
Anti False Positive Decision Making
- 20 installs
- 7 repo stars
- Updated May 20, 2026
- daemon-blockint-tech/agentic-enteprises-skill
Set thresholds, evidence bars, and tiered human-in-the-loop gates so security, fraud, or compliance actions aren't taken on weak signals.
About
Guides decision frameworks for when false positives are costly covering thresholds, evidence bars, base rates, and tiered response with human-in-the-loop gates. A developer or analyst uses it when tuning security, fraud, or compliance alerts to reduce false alarms.
- Evidence bar and multi-signal corroboration before irreversible actions
- Tiered response and HITL gates with precision/recall/FDR metrics
Anti False Positive Decision Making by the numbers
- 20 all-time installs (skills.sh)
- Ranked #1,589 of 2,203 Security skills by installs in the Skillselion catalog
- Data as of Jul 27, 2026 (Skillselion catalog sync)
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| Installs | 20 |
|---|---|
| repo stars | ★ 7 |
| Last updated | May 20, 2026 |
| Repository | daemon-blockint-tech/agentic-enteprises-skill ↗ |
What it does
Set thresholds, evidence bars, and tiered human-in-the-loop gates so security, fraud, or compliance actions aren't taken on weak signals.
Files
Anti-False-Positive Decision Making
When to Use
- Calibrate when to act vs monitor when false positives block users, delay revenue, or burn analyst capacity
- Design evidence bars and multi-signal corroboration before irreversible actions (block, freeze, terminate, auto-remediate)
- Tune security, fraud, or compliance alerts with explicit FP/FN trade-offs and base-rate context
- Define tiered response paths and human-in-the-loop gates for screening and monitoring workflows
- Choose metrics (precision, recall, FDR) and review cadence for alert quality—not model training alone
- Document decision rationale for auditors, regulators, or post-incident review when disposition matters
- Reduce alert fatigue and over-blocking without silently accepting unacceptable false negatives
When NOT to Use
- Train, deploy, or optimize production ML classifiers (feature engineering, hyperparameters, MLOps) →
data-scientist,ml-ops-engineer - Legal conclusions, sanctions determinations, or contract interpretation →
commercial-counsel - Author detection rules or queries only with no decision policy, escalation, or disposition framework →
information-security-engineer,defensive-security-analyst,aml-compliance(as primary) - Generic strategy stress-tests without operational decision design →
executive-mentor - Full AML program design, KYC policy, or STR narrative drafting →
aml-compliance,str-report - Internal audit workpapers and control effectiveness sampling →
auditor - Pre-flight architecture or build validation without alert/disposition lens →
build-validator
Related skills
| Need | Skill |
|---|---|
| Security control implementation, SIEM/EDR integration | information-security-engineer |
| Technical compliance evidence and CCM pipelines | compliance-engineer |
| AML TM scenarios, alert triage, SAR paths | aml-compliance |
| Behavioral risk heuristics (volume, velocity, transit) | Use behavioral-risk-screening-concepts (blockint bundle) for UI/workflow concepts |
| AI system risk tiers, model governance, policy gates | ai-risk-governance |
| Incident severity, escalation, on-call design | incident-management-engineer |
| Audit sampling, deficiency write-ups, control testing | auditor |
| SOC triage and shift operations | soc-analyst |
| Detection content and hunt hypotheses | defensive-security-analyst |
| Plan/design go-no-go before execution | build-validator |
| Security risk registers and treatment decisions | security-risk-analyst |
Core Workflows
1. Frame the decision and costs
1. Name the action (block, freeze, escalate, auto-close, notify, quarantine) 2. List cost of false positive (customer harm, ops load, revenue, reputation, legal exposure from over-action) 3. List cost of false negative (fraud loss, breach, regulatory miss, safety) 4. Estimate base rate or prevalence band for the population (see reference) 5. Set explicit risk appetite for this decision class (who approves exceptions)
See `references/anti_fp_decision_scope.md` for scope, boundaries, and handoffs.
2. Set evidence bar and corroboration
signal(s) → minimum evidence tier → optional corroboration → disposition → audit record- Define single-signal vs multi-signal requirements before irreversible action
- Prefer independent evidence types (rule + graph + human review; not two copies of same feature)
- Document what would falsify the hypothesis before closing as benign
See `references/evidence_bars_and_corroboration.md`.
