
Penetration Tester
- 29 installs
- 7 repo stars
- Updated May 20, 2026
- daemon-blockint-tech/agentic-enteprises-skill
Guides authorized penetration testing across multiple domains under one ROE: scoping, recon, vulnerability identification, in-scope exploitation, and remediation reporting.
About
Guides authorized multi-domain penetration testing covering rules of engagement, reconnaissance, vulnerability identification, in-scope exploitation and post-exploitation, and remediation reporting. A developer uses it when running a cross-domain pentest engagement with written authorization and safe boundaries.
- Emphasizes written authorization, ROE boundaries, and emergency stop procedures
- Covers in-scope post-exploitation with cleanup and retest of critical/high findings
Penetration Tester by the numbers
- 29 all-time installs (skills.sh)
- Ranked #1,498 of 2,203 Security skills by installs in the Skillselion catalog
- Data as of Jul 29, 2026 (Skillselion catalog sync)
npx skills add https://github.com/daemon-blockint-tech/agentic-enteprises-skill --skill penetration-testerAdd your badge
Show developers this skill is listed on Skillselion. Paste this into your README.
| Installs | 29 |
|---|---|
| repo stars | ★ 7 |
| Last updated | May 20, 2026 |
| Repository | daemon-blockint-tech/agentic-enteprises-skill ↗ |
What it does
Guides authorized penetration testing across multiple domains under one ROE: scoping, recon, vulnerability identification, in-scope exploitation, and remediation reporting.
Files
Penetration Tester
When to Use
- Plan or execute authorized penetration tests (cloud workload, wireless) spanning multiple domains under one ROE
- Coordinate dedicated network/AD/infra assessments →
network-pentester - Draft or validate rules of engagement, asset lists, and emergency stop procedures
- Perform reconnaissance and vulnerability identification with manual validation
- Develop proof-of-concept exploitation and document attack paths within agreed impact
- Execute in-scope post-exploitation (credential proof, lateral movement, objective demo) with cleanup
- Produce remediation-focused reports and retest critical/high findings
When NOT to Use
- Deep web application or API-only assessments (OWASP, proxy methodology, GraphQL) →
web-pentester - Dedicated internal/external network, AD, segmentation, wireless methodology →
network-pentester - Triage SIEM/EDR alerts or run SOC playbooks →
soc-analyst - Lead live incident command, war room, or stakeholder comms →
incident-responder - Acquire and analyze forensic disk/memory images →
digital-forensics-analyst - Disassembly, decompilation, patch diff, or malware RE lab work →
reverse-engineer - Jailbreak LLMs, prompt injection, or agent tool abuse →
ai-redteam - Campaign planning, purple team, detection validation at program level →
red-team-specialist - Implement cloud IAM, CSPM, landing zone guardrails →
cloud-security-engineer - Map audit controls or continuous compliance evidence →
compliance-engineer - Add CI/CD security gates or SBOM pipelines →
devsecops
Related skills
| Need | Skill |
|---|---|
| Web/API-focused OWASP and proxy-based testing | web-pentester |
| Network, AD, lateral movement, segmentation, wireless | network-pentester |
| Security program, pentest program governance, GRC | cybersecurity |
| Implement fixes for findings (IAM, WAF, SIEM) | information-security-engineer |
| Threat context for findings; IOC/TTP intel (not pentest execution) | cti-analyst |
| Cloud control implementation and misconfig remediation | cloud-security-engineer |
| LLM/agent adversarial testing | ai-redteam |
| Red team campaigns, purple team, ATT&CK emulation | red-team-specialist |
| SOC alert triage and playbooks | soc-analyst |
| Proactive threat hunts from pentest hypotheses | threat-hunter |
| Live IR command and containment cadence | incident-responder |
| Post-incident forensic artifacts | digital-forensics-analyst |
| Binary/protocol RE and patch analysis | reverse-engineer |
| Audit evidence and control mapping | compliance-engineer |
| Pipeline/supply-chain testing in CI | devsecops |
| Offensive reporting for customers | tech-writer-researcher |
Core Workflows
1. Scope and authorization
Do not test without written authorization.
