentation, proportionate controls, and clear escalation—not for building TM platforms, attesting ISO/SOC controls, or substituting legal counsel.
In scope
| Domain | Examples |
|---|---|
| Program design | AML/CFT policy stack, roles (MLRO, BSA officer analogues), three lines of defense |
| Risk assessment | Enterprise and business-line AML risk assessment; customer/product/channel/geography factors |
| CDD/KYC | Onboarding tiers, periodic refresh, EDD triggers, beneficial ownership |
| Screening | PEP, sanctions, adverse media; match disposition; list management concepts |
| Transaction monitoring | Scenario design, thresholds, alert triage, investigation playbooks |
| Reporting | SAR/STR narrative structure, internal escalation, record retention (not filing advice) |
| Governance | Board/MLRO reporting, metrics, issues and exceptions, training cadence |
| Framework mapping | FATF Recommendations (high level), BSA/USA PATRIOT concepts, EU AMLD/AMLA, UK MLR |
| Correspondent banking | Due diligence, payable-through, nested accounts, wire due diligence |
| Crypto / VA | VASP risk, blockchain analytics touchpoints, travel rule operations |
| Assurance | Independent testing scope, AML model validation concepts, exam request prep |
Out of scope
| Topic | Route to |
|---|---|
| SOC 2 / ISO 27001 / HIPAA technical control implementation | compliance-engineer |
| Cloud CSPM evidence, FedRAMP/PCI in cloud | cloud-compliance-specialist |
| Non-AML GRC charters, SIG questionnaires without financial crime lens | compliance-specialist |
| Contract negotiation, regulatory interpretation as counsel | commercial-counsel |
| IT audit workpapers, ITGC walkthroughs (primary) | auditor |
| Cloud cost optimization | finops-analyst |
| SIEM/IdP/TM software engineering (primary) | information-security-engineer |
| Law enforcement blockchain investigation narratives | on-chain-investigator-agent, blockint skills |
| Legal determination to file SAR/STR or sanctions blocking | MLRO / licensed counsel |
Handoffs
From product / engineering:
- Provide: new product or corridor description, customer types, settlement rails, jurisdictions, and planned go-live date
- Receive: AML risk rating, required CDD tier, TM scenarios to implement, and monitoring KPIs
To `compliance-engineer`:
- Deliver: control objectives and evidence requirements for automated KYC/TM/logging
- Request: evidence collectors, retention configs, and access logs—not policy drafting alone
To `commercial-counsel`:
- Escalate: novel regulatory interpretations, regulator correspondence, contractual AML clauses, and filing decisions
To `auditor`:
- Provide: risk assessment, policy suite, tuning documentation, sample alert populations for independent review
- Distinguish: second-line AML compliance testing vs third-line internal audit plan
To blockint skills:
- Request: on-chain tracing for investigation support with labeled confidence; AML owns disposition and SAR narrative
Operating principles
- Risk-based and documented — every control ties to assessed risk and named owner
- Quality over volume — reduce false positives with governed tuning, not silent threshold changes
- Need-to-know — SAR/STR materials and EDD files restricted; access logged
- Jurisdiction-aware — flag multi-license entities; do not assume one rule set globally
- No legal advice — frameworks mapped for orientation; counsel confirms obligations
- Human in the loop — automation supports; analysts and MLRO decide material outcomes
Deliverable patterns
| Deliverable | Minimum contents |
|---|---|
| AML risk assessment | Methodology, inherent/residual scoring, key risks, control mapping, approval |
| CDD procedure outline | Tiers, data elements, refresh, EDD triggers, escalation |
| TM scenario catalog | Scenario ID, typology, data sources, threshold logic, disposition codes |
| Alert investigation template | Customer facts, activity summary, red flags, conclusion, reviewer sign-off |
| SAR narrative draft | Structured facts; gaps labeled; no legal sufficiency opinion |
| Board/MLRO pack | KPIs, open issues, regulatory themes, resource asks |
| Exam readiness index | Policies, RA, tuning logs, training records, independent test reports |
Reference Documentation for Aml Compliance
This is a placeholder for detailed reference documentation. Replace with actual reference content or delete if not needed.