3. Map FP/FN trade-offs and thresholds
- Plot operating points: stricter threshold → fewer FPs, more FNs (usually)
- Use base rate to interpret raw alert rates; avoid judging rules on volume alone
- Segment by customer tier, geography, product, or asset criticality where policy differs
See `references/fp_fn_tradeoffs_and_base_rates.md`.
4. Design tiered response and HITL gates
| Tier | Typical disposition | Automation allowed |
|---|---|---|
| 0 — Observe | Log, aggregate metrics | Yes |
| 1 — Soft signal | Queue, enrich, no customer impact | Yes with caps |
| 2 — Review required | Analyst disposition before action | Human or timed SLA |
| 3 — Contain | Reversible hold (pending review) | Policy + dual control |
| 4 — Irreversible | Block, SAR, account closure | Executive / MLRO / legal path |
See `references/tiered_response_and_hitl_gates.md`.
5. Tune alerts in security and compliance contexts
- Govern threshold changes: hypothesis, backtest, approval, post-change review
- Separate detection quality from workflow quality (routing, SLAs, training)
- Track precision at disposition and time-to-benign-close, not alert count alone
See `references/security_compliance_alert_tuning.md`.
6. Measure, calibrate, and document
- Define metrics owners and review cadence (weekly ops, quarterly risk)
- Record rationale template on every material disposition
- Run calibration reviews: sample closed-as-benign and closed-as-true-positive
See `references/metrics_calibration_and_documentation.md`.
When to load references
| Topic | Reference |
|---|---|
| Scope, boundaries, peer handoffs | references/anti_fp_decision_scope.md |
| FP/FN, base rates, prevalence | references/fp_fn_tradeoffs_and_base_rates.md |
| Evidence tiers and corroboration | references/evidence_bars_and_corroboration.md |
| Alert tuning (security, compliance, screening) | references/security_compliance_alert_tuning.md |
| Tiered response and HITL gates | references/tiered_response_and_hitl_gates.md |
| Metrics, calibration, audit trail | references/metrics_calibration_and_documentation.md |
Anti–false-positive decision scope
Table of contents
1. Purpose 2. In scope 3. Out of scope 4. Decision classes 5. Stakeholders and RACI 6. Peer skill handoffs 7. Deliverables 8. Governance cadence
Purpose
This skill addresses operational and policy decisions where acting on a weak or noisy signal causes disproportionate harm: customer friction, wrongful blocks, analyst burnout, wrongful escalations, or audit findings from undocumented dispositions.
The agent applies structured judgment—not ad-hoc leniency—so teams can defend why they did not act as clearly as why they did.
In scope
| Area | Examples |
|---|---|
| Threshold and tier design | When a rule may auto-queue vs auto-block |
| Evidence standards | Minimum corroboration before irreversible action |
| Escalation paths | MLRO, security lead, legal, executive for Tier 4 |
| Alert tuning governance | Hypothesis, approval, post-change review |
| Screening workflows | Sanctions, fraud, abuse, policy violations |
| Metrics and calibration | Precision at disposition, sample QA |
| Documentation | Rationale templates, tuning change logs |
| Alert fatigue reduction | Routing, dedup, enrichment—not “turn everything off” |
Out of scope
| Area | Route to |
|---|---|
| Production ML training, feature stores, deployment | data-scientist, ml-ops-engineer |
| Legal interpretation, sanctions “match” as legal fact | commercial-counsel |
| Writing SIEM rules without disposition policy | defensive-security-analyst, information-security-engineer |
| Full AML program, KYC tiers, STR drafting | aml-compliance, str-report |
| IT audit workpapers and control testing | auditor |
| Live incident command and war-room comms | incident-management-engineer, incident-responder |
| AI model risk classification program | ai-risk-governance (complement, not replace) |
Decision classes
Classify each workflow by reversibility and impact:
| Class | Reversibility | Examples |
|---|---|---|
| A — Informational | N/A | Dashboard, metric spike |
| B — Reversible soft | High | Flag for review, step-up auth |
| C — Reversible hard | Medium | Temporary hold, rate limit |
| D — Irreversible | Low | Account closure, SAR filing, permanent block |
Anti-FP discipline matters most for classes C and D, where a single weak signal must rarely trigger action alone.