1. Confirm signed SOW/ROE: assets, methods, windows, contacts 2. Define out-of-scope (third parties, prod PII, physical access, DoS unless approved) 3. Agree severity rubric and evidence handling 4. Establish emergency stop and escalation path 5. Prefer isolated lab or designated test tenants
See `references/scoping_rules_of_engagement.md` and `references/penetration_tester_scope.md`.
2. Reconnaissance and vulnerability identification
passive OSINT → asset inventory → service/version ID → auth surface mapping → validate findingsDocument source, timestamp, tool, and raw output references. Validate scanner output manually.
See `references/recon_and_vulnerability_identification.md`.
3. Exploitation and post-exploitation (in scope only)
- Minimal PoC steps; redacted evidence
- Clear preconditions (role, network position, config)
- Stop at agreed impact; chain into attack paths when useful
- Post-exploitation only per ROE; remove persistence and test artifacts before closeout
See `references/exploitation_and_post_exploitation.md`.
4. Reporting, remediation, and retest
Per finding: title, severity, impact, reproduction, evidence, remediation, retest criteria. Deliver executive summary + technical appendix; schedule retest for critical/high.
See `references/reporting_and_remediation.md` and `references/retest_and_safe_practices.md`.
When to load references
| Topic | Reference |
|---|---|
| Role boundaries | references/penetration_tester_scope.md |
| Authorization and ROE | references/scoping_rules_of_engagement.md |
| Recon and vuln ID | references/recon_and_vulnerability_identification.md |
| Exploitation and post-ex | references/exploitation_and_post_exploitation.md |
| Reports and remediation | references/reporting_and_remediation.md |
| Retest and safe practices | references/retest_and_safe_practices.md |
Exploitation and post-exploitation
Table of contents
1. Exploitation principles 2. Proof-of-concept template 3. Attack-path chaining 4. Post-exploitation (in scope) 5. Cleanup 6. Out of scope behaviors
Exploitation principles
- Minimal impact — demonstrate the weakness; do not maximize damage
- In scope only — stop at agreed objective (e.g., single host proof, no domain-wide ransom simulation)
- No real harm — avoid deleting data, disrupting production, or exfiltrating unnecessary PII
- Document preconditions — role, network path, config, chained bugs
- Preserve evidence — redact tokens, passwords, and personal data in artifacts
If exploitation risks instability, coordinate with customer before proceeding.
Proof-of-concept template
| Field | Content |
|---|---|
| Finding ID | PT-2026-001 |
| Title | IDOR on /api/v1/orders/{id} |
| Preconditions | Authenticated user A; no admin role |
| Steps | 1. Login as A 2. Request order ID belonging to B 3. Observe 200 + data |
| Impact | Read other users' order PII |
| Evidence | evidence/PT-2026-001.har (redacted) |
| Stopped at | Data read only; no modification |
Attack-path chaining
When useful, document chains:
Initial access → privilege escalation → objective (per ROE)Example: phishing not in scope → do not include phishing. Web RCE in scope → document through agreed depth only.
| Stage | Example technique | Stop when |
|---|---|---|
| Initial access | Unauth API flaw, cred spray (if ROE allows) | Access achieved |
| Execution | Web shell, API abuse | Per impact limit |
| Privilege | Vertical escalation to admin | Per ROE |
| Lateral | Adjacent host or segment | Only if scoped |
| Objective | Sensitive data proof, domain admin demo | Customer-defined |
Post-exploitation (in scope)
Perform only what ROE permits:
| Activity | Typical ROE | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Credential proof | Hash or ticket demo; no mass dump | Redacted screenshot |
| Lateral movement | One hop or agreed segment | Path diagram |
| Data access | Single record or synthetic marker | Redacted sample |
| Persistence | Usually forbidden in pentest | If approved, remove in cleanup |
Do not install ransomware, crypto-miners, or long-term backdoors unless explicitly part of a scoped red-team exercise with cleanup plan.
Cleanup
Before engagement closeout:
- [ ] Remove shells, web shells, scheduled tasks, and test accounts created
- [ ] Revoke API keys or tokens issued for testing
- [ ] Confirm with customer that monitoring alerts from testing are understood
- [ ] Deliver list of artifacts left intentionally (if any) with removal date
Document cleanup in the final report appendix.
Out of scope behaviors
Unless explicit written approval:
- Denial of service or resource exhaustion attacks
- Testing third-party services without their authorization
- Social engineering of employees
- Physical intrusion
- Supply-chain attacks on unrelated vendors
- Modifying production data or encryption keys
- Sharing exploits or customer data outside the engagement team
When in doubt, stop and confirm in writing.