Example real reference docs from other skills:
- product-management/references/communication.md - Comprehensive guide for status updates
- product-management/references/context_building.md - Deep-dive on gathering context
- bigquery/references/ - API references and query examples
When Reference Docs Are Useful
Reference docs are ideal for:
- Comprehensive API documentation
- Detailed workflow guides
- Complex multi-step processes
- Information too lengthy for main SKILL.md
- Content that's only needed for specific use cases
Structure Suggestions
API Reference Example
- Overview
- Authentication
- Endpoints with examples
- Error codes
- Rate limits
Workflow Guide Example
- Prerequisites
- Step-by-step instructions
- Common patterns
- Troubleshooting
- Best practices
Crypto, travel rule, and exam readiness
Table of contents
1. Virtual asset AML touchpoints 2. Blockchain analytics 3. Travel rule 4. Correspondent and fiat ramps 5. Exam readiness 6. Request list preparation 7. Common findings
Virtual asset AML touchpoints
Map activities to risk assessment:
| Activity | AML considerations |
|---|---|
| Custody | Customer identification, wallet ownership, withdrawal controls |
| Exchange / broker | KYC tiers, TM on trades and transfers, market manipulation adjacent risks |
| Transfer | Travel rule, unhosted wallet policies, address screening |
| Staking / DeFi exposure | Counterparty risk, smart contract commingling, disclosure |
| NFT / high-risk tokens | Fraud and sanctions exposure; listing policies |
Classify VASPs and non-custodial models per license; do not assume one control set fits all products.
Blockchain analytics
Use on-chain tools as decision support, not sole proof:
| Use | Caveats |
|---|---|
| Address screening | Heuristic labels; false labels; freshness |
| Clustering | Attribution confidence varies by chain |
| Path tracing | Does not prove beneficial ownership |
| Risk scores | Vendor-specific; document methodology |
Workflow:
1. Document why analytics were pulled (alert, EDD, SAR support) 2. Capture screenshot or export with timestamp and tool version 3. State confidence and alternative explanations 4. Route law-enforcement-grade investigations to blockint skills
For sanctions checks on addresses, see chainalysis-sanctions-screening as engineering pointer; AML owns disposition.
Travel rule
FATF Travel Rule — transmit originator/beneficiary information with virtual asset transfers between obliged entities.
Operational design elements:
| Element | Design question |
|---|---|
| Counterparty VASP discovery | How identify beneficiary exchange? |
| Data elements | Name, account, address per jurisdiction |
| IVMS101 / protocols | Travel Rule Protocol, OpenVASP, etc. |
| Exceptions | Unhosted wallets, below thresholds, unable to obtain data |
| Hold / reject | When to delay transfer pending data |
| Recordkeeping | Proof of send/receive of Travel Rule payload |
Document sunrise issues and corridor-specific gaps; escalate legal interpretation to counsel.
Correspondent and fiat ramps
- Fiat on/off ramps — bank partners, MSB relationships, nested flows
- Correspondent due diligence — questionnaire, AML attestation, onsite/sampling for high risk
- Payable-through accounts — prohibited or heavily restricted in many programs
- Wire due diligence — OFAC and AML dual checks; originator/beneficiary fields
Align crypto flows with traditional TM where fiat touches the bank.
Exam readiness
Maintain standing exam packet (refresh quarterly):
| Artifact | Notes |
|---|---|
| Board-approved AML policy | Version and approval date |
| Enterprise risk assessment | Latest approved |
| MLRO appointment | Letter or org chart |
| Organization chart | First/second/third line |
| Training logs | Completion by role |
| Independent test report | Issues and remediation status |
| TM scenario catalog | With last tuning summary |
| Sample alert dispositions | Redacted exemplars |
| SAR metrics | Counts, aging—no tipping off in walkthroughs |
Assign exam coordinator; single point for requests and legal privilege coordination.