Stakeholders and RACI
| Role | Typical responsibility |
|---|---|
| Risk owner | Approves FP/FN appetite for a decision class |
| Operations / SOC / AML | Disposition quality, queue SLAs, training |
| Engineering | Implements tiers, enrichment, audit logs |
| Second line (compliance / risk) | Tuning approvals, thematic reviews |
| Legal | Irreversible and regulatory paths only |
| Audit | Samples dispositions and tuning evidence |
Document who can approve threshold moves that increase false negatives (stricter blocking) vs decrease false positives (looser blocking)—both directions need governance.
Peer skill handoffs
| If the user needs… | Hand off to |
|---|---|
| Deploy WAF, SIEM parsers, IdP policies | information-security-engineer |
| SOC 2 / ISO evidence automation | compliance-engineer |
| TM scenario libraries and SAR narrative | aml-compliance |
| Severity model and on-call escalation | incident-management-engineer |
| Workpaper sampling and deficiency grading | auditor |
| Go/no-go on a architecture plan | build-validator |
| Behavioral heuristic concepts (educational) | behavioral-risk-screening-concepts |
Return to this skill when the question is “what bar before we act?” not “how do we implement the control?”
Deliverables
Typical outputs when applying this skill:
1. Decision policy one-pager — action, evidence bar, tiers, owners 2. Threshold change packet — hypothesis, metrics, approval, effective date 3. Disposition rationale template — fields required in case tooling 4. Calibration plan — sample sizes, review frequency, success criteria 5. Escalation matrix — tier → role → SLA
Governance cadence
| Cadence | Activity |
|---|---|
| Weekly | Queue health: age, reopen rate, benign-close quality spot checks |
| Monthly | Rule/scenario performance: precision at disposition, top FP drivers |
| Quarterly | Risk appetite review: FN incidents vs FP cost; tier adjustments |
| Ad hoc | Post-incident or regulatory feedback → targeted tuning packet |
Operating principles
1. Prefer delay over wrong irreversible action when base rate is low and cost of FP is high. 2. Never optimize on alert volume alone—volume can rise with better detection or worse noise. 3. Corroborate with independent signal types before Tier 3–4. 4. Document negatives (why not escalated) as rigorously as positives. 5. Segment populations; one global threshold often fails retail and corporate alike.
Red flags (process failure)
- “We blocked because the model said so” with no secondary check for Class D
- Threshold changes in production without versioned approval
- 90%+ benign closure with one-line notes
- Analysts incentivized only on alert closure speed
- No FN review when FP rate drops sharply (may indicate under-detection)
Evidence bars and corroboration
Table of contents
1. Evidence tiers 2. Corroboration rules 3. Independence 4. Disconfirming evidence 5. Screening-specific patterns 6. [Security alert patterns](#security-alert patterns) 7. Rationale template 8. Anti-patterns
Evidence tiers
Define tiers per decision class (see anti_fp_decision_scope.md):
| Tier | Description | Example sources |
|---|---|---|
| E0 — Context | Background only | Customer tier, tenure |
| E1 — Weak signal | Single heuristic | Velocity spike, one IOC hit |
| E2 — Moderate | Rule + enrichment | TM scenario + KYC match |
| E3 — Strong | Multi-path agreement | Two independent rules + analyst review |
| E4 — Conclusive | Documented proof | Confirmed fraud, law enforcement, confirmed sanctions match per policy |
Map tiers to response tiers:
- E0–E1 → observe or soft queue
- E2 → review before customer impact
- E3 → contain pending review
- E4 → irreversible path with approvals
Corroboration rules
Corroboration = at least two pieces of evidence that jointly increase confidence before action.
Minimum rules (examples—adapt per policy)
| Action | Minimum evidence |
|---|---|
| Auto-close benign | E1 + negative enrichment (expected activity) |
| Customer-visible friction | E2 + analyst or E2 + second automated check |
| Funds hold | E3 or E2 + mandatory human within SLA |
| Account termination / SAR | E4 path with legal/compliance gates |
Write rules as AND across independent families, not duplicate counts of the same data.