Penetration tester scope
Table of contents
1. Role boundary 2. Engagement types 3. Partnership model 4. What good looks like
Role boundary
| Pentester owns | Others own |
|---|---|
| Authorized offensive testing within ROE | SOC alert triage and playbooks (soc-analyst) |
| Recon, vuln validation, PoC exploitation | Incident command and containment cadence (incident-responder) |
| Attack-path documentation and retest | Forensic acquisition and imaging (digital-forensics-analyst) |
| Remediation-focused pentest reports | Cloud guardrail implementation (cloud-security-engineer) |
| Safe testing hygiene and evidence handling | Security program and GRC strategy (cybersecurity) |
| RoE-aligned post-exploitation proof | LLM jailbreak and agent abuse testing (ai-redteam) |
| Retest validation of fixes | Audit control mapping and evidence (compliance-engineer) |
CI/CD scan gates and SBOM (devsecops) | |
Control engineering (IAM, SIEM, WAF) (information-security-engineer) |
Pentester validates exploitability and impact of weaknesses; it does not operate the SOC, command live incidents, or build production security controls.
Engagement types
| Type | Focus | Typical deliverable |
|---|---|---|
| Web / API (when not delegated) | AuthZ, injection, session, business logic | App-layer findings + retest |
| Web / API (deep OWASP/proxy focus) | Delegate to web-pentester when scoped | Same deliverables |
| Network | Segmentation, services, cred attacks | Internal/external network report → specialist: network-pentester |
| Cloud workload | IAM, metadata, storage, K8s misconfig | Findings tied to cloud assets (test only) |
| Red team (when scoped) | Adversary simulation, detection gap | TTP narrative + purple-team notes |
| Retest | Prior critical/high fixes | Pass/fail per finding |
Clarify black-box vs grey-box vs white-box and credentials provided in the SOW.
Partnership model
| Partner | Interaction |
|---|---|
| Customer engineering | Receives findings; implements fixes; provides retest window |
cloud-security-engineer | Implements guardrails; pentester tests them—not designs landing zones |
information-security-engineer | Operates WAF/SIEM/IdP; may assist with test accounts |
soc-analyst / defensive | May receive heads-up; not a substitute for ROE |
| Legal / compliance | Reviews data handling; not a substitute for authorization |
ai-redteam | Owns LLM-specific adversarial testing when apps use AI |
network-pentester | Owns dedicated network/AD/infra methodology when not a thin workstream |
web-pentester | Owns OWASP web/API testing when not a thin workstream |
What good looks like
1. Written authorization on file before any active testing 2. Every reported issue is manually validated with reproducible steps 3. Evidence is redacted; no unnecessary real customer data exfiltration 4. Cleanup completed; test accounts and shells removed 5. Retest scheduled for critical/high; closed only with evidence
Reconnaissance and vulnerability identification
Table of contents
1. Recon phases 2. Asset tracking 3. Vulnerability identification 4. Validation rules 5. Documentation
Recon phases
Execute in order unless ROE restricts passive activity:
passive OSINT → DNS/certificate transparency → active discovery (if allowed) →
service/version fingerprint → auth surface mapping → prioritize targets| Phase | Actions | Guardrails |
|---|---|---|
| Passive | WHOIS, CT logs, public repos, job posts, docs | No interaction with customer systems without scope |
| Active discovery | Port scan, HTTP probing, API schema harvest | Rate-limit; respect ROE windows; avoid DoS |
| Enumeration | Dir busting, vhost, API endpoints, cloud metadata checks | Stop on out-of-scope hosts |
| Auth mapping | Login flows, OAuth, API keys, roles, MFA behavior | Use only provided or approved test accounts |
Asset tracking
Maintain a table:
| Asset | Type | Source | In scope (Y/N) | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
api.example.com | API | CT log | Y | Customer confirmed |
Never expand scope silently—confirm new assets with the customer.