Request list preparation
When regulators or auditors request samples:
1. Define population — date range, business line, alert type 2. Sample size — per methodology (statistical or judgmental) 3. Pull uniformly — avoid cherry-picking 4. Index files — control ID, customer ID, disposition, approver 5. Redact — third-party PII; SAR confidentiality rules 6. Walkthrough script — who presents, system demo path, known limitations
For IT-dependent controls, involve compliance-engineer for log exports and system evidence.
Common findings
Themes from AML examinations (illustrative):
| Finding | Preventive practice |
|---|---|
| Stale risk assessment | Annual refresh + trigger-based updates |
| Undocumented tuning | Change log with approvals |
| Weak EDD files | Source-of-wealth evidence checklist |
| Screening backlog | SLA monitoring and surge staffing |
| SAR narrative quality | Templates and QC review |
| Travel rule gaps | Exception register with remediation |
| Inadequate crypto policies | Product-specific annexes |
| First-line overrides without approval | Exception workflow with expiry |
Track findings in issues register with root cause and retest evidence.
KYC, CDD, and screening
Table of contents
1. Definitions 2. Customer risk tiers 3. CDD data elements 4. EDD triggers 5. Screening workflow 6. Beneficial ownership 7. Ongoing monitoring 8. Quality and audit
Definitions
| Term | Practical meaning |
|---|---|
| KYC | Know-your-customer process at onboarding and through lifecycle |
| CDD | Standard due diligence for most customers—identity, purpose, expected activity |
| EDD | Enhanced measures for higher risk—source of funds/wealth, senior approval, frequency |
| PEP | Politically exposed person per firm definition and regulator lists |
| Sanctions | Government restricted-party lists; blocking vs reporting regimes vary by license |
Customer risk tiers
Typical tiering (calibrate to firm risk assessment):
| Tier | Profile examples | CDD depth |
|---|---|---|
| Low | Regulated retail, low-value accounts, domestic only | Simplified CDD where permitted |
| Standard | SME, payroll, everyday commercial | Full CDD |
| High | Cash-intensive, cross-border corridors, complex ownership | EDD |
| Prohibited | Sanctions match (true hit), illegal activity, policy exclusions | Do not onboard / exit |
Document rationale for tier assignment and re-rating triggers (volume spikes, adverse media, STR filing).
CDD data elements
Collect and verify per policy (not every field for every tier):
- Legal name, aliases, date of birth or incorporation, jurisdiction
- Government ID or corporate registry references (where applicable)
- Address and contact; verify using independent sources where required
- Nature of business and expected activity (volume, products, counterparties)
- Source of funds / wealth for higher-risk relationships
- Purpose of account and anticipated transaction profile
- Related parties: signers, controllers, UBOs
Record verification method (documentary, non-documentary, reliable third party) and date.
EDD triggers
Apply EDD when any trigger fires (examples—firm policy may expand):
- PEP or close associate (domestic or foreign)
- High-risk country or corridor per firm list
- Correspondent banking, nested accounts, payable-through
- Virtual asset service providers and unhosted wallet business models
- Adverse media indicating financial crime, fraud, or regulatory action
- Unusual ownership (shell layers, nominee directors, bearer shares where relevant)
- Prior SAR/STR, law enforcement inquiry, or account restriction history
- Material change in activity vs stated profile
EDD outputs: source-of-funds/wealth narrative, senior approval, enhanced monitoring frequency, shorter refresh.
Screening workflow
onboarding / periodic / event-driven
→ run lists (sanctions, PEP, adverse media)
→ algorithmic matches + analyst review
→ disposition: false positive | true positive | inconclusive
→ document rationale + approver
→ update risk tier and monitoringMatch disposition rules:
- False positive — different person/entity; document distinguishing factors (DOB, ID, address)
- True positive — escalate per sanctions program; do not proceed without compliance/legal path
- Inconclusive — obtain additional data; freeze or restrict per policy pending resolution
Maintain list version, screening timestamp, and analyst ID in audit trail.
Beneficial ownership
For legal entities, identify ultimate beneficial owners and control persons per jurisdictional thresholds (e.g., 25% ownership tests—confirm locally with counsel).