Independence
Evidence families should not share a single failure point:
| Family | Examples |
|---|---|
| Transactional | Amount, velocity, counterparties |
| Identity / KYC | Tier, occupation, geography |
| Watchlist / intel | Sanctions, adverse media (licensed) |
| Behavioral | Device, session, graph (where allowed) |
| Technical security | EDR, auth anomalies, impossible travel |
| Human | Analyst interview, doc request |
Not independent: two rules using the same raw field; model score + derived bucket from same score.
Disconfirming evidence
Before closing or escalating, explicitly check falsifiers:
| Hypothesis | Disconfirming checks |
|---|---|
| Account takeover | User confirms activity; known travel; MFA success history |
| Structuring | Payroll pattern; documented business model |
| Sanctions hit | False positive on common name; DOB mismatch per policy |
| Malware beacon | Corporate VPN; known scanner; patched host |
Record what you looked for and what you found in the case note.
Screening-specific patterns
Sanctions and PEP screening (operational—not legal advice):
| Stage | Anti-FP practice |
|---|---|
| Hit review | Require identifier match strength (name + DOB + country) per playbook |
| Auto-block | Avoid on name-only weak match; queue for review |
| Rescreen | Do not treat stale hit as new without delta |
| Whitelist | Governed whitelist with expiry and approver |
Pair with aml-compliance for program design; this skill sets bars, not vendor config alone.
Security alert patterns
| Pattern | Corroboration before containment |
|---|---|
| Single IOC domain lookup | Pair with host execution, beaconing, or user context |
| One failed login | Rate-based tier only unless privileged account |
| Cloud “public bucket” | Confirm exposure + data class before paging exec |
| DLP single match | Context: test data, known false pattern library |
Use defensive-security-analyst for detection content; use this reference for disposition bar.
Rationale template
Required fields for material dispositions:
Alert ID / case ID:
Decision: [monitor | soft | hold | escalate | close benign | confirm]
Evidence tier reached: E_
Signals (independent families):
1.
2.
Disconfirming checks performed:
Outcome of checks:
Residual uncertainty:
Approver (if Tier 3+):
Next review date (if monitor):Anti-patterns
| Anti-pattern | Why it fails |
|---|---|
| “Stacking” correlated rules | Inflates confidence artificially |
| Closing with “FP” without checks | Repeats miss on similar cases |
| Auto-block on vendor score alone | Opaque, hard to audit |
| Ignoring population context | New product looks like fraud |
| Permanent whitelist without expiry | Hides true positives later |
Escalation when evidence is insufficient
If tier required for policy but evidence is only E1:
1. Do not downgrade policy silently 2. Escalate to risk owner for exception or temporary monitor tier 3. Time-box enhanced monitoring 4. Log exception with expiry
FP/FN trade-offs and base rates
Table of contents
1. Definitions 2. Why base rate matters 3. Cost asymmetry 4. Operating points 5. Segmentation 6. Bayesian intuition (practical) 7. Worksheet 8. Common mistakes
Definitions
| Term | Meaning |
|---|---|
| True positive (TP) | Signal fires; harmful condition truly present |
| False positive (FP) | Signal fires; condition absent—unnecessary action |
| False negative (FN) | Harmful condition present; signal silent |
| True negative (TN) | No signal; condition absent |
| Precision | TP / (TP + FP) — trust when alert fires |
| Recall (sensitivity) | TP / (TP + FN) — catch rate |
| False discovery rate (FDR) | FP / (TP + FP) — same denominator as 1 − precision |
In high-stakes workflows, precision at disposition (after analyst review) often matters more than raw rule precision.
Why base rate matters
Base rate (prevalence): fraction of the population that truly has the condition.
When prevalence is low, even a highly specific rule can produce mostly false positives among alerts:
- Example: 0.1% fraud rate, rule with 99% specificity on random population still yields ~90% FPs among alerts if sensitivity forces volume (illustrative—always model with your data).
Never judge a rule only by “we get 10,000 alerts/month” without prevalence and disposition outcomes.
Cost asymmetry
Build a cost matrix before moving thresholds:
| Predicted positive | Predicted negative | |
|---|---|---|
| Actually positive | Benefit of catch | Cost of miss (FN) |
| Actually negative | Cost of FP | Cost of TN (usually low) |
FP costs to enumerate:
- Customer churn, support load, wrongful freeze
- Analyst hours × fully loaded rate
- Reputation and regulatory complaints
- Opportunity cost (delayed wire, failed checkout)
FN costs to enumerate:
- Direct loss, breach impact, fine exposure
- Safety harm, sanctions exposure
Risk appetite states which cell the org will tolerate more of, by segment.