Vulnerability identification
Sources (use per ROE):
- Manual testing (Burp, browser, API client)
- Authenticated scanners (when approved)
- Configuration review (headers, TLS, cloud settings—read-only unless exploit scoped)
- Source review (if white-box)
Classify each candidate:
| Class | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Exploitable | Demonstrated or trivially demonstrable impact |
| Conditional | Requires specific role, network, or config |
| Informational | Hardening or disclosure without practical exploit |
| False positive | Do not report; note in workpapers |
Map to CWE/CVE and MITRE ATT&CK where it aids remediation—not for checkbox reporting.
Validation rules
Do not report unvalidated scanner output.
1. Reproduce the issue manually or with a minimal script 2. Confirm impact matches severity rubric 3. Note preconditions (auth level, network position) 4. Check if compensating control blocks exploitation in production 5. Capture evidence (request/response, screenshot)—redact secrets
Filter common noise: version banners alone, self-signed TLS in lab, missing headers without exploit chain.
Documentation
For each validated finding (draft):
- Title (business-readable)
- Affected asset and parameter
- Steps to reproduce (numbered)
- Evidence reference (file hash or ticket ID)
- Preliminary severity (finalize in report)
Log tool, command, timestamp, and operator for auditability and retest.
Reporting and remediation
Table of contents
1. Report structure 2. Finding template 3. Executive summary 4. Remediation guidance 5. Handoff
Report structure
Deliverables (per SOW):
1. Executive summary — risk posture, top issues, business impact (non-technical audience) 2. Technical report — all findings with reproduction and evidence 3. Appendices — scope, ROE, tools, glossary, cleanup attestation 4. Retest plan — dates and criteria for critical/high (if included)
Use consistent finding IDs across report, ticket system, and retest.
Finding template
| Field | Guidance |
|---|---|
| ID | Stable (e.g., PT-2026-014) |
| Title | Specific and readable |
| Severity | Per agreed rubric |
| CVSS | Optional; explain if used |
| Affected assets | Host, URL, parameter, cloud resource |
| Description | What is wrong and why it matters |
| Impact | Confidentiality, integrity, availability, compliance |
| Preconditions | Auth, network, config |
| Steps to reproduce | Numbered, minimal |
| Evidence | Redacted screenshots, requests, hashes |
| Remediation | Specific fix (config, code pattern, control) |
| References | CWE, OWASP, vendor docs |
| Retest criteria | Observable pass condition |
Executive summary
Include:
- Engagement type, dates, and scope summary
- Overall risk rating (qualitative)
- Count by severity
- Top 3–5 themes (e.g., broken access control, secrets in repos)
- Positive observations (defenses that worked)
- Recommended prioritization for remediation
Avoid jargon; link to technical section for detail.
Remediation guidance
Write remediation actionable for engineering:
| Weakness | Weak remediation | Strong remediation |
|---|---|---|
| IDOR | "Fix access control" | Enforce server-side object ownership check on orderId; add integration test |
| SQLi | "Use prepared statements" | Parameterize query in UserDAO.find; SAST rule; WAF as defense in depth |
| Cloud IAM | "Reduce permissions" | Replace *:* with least-privilege policy attached to role X |
Note compensating controls already present and what remains exploitable.
Handoff
| Audience | Provide |
|---|---|
| Engineering | Technical report + tickets per finding |
| Leadership | Executive summary |
information-security-engineer / cloud-security-engineer | Control-oriented fixes for platform issues |
compliance-engineer | Factual summary only if audit timeline requires; not legal attestation |
| SOC (optional) | IOCs or test IPs used; expected alert volume |
Schedule readout; capture questions and scope for retest.
Retest and safe practices
Table of contents
1. Retest workflow 2. Retest criteria 3. Safe testing practices 4. Legal and ethical boundaries 5. Tool and data hygiene
Retest workflow
1. Customer notifies fixes deployed (environment, build, date) 2. Confirm same scope and credentials as original test (or updated list) 3. Re-run minimal reproduction steps per finding ID 4. Record outcome: Pass, Fail, Partial, Not applicable 5. Update report or issue retest letter; do not reopen closed SOW without amendment
| Severity | Typical retest SLA (customer-defined) |
|---|---|
| Critical | Before production release or within days |
| High | Within agreed sprint |
| Medium/Low | Batch or next assessment |
Retest criteria
Define pass conditions when the finding is first reported:
| Finding type | Pass when |
|---|---|
| IDOR | User cannot access other tenants' objects; automated test added |
| XSS | Payload encoded or CSP blocks execution in browser retest |
| Missing auth | Endpoint returns 401/403 for unauthenticated caller |
| Cloud public bucket | Object ACL/block public access enforced; verified via API |
Document partial fixes (e.g., patched one endpoint but not others) as Fail with notes.