- Collect ownership chain for complex structures
- Identify control without ownership (directors, POA, trust protectors)
- Refresh on material ownership changes
- Reconcile UBO with screening results
Ongoing monitoring
CDD is not onboarding-only:
| Activity | Cadence |
|---|---|
| Periodic refresh | By tier (e.g., 1–5 years) |
| Event-driven | Ownership change, new product, adverse media alert |
| Transaction profile | Compare actual vs expected; trigger EDD if divergence |
| Screening rescreen | On list updates and schedule per tier |
Quality and audit
- QC sample of onboarding and dispositions with second-line review
- Metrics: time-to-complete, EDD backlog, false positive rate, true positive escalation time
- Do not delete screening hits; retain superseded dispositions with reason
- Align retention with
sar_str_reporting_and_records.mdand local law
Risk assessment and program governance
Table of contents
1. Enterprise AML risk assessment 2. Risk factors 3. Control mapping 4. MLRO and second line 5. Board reporting 6. Framework orientation 7. Training and culture 8. Independent testing
Enterprise AML risk assessment
Purpose: identify inherent risk, evaluate controls, and document residual risk with board-approved appetite.
Steps:
1. Scope — entities, licenses, products, channels, geographies, customer segments 2. Inherent risk — score or rank each cell (customer × product × channel × geography) 3. Controls — map preventive/detective controls; rate design and operating effectiveness 4. Residual risk — inherent minus control mitigation; flag above appetite 5. Action plan — owners, dates, evidence for remediation 6. Approval — MLRO and board (or delegated committee) with date 7. Refresh — annual minimum; triggers on new product, M&A, exam findings, enforcement trends
Store methodology, data sources, assumptions, and dissenting views.
Risk factors
| Category | Examples |
|---|---|
| Customer | PEPs, MSBs, NGOs, shell companies, VASPs, correspondent banks |
| Product | Cash, wires, cross-border, private banking, trade finance, crypto |
| Channel | Non-face-to-face, agents, third-party introducers, API onboarding |
| Geography | FATF high-risk jurisdictions, sanctions programs, weak AML regimes |
| Delivery | Speed, anonymity features, nested relationships, omnibus accounts |
Weight factors per firm strategy; avoid copy-paste scores without business context.
Control mapping
For each material risk, document:
| Field | Content |
|---|---|
| Control ID | Unique identifier |
| Control type | Preventive / detective / corrective |
| Owner | First-line role |
| Evidence | Reports, logs, approvals |
| Frequency | Continuous / monthly / annual |
| Effectiveness | Design OK? Operating OK? Last test date |
Gaps become issues with severity, compensating controls, and target dates.
MLRO and second line
Money Laundering Reporting Officer (or equivalent):
- Owns AML/CFT program oversight and regulatory liaison
- Reviews escalations, SAR/STR decisions (with counsel where required)
- Approves high-risk relationships and policy exceptions
- Reports to board; ensures resources for compliance
Second line (AML compliance function):
- Sets standards, monitors first-line execution, challenges risk ratings
- Performs thematic reviews and quality assurance on investigations
- Manages regulatory change horizon scanning (facts to counsel for interpretation)
First line — business units own customers and day-to-day CDD/TM execution.
Third line — internal audit independent assurance (auditor).
Board reporting
Typical MLRO pack (quarterly or per charter):
| Section | Contents |
|---|---|
| Risk posture | Summary of RA, top residual risks, appetite breaches |
| Metrics | Alerts per FTE, SAR filings, onboarding times, QC results |
| Issues | Open exam findings, independent test gaps, enforcement themes |
| Emerging risks | New products, corridors, typologies from FATF/FIU |
| Resources | Staffing, tooling, budget asks |
Use trends, not point-in-time vanity metrics; explain false positive burden and tuning actions.
Framework orientation
High-level mapping only—confirm obligations with counsel:
| Framework | Orientation |
|---|---|
| FATF 40 Recommendations | International baseline; RBA, DNFBPs, wire transfers, PEPs, reporting |
| BSA / USA PATRIOT (U.S.) | CIP, CDD rule, SAR, CTR concepts, OFAC, beneficial ownership (CDD rule) |
| EU AMLD / AMLA | Harmonized EU requirements; authority structure evolving under AMLA |
| UK MLR | JMLSG guidance context; MLR obligations for relevant firms |
Use fatf-glossary-reference for standardized terms—not as legal advice.