Operating points
Threshold selection is choosing an operating point on a precision–recall curve (or ROC for scores):
| Move | Typical effect |
|---|---|
| Raise bar (stricter) | ↑ precision, ↓ recall, fewer alerts |
| Lower bar (looser) | ↓ precision, ↑ recall, more alerts |
Document the intended move in every tuning packet:
- “Reduce FP on retail wires by 30% at acceptable 5% recall drop”
- Not “reduce alerts” without FN review
Segmentation
Global thresholds fail when subpopulations differ:
| Segment | Often lower base rate | FP cost | FN cost |
|---|---|---|---|
| New users | Unknown | Medium | High fraud |
| Established low-risk | Very low | High (trust) | Medium |
| High-value corporate | Low | Very high | Very high |
| Sanctions geography | Varies | Regulatory | Critical |
Use segment-specific thresholds and evidence bars where policy allows; document exceptions.
Bayesian intuition (practical)
After an alert fires, ask:
Given this evidence, what is the posterior probability of true harm?
Operational proxies:
- Single weak feature → low posterior → Tier 1–2 only
- Multiple independent features → higher posterior → Tier 3
- Human-confirmed pattern → may justify Tier 4 with approvals
You do not need formal Bayes in production if you enforce independent corroboration and calibration sampling.
Worksheet
Copy for each decision class:
Decision class: _______________
Population size (monthly): _______________
Estimated prevalence (band): ___% to ___%
Current alerts/month: _______________
Disposition TP / FP / FN (last 90d): ___ / ___ / ___
Estimated cost per FP: $________
Estimated cost per FN: $________
Target precision at disposition: ___%
Minimum acceptable recall: ___%
Approved operating point change: _______________
Approver: _______________ Date: _______________Common mistakes
| Mistake | Fix |
|---|---|
| “99% accurate model” without prevalence | Model accuracy on imbalanced data misleads; use precision/recall at operating point |
| Optimizing recall only after an FN headline | Pair with FP impact review and tiered response |
| Using training metrics in production | Track production disposition labels with lag correction |
| Ignoring selection bias | Analysts only see alerts—FNs require separate sampling |
| Same threshold for batch and real-time | Real-time may need higher bar or softer tier |
Review triggers
Revisit trade-offs when:
- Product or geography launch changes population mix
- Adversary adapts (sudden FN spike)
- Regulatory feedback on over-blocking
- Major vendor or model change
- FP cost event (public complaint, executive escalation)
Metrics, calibration, and documentation
Table of contents
1. Metric hierarchy 2. Precision, recall, and FDR 3. Labels and lag 4. Calibration program 5. Sampling methodology 6. Documentation artifacts 7. Audit and regulatory readiness 8. Dashboards 9. Failure modes
Metric hierarchy
| Level | Question | Audience |
|---|---|---|
| L1 — Volume | How many alerts? | Ops capacity |
| L2 — Efficiency | How fast disposed? | Ops management |
| L3 — Quality | Were dispositions correct? | Risk, audit |
| L4 — Outcome | Loss prevented vs harm? | Executive |
Anti-FP programs optimize L3–L4, not L1 alone.
Precision, recall, and FDR
| Metric | Formula | Use |
|---|---|---|
| Precision | TP / (TP + FP) | Trust in positive decisions |
| Recall | TP / (TP + FN) | Coverage of true harm |
| FDR | FP / (TP + FP) | Burden on reviewers |
| Specificity | TN / (TN + FP) | Often less actionable alone |
Report confidence intervals on sampled metrics when populations are small.
Disposition precision
Precision_at_disposition = Confirmed_TP_after_review / All_closed_as_TPSeparate rule-fired precision from analyst-confirmed—analysts may rescue weak rules or bury FPs in benign closes.
Labels and lag
Ground truth is delayed:
| Domain | Label lag | Implication |
|---|---|---|
| Fraud chargeback | 30–120 days | Recent precision understated |
| AML SAR | Months | Use proxy labels + thematic review |
| Security incident | Variable | Link cases to incident IDs |
| Benign close | Immediate | Risk of optimistic FP hide |
Run matured cohort reviews quarterly on older alert vintages.