Safe testing practices
- Rate-limit active scans and brute force per ROE
- Prefer non-production environments when they represent prod code paths
- Coordinate with SOC if production testing may trigger alerts
- Use dedicated test accounts; never spray passwords against real employee accounts without approval
- Redact secrets in logs, reports, and chat
- Encrypt evidence at rest; limit distribution to engagement team
- Time-box sessions; avoid overnight unmonitored destructive tests
Legal and ethical boundaries
- Operate only under valid authorization in relevant jurisdictions
- Respect computer fraud and contract terms; unauthorized testing is out of scope for this skill
- Do not use engagement access for personal benefit or unrelated research
- Report critical issues promptly per ROE (responsible disclosure timeline)
- Do not disclose customer vulnerabilities publicly without written permission
This skill is operational guidance, not legal advice—escalate legal questions to customer counsel.
Tool and data hygiene
- Keep tool versions and command logs for reproducibility
- Store evidence in customer-approved repository (ticket, vault, encrypted share)
- Delete local copies per data-retention clause when engagement ends
- Do not upload customer data to public paste sites or unapproved cloud drives
- Segregate customer A and customer B workspaces to prevent cross-contamination
When retest passes, archive workpapers with pass evidence linked to finding ID.
Scoping and rules of engagement
Table of contents
1. Authorization gate 2. Scope worksheet 3. ROE decisions 4. Emergency stop 5. Severity rubric
Authorization gate
Stop. Do not run active scans, exploitation, or credential attacks without:
- [ ] Signed contract, SOW, or letter of authorization naming tester and customer
- [ ] Named technical and business contacts (24/7 during test window if production)
- [ ] Explicit in-scope assets (IPs, hostnames, app URLs, API bases, cloud accounts)
- [ ] Explicit out-of-scope (third parties, other tenants, physical, employees unless approved)
- [ ] Agreed testing window, timezone, and notification channel
- [ ] Emergency stop procedure and escalation path documented
If authorization is unclear, ask the customer in writing—do not assume implied consent.
Scope worksheet
| Field | Example |
|---|---|
| Engagement name | Q2 external web pentest |
| Test type | Grey-box web + API |
| Environments | staging.example.com, api-stg.example.com |
| Credentials | 2 user roles + 1 admin (test tenant) |
| Network position | Internet-only / VPN jump / on-segment |
| Data rules | Synthetic data only; no bulk export |
| Tools | Burp, nmap, custom scripts (list if restricted) |
Maintain a living asset inventory during recon; add newly discovered hosts only after customer confirms they are in scope.
ROE decisions
| Topic | Document allowed / forbidden |
|---|---|
| Denial of service | Usually forbidden unless explicit written approval |
| Social engineering | Allowed / not allowed / targeted roles only |
| Password attacks | Spraying, brute force, default creds—rate limits and lockout policy |
| Production vs non-prod | Which environments; customer monitoring expectations |
| Destructive tests | Data deletion, ransomware simulation—almost always out of scope |
| Third-party SaaS | Out of scope unless vendor authorization on file |
| Cloud | Which accounts/subscriptions; no org-wide changes without approval |
| Post-exploitation | Lateral movement depth, credential dumping, domain admin proof |
Record compensating controls that block exploitation (WAF, MFA, segmentation)—they inform severity and remediation, not excuses to skip validation.
Emergency stop
1. Customer or tester invokes stop word or stop channel 2. Cease all active testing immediately 3. Preserve logs and notes; do not delete evidence 4. Notify all testers and customer contact 5. Document stop reason and resume criteria in writing before continuing
Severity rubric
Align with customer before testing. Typical mapping:
| Level | Typical criteria |
|---|---|
| Critical | Unauthenticated RCE, full tenant/account takeover, mass sensitive data access |
| High | Authenticated RCE, admin privilege escalation, significant data read/write |
| Medium | Limited impact, difficult preconditions, partial control bypass |
| Low | Minor information disclosure, missing hardening |
| Info | Best-practice gaps without direct exploit path |
Score impact × likelihood using agreed definitions; avoid inflating scanner noise to Critical.