Training and culture
- Role-based training: front office, ops, TM analysts, executives, board
- Frequency — annual minimum; refresh on material policy change
- Attestation — completion tracked; exceptions escalated
- Speak-up — escalation paths without retaliation; document referrals to compliance
Independent testing
Scope second-line or external testers to evaluate:
- RA reasonableness and refresh
- CDD/EDD sample quality
- Screening disposition accuracy
- TM scenario coverage and tuning governance
- SAR decision documentation (redacted samples)
- Training completion and issue management
Findings rated by severity with management responses and retest dates.
SAR, STR reporting, and records
Table of contents
1. Scope and boundaries 2. Internal escalation 3. Narrative structure 4. Supporting documentation 5. Confidentiality 6. Recordkeeping 7. Post-filing considerations
Scope and boundaries
This reference covers internal workflows and narrative drafting structure for suspicious activity reports (SAR) and suspicious transaction reports (STR) in various jurisdictions.
Do not:
- Advise whether filing is legally required in a specific case
- Draft final filings for submission without MLRO/counsel review
- Communicate filing decisions to customers (tipping off risk)
- Provide regulator negotiation or enforcement strategy
Escalate filing decisions to MLRO and legal counsel per firm policy.
Internal escalation
Typical escalation path:
analyst investigation → team lead → AML compliance → MLRO (+ counsel)Document at each stage:
- Summary of suspicious facts
- Why rule-out explanations are insufficient
- Amounts, dates, accounts, instruments, jurisdictions
- Prior alerts and dispositions
- Recommendation: file | do not file | need more information
Materiality thresholds — firm-defined dollar or risk-based triggers for mandatory MLRO review.
Narrative structure
Use clear, chronological, fact-based prose. Suggested sections:
1. Subject information — name, identifiers, addresses, occupation/business, relationship to firm 2. Account / product summary — accounts involved, open dates, stated purpose 3. Summary of suspicious activity — what happened, when, where, instruments 4. Detailed transaction description — table or narrative of key transactions (date, amount, type, counterparty) 5. Why activity is suspicious — red flags tied to typology; deviation from expected profile 6. Other related activity — linked accounts, parties, prior alerts 7. Investigation steps — databases checked, outreach, documents reviewed 8. Law enforcement — prior inquiries if known and disclosable per policy 9. Action taken — account restrictions, termination, continued monitoring
Writing rules:
- Facts vs suspicion — label inferences explicitly ("based on pattern, it appears...")
- Avoid legal conclusions ("money laundering occurred") unless counsel directs
- Use active voice and precise amounts/currencies
- Do not include gratuitous PII beyond form requirements in shared drafts
Supporting documentation
Maintain an index (not necessarily attached to regulator filing):
| Item | Example |
|---|---|
| Alert history | Case IDs, scenarios |
| KYC/CDD | Onboarding, EDD files |
| Transactions | Extracts, SWIFT details, blockchain analytics summary |
| Screening | Hit dispositions |
| Communications | Customer emails (if policy allows) |
| Approvals | MLRO sign-off timestamp |
Redact third-party PII not necessary for internal review.
Confidentiality
- Need-to-know access to SAR/STR workspace
- No customer notification that a report was or will be filed
- Train staff on tipping off and safe harbor concepts (counsel briefing)
- Separate IT permissions from general case management where possible
Recordkeeping
Retain per jurisdictional schedule (often five years from filing—confirm with counsel):
- Draft narratives and final filed copies (where retained)
- Supporting investigation files
- Decision memos for no-file determinations with rationale
- Training records for analysts involved
Immutable audit logs for access to SAR repositories.
Align with enterprise records management and cross-border data transfer rules.
Post-filing considerations
Operational items (policy-driven, not legal advice):
- Continuing activity — ongoing monitoring level; new alerts handling
- Account disposition — maintain, restrict, or exit relationship per risk committee
- Law enforcement requests — route to counsel; document subpoenas
- Repeat filings — link prior SAR reference numbers in narrative when applicable
Do not use SAR filing as substitute for immediate law enforcement contact when imminent harm—follow crisis/IR playbooks.