Calibration program
Calibration = periodic check that scores, tiers, and dispositions match reality.
Cadence
| Activity | Frequency | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| Random benign sample | Weekly | Team lead |
| Random TP sample | Monthly | Risk |
| Matured cohort relabel | Quarterly | Risk + ops |
| Full rule review | Annual or post-incident | Engineering + risk |
Calibration meeting agenda (60 min)
1. Metric dashboard vs targets 2. Top 5 FP drivers (root cause) 3. FN themes (from incidents + sample) 4. Open tuning packets status 5. Exceptions nearing expiry 6. Actions with owners
Sampling methodology
| Goal | Method |
|---|---|
| Estimate precision | Stratified random sample of closed alerts |
| Find FN | Targeted sample: high-risk segment, near-miss cases |
| Audit defensibility | Include Tier 3–4 100% or high % |
| Analyst QA | Random 5–10% per analyst monthly |
Minimum sample sizes depend on volume; document confidence when n is small.
Stratification dimensions
- Rule / scenario ID
- Tier at disposition
- Analyst / team
- Customer segment
- Geography
Documentation artifacts
Maintain versioned artifacts:
| Artifact | Contents |
|---|---|
| Decision policy | Tiers, evidence bars, approvers |
| Tuning log | Change ID, hypothesis, metrics, approver |
| Disposition taxonomy | Codes: benign reason, TP type, escalate reason |
| Rationale template | Required fields (see evidence reference) |
| Exception register | Expiry, scope, approver |
| Training record | Annual refresh on disposition standards |
Store in systems of record—not only wiki.
Audit and regulatory readiness
Auditors and regulators often ask:
- How do you know alerts are appropriately dispositioned?
- Show threshold changes and approvals
- Show sample of benign closes with rationale
- Prove irreversible actions had sufficient evidence
Prepare audit pack per scenario family:
1. Policy excerpt 2. Metric trend (precision, FN incidents) 3. Sample workpapers (redacted) 4. Tuning log excerpt
Use auditor for workpaper format; use this reference for quality metrics narrative.
Dashboards
Minimum viable dashboard panels:
| Panel | Notes |
|---|---|
| Alerts by tier over time | Detect tier creep |
| Precision at disposition (matured) | Lag-adjusted |
| Benign close reason Pareto | Drives tuning |
| SLA breach | Capacity signal |
| FN count / incidents | Paired with FP |
| Open exceptions | Expiry warnings |
Avoid ranking analysts on volume closed only.
Failure modes
| Symptom | Likely cause | Response |
|---|---|---|
| Precision ↑, complaints ↑ | Wrong benign taxonomy | Relabel sample |
| Precision ↑, losses ↑ | FN under-detection | Lower bar or add coverage |
| Benign close time ↓ | Rubric drift | QA sample |
| Auto-actions ↑ | Tier creep | Policy audit |
| Metrics flat, pain high | Wrong metric | Shift to disposition precision |
Integration with build validation
Before launching new automated checks in product or CI, ask (build-validator complement):
- What tier can this signal trigger?
- What evidence bar is required?
- What metric proves it is not noisy?
Document answers in the launch checklist.
Security and compliance alert tuning
Table of contents
1. Tuning vs detection 2. Governed change process 3. Security operations (SOC) 4. Compliance monitoring 5. Fraud and AML TM 6. Screening systems 7. Enrichment and deduplication 8. Metrics for tuning 9. Post-change review
Tuning vs detection
| Layer | Owns | This skill focuses on |
|---|---|---|
| Detection | Logic, data, coverage | When detection may drive action |
| Tuning | Thresholds, suppressions, routing | Operating point and workflow |
| Workflow | Queues, SLAs, training | Disposition quality |
Do not conflate “fewer alerts” with success if FN rate rises without review.
Governed change process
Every material tuning change follows:
1. Hypothesis → 2. Analysis → 3. Approval → 4. Deploy → 5. Post-review1. Hypothesis
Document:
- Problem statement (FP pain, FN incident, new product)
- Affected rules/scenarios and population
- Expected direction (precision ↑, recall ↓, etc.)