Transaction monitoring and alerts
Table of contents
1. TM program components 2. Scenario design 3. Thresholds and tuning 4. Alert triage 5. Investigation playbook 6. Typologies 7. Metrics and governance 8. Model validation touchpoints
TM program components
| Component | Role |
|---|---|
| Data | Core banking, payments, cards, crypto ledgers, KYC attributes, watchlists |
| Rules / models | Scenarios, aggregation logic, anomaly detection, network analytics |
| Case management | Alert queues, notes, attachments, approvals, audit trail |
| Reporting | Management MI, regulatory metrics, tuning change log |
Separate AML TM from fraud or credit systems where possible; if shared, tag alert type and route to trained analysts.
Scenario design
Each scenario should document:
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
| Scenario ID | Stable identifier |
| Typology | Structuring, rapid movement, high-risk geography, etc. |
| Risk linkage | RA reference |
| Data sources | Tables, fields, latency |
| Logic | Plain-language rule; version |
| Thresholds | Parameters with effective dates |
| Disposition codes | Closed: benign / escalated / SAR referral |
Cover onboarding (misuse of product), ongoing activity, and exit (draining accounts).
Thresholds and tuning
Govern tuning as a controlled change:
1. Hypothesis — why change (typology shift, false positive burden, new product) 2. Analysis — historical alert population, SAR yield, sample review 3. Approval — AML compliance + second-line sign-off; MLRO for material shifts 4. Implementation — versioned deploy; back-test where feasible 5. Post-change review — alert volume, quality, SAR outcomes at 30/90 days
Avoid silent threshold edits in production without documentation.
Alert triage
Queue design principles:
- Priority — high-risk customer, large amount, sanctions proximity, law enforcement flags
- SLA — time to first touch and to disposition by severity
- Skill-based routing — complex correspondent vs retail
- Escalation — team lead → AML compliance → MLRO
Triage checklist (first 15 minutes):
- Confirm customer identity and tier
- Validate alert fired correctly (not data defect)
- Compare to expected activity profile
- Check open cases and recent screening hits
- Decide: close with rationale | investigate further | escalate
Investigation playbook
Deeper investigation steps:
1. Activity chart — credits/debits over review window; counterparties 2. KYC refresh — still accurate? trigger EDD? 3. Screening — rescreen if stale or new names appear 4. External research — adverse media (licensed tools); document sources 5. Customer outreach — if policy allows; document questions and responses 6. Conclusion — reasonable explanation vs unexplained; recommend SAR referral or not 7. Supervisor review — mandatory for closures above materiality or SAR paths
Attach supporting extracts (redacted) to case; never paste full SAR drafts into general tickets.
Typologies
Reference typologies (not exhaustive):
| Typology | Indicators |
|---|---|
| Structuring | Amounts just below reporting thresholds; smurfing patterns |
| Rapid movement | Pass-through; layering across accounts |
| High-risk geography | Corridors inconsistent with profile |
| Trade-based ML | Invoice anomalies, over/under shipping (if applicable) |
| Mule activity | New account, immediate dispersal, many small beneficiaries |
| Crypto-specific | Peel chains, mixer proximity, exchange hops (heuristic) |
Pair typologies with red flags list in investigation notes; distinguish facts from inference.
Metrics and governance
| Metric | Use |
|---|---|
| Alerts per analyst / month | Capacity planning |
| False positive rate | Tuning input (define consistently) |
| SAR conversion rate | Scenario effectiveness (interpret carefully) |
| Aging backlog | Operational risk |
| Escalation rate | Training needs |
| Repeat alerts same customer | Profile or scenario gap |
Review metrics in AML committee with first-line and MLRO.
Model validation touchpoints
When TM uses machine learning or scoring models:
- Document model purpose, features, training data, and known bias
- Independent validation: conceptual soundness, outcomes analysis, ongoing monitoring
- Define override policy and logging
- Align with firm model risk policy; separate from IT change management
Validation is conceptual structure here—specialist model risk teams may own execution.