2. Analysis
| Analysis type | Use when |
|---|---|
| Historical replay | Stable data; rule logic unchanged |
| Shadow mode | New threshold runs parallel; no customer impact |
| Sample review | Last N alerts stratified by outcome |
| Cohort comparison | Before/after for similar customers |
Include base rate and disposition breakdown (see fp_fn_tradeoffs_and_base_rates.md).
3. Approval
| Change magnitude | Typical approver |
|---|---|
| Routing / enrichment only | Team lead |
| Threshold affecting queue volume >20% | Risk + ops |
| Auto-action enabled or disabled | Second line + engineering |
| Irreversible auto-action | Risk owner + legal/compliance |
4. Deploy
- Version ID and effective timestamp
- Feature flag or gradual rollout where possible
- Rollback plan documented
5. Post-review
30- and 90-day checkpoints: precision at disposition, FN themes, customer complaints, SLA breach.
Security operations (SOC)
| Tuning lever | Anti-FP note |
|---|---|
| Severity mapping | Map low-confidence detections to monitor not page |
| Correlation windows | Widen to reduce duplicate pages; watch FN on short attacks |
| Suppression lists | Time-boxed; owner; reason code |
| Auto-enrichment | Reduce analyst guesswork; improves precision at review |
| Playbook branching | “Weak signal” branch must not auto-isolate |
Pair with soc-analyst for shift ops; defensive-security-analyst for rule content.
Compliance monitoring
Continuous control monitoring (CCM) alerts differ from threat alerts:
| CCM alert | Tuning principle |
|---|---|
| Config drift | Confirm asset in scope; suppress known approved exceptions with ticket |
| Access anomaly | Tier: self-service fix vs security incident |
| Evidence gap | Route to control owner, not 24/7 SOC by default |
Use compliance-engineer for evidence automation design; this reference for alert disposition policy.
Fraud and AML TM
Transaction monitoring tuning (operational):
| Input | Review |
|---|---|
| Alert volume trend | vs customer growth and new scenarios |
| SAR yield / referral rate | Not sole metric—quality over count |
| Benign close reasons | Top 5 FP drivers → rule or enrichment fix |
| Reopen rate | Indicates weak initial disposition |
Hand off program-level scenario libraries to aml-compliance; use governed process here.
Screening systems
| Control | Anti-FP tuning |
|---|---|
| Fuzzy name match | Tune match scores; require secondary identifiers for auto-action |
| Batch vs real-time | Different bars; batch may allow analyst batch review |
| Periodic rescreen | Delta-only alerts where vendor supports |
| Internal watchlist | Separate governance from sanctions vendor |
Enrichment and deduplication
Often the highest ROI for FP reduction without lowering detection:
| Technique | Effect |
|---|---|
| Dedup by entity + scenario + window | Cuts analyst duplicate work |
| Attach KYC / expected activity | Faster benign close |
| Link related alerts to parent case | Single disposition |
| Auto-prioritize by loss exposure | Protects capacity for true risk |
Metrics for tuning
Track before and after deploy:
| Metric | Definition |
|---|---|
| Alerts per 1k customers | Volume (context only) |
| Precision at disposition | Confirmed TP / all closed as TP |
| Benign close rate | With quality sample |
| Time to first touch | SLA health |
| FN count (sampled) | Active FN review required |
| Customer impact tickets | FP proxy |
Post-change review
Template:
Change ID:
Effective date:
Hypothesis result: [met | partial | failed]
Volume delta: ___%
Precision at disposition delta: ___%
FN incidents (if any):
Customer impact signals:
Decision: [keep | rollback | iterate]When not to tune
- During active incident (stabilize first)
- Without baseline metrics
- To meet arbitrary “alert reduction OKR”
- By disabling detection without risk acceptance
Route systemic detection gaps to engineering and detection owners; route policy gaps to risk owner.
Tiered response and human-in-the-loop gates
Table of contents
1. Response tier model 2. Mapping evidence to tiers 3. HITL gate types 4. SLAs and capacity 5. Automation guardrails 6. Dual control and approvals 7. Customer communication 8. Exception handling 9. Examples by domain
Response tier model
| Tier | Name | Customer / user impact | Automation |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | Observe | None | Full |
| 1 | Enrich & queue | None | Full with rate limits |
| 2 | Analyst review | None until disposition | Auto-route; human decides |
| 3 | Reversible contain | Temporary (hold, step-up, throttle) | Policy-limited auto |
| 4 | Irreversible | Block, close, SAR, report | Human + named approvers only |
Default posture for low base rate + high FP cost: start at Tier 0–1; earn Tier 3–4 with evidence tiers (see evidence_bars_and_corroboration.md).
Mapping evidence to tiers
| Max evidence tier | Allowed response tier (default) |
|---|---|
| E0–E1 | 0–1 |
| E2 | 0–2 |
| E3 | 0–3 (contain reversible) |
| E4 | 0–4 with approvals |
Escalation up tiers requires new evidence or approver exception—never downgrade evidence requirement silently.
HITL gate types
| Gate | When | Who |
|---|---|---|
| G1 — Sample QA | Random % of benign closes | Team lead |
| G2 — Mandatory review | All Tier 3+ or amount > limit | Analyst |
| G3 — Four-eyes | Tier 4 or policy list | Second analyst / lead |
| G4 — Management | Material loss, regulatory | Compliance / risk |
| G5 — Legal | SAR, law enforcement, sanctions confirm | Legal / MLRO |
Document gates in runbooks; do not rely on tribal knowledge.
SLAs and capacity
Capacity planning prevents fake precision from rushed closes:
| Queue | Example SLA | Staffing input |
|---|---|---|
| Low severity | 24–72h | Volume forecast |
| High severity | 1–4h | On-call rotation |
| Tier 3 contain | Time-boxed hold max | Legal max hold policy |
| Tier 4 | Same-day exec path | Named backup approvers |
If SLA routinely missed:
- Do not lower evidence bar
- Add enrichment, dedup, or tier-0 routing
- Escalate capacity to operations leadership
Pair with incident-management-engineer for major incident severity—not daily alert queues.
Automation guardrails
Allowed automation only with:
1. Written policy mapping tier → action 2. Kill switch and rollback 3. Audit log (who/what/when/version) 4. Rate limits per customer / global 5. Periodic sample QA (G1)
Prohibited without explicit risk acceptance:
- Tier 4 without human
- Permanent suppress without expiry
- Cross-customer threshold changes without segment analysis
Dual control and approvals
| Action | Typical dual control |
|---|---|
| Release funds hold | Analyst + lead |
| Permanent whitelist | Compliance + ops |
| Rule auto-block enable | Engineering + risk |
| SAR filing | Analyst + MLRO |
Record approver identity in case system—not chat only.
Customer communication
Tier 3–4 often requires controlled messaging:
| Situation | Guidance |
|---|---|
| Hold on payment | Factual, minimal, regulatory-safe wording per policy |
| False positive apology | Only after confirmed FP; track goodwill policy |
| No disclosure of internal rules | Avoid tipping fraudsters |
Route wording to compliance/legal for regulated text; this skill defines when to contact, not copy.
Exception handling
Temporary exception (risk acceptance):
Exception ID:
Scope (customers, rules, duration):
Evidence bar waived to tier: ___
Approver:
Expiry (mandatory):
Review date:Exceptions must expire automatically; no permanent “VIP skip” without executive register.
Examples by domain
Payments fraud
| Signal | Tier |
|---|---|
| Velocity only | 1 → 2 |
| Velocity + device mismatch | 2 → 3 (hold) |
| Confirmed mule pattern + loss | 3 → 4 with G3 |
Sanctions screening
| Signal | Tier |
|---|---|
| Weak name match | 1 → 2 |
| Strong identifier match | 2 → 3 pending policy |
| Confirmed match per playbook | 4 MLRO path |
Security (account compromise)
| Signal | Tier |
|---|---|
| Single failed login geo | 0–1 |
| Impossible travel + success login | 2 → 3 step-up |
| EDR confirmed malware + C2 | 3 → 4 isolate |
AI / automated agent actions
For agentic systems that act on alerts:
- Require tool policy: max tier without human token
- Log chain-of-thought decisions not raw model rationale for audit
- Use
ai-risk-governancefor model tier; use this reference for action tier
De-escalation
When evidence weakens:
1. Release contain at Tier 3 when disconfirming checks pass 2. Document de-escalation rationale 3. Retain monitor tier (0–1) for cooling period if policy requires