
Red Team Specialist
- 29 installs
- 7 repo stars
- Updated May 20, 2026
- daemon-blockint-tech/agentic-enteprises-skill
Guides authorized enterprise adversary simulation: campaign planning, MITRE ATT&CK TTP selection, OPSEC and scope, purple-team coordination, and detection-validation reporting.
About
Guides authorized enterprise red-team and adversary-simulation operations covering campaign planning, threat-informed objectives, MITRE ATT&CK TTP selection, purple-team coordination, and executive reporting. A developer uses it when leading assumed-breach or full-scope red-team exercises with written authorization.
- Selects and sequences TTPs using MITRE ATT&CK technique IDs and detection expectations
- Coordinates purple-team detection validation and captures blue-team lessons learned
Red Team Specialist by the numbers
- 29 all-time installs (skills.sh)
- Ranked #1,501 of 2,203 Security skills by installs in the Skillselion catalog
- Data as of Jul 29, 2026 (Skillselion catalog sync)
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| Installs | 29 |
|---|---|
| repo stars | ★ 7 |
| Last updated | May 20, 2026 |
| Repository | daemon-blockint-tech/agentic-enteprises-skill ↗ |
What it does
Guides authorized enterprise adversary simulation: campaign planning, MITRE ATT&CK TTP selection, OPSEC and scope, purple-team coordination, and detection-validation reporting.
Files
Red Team Specialist
When to Use
- Plan or lead authorized enterprise adversary simulation (assumed breach, full-scope red team, purple team)
- Define threat-informed objectives aligned to business risk and threat intelligence
- Select and sequence TTPs using MITRE ATT&CK framing (technique IDs, detection expectations)
- Draft rules of engagement, scope, OPSEC constraints, and emergency stop procedures
- Coordinate purple team exercises and detection validation with blue team / SOC
- Produce executive narratives, attack-path stories, and remediation handoff for defenders
- Capture lessons learned for detection engineering, tabletop, and control improvement
When NOT to Use
- Jailbreak LLMs, prompt injection, RAG/tool abuse, or AI safety harnesses →
ai-redteam - Execute hands-on web/API OWASP testing as primary deliverable →
web-pentester - Execute network/AD/infra pentest as primary deliverable →
network-pentester - Run a standard pentest engagement (recon → vuln → PoC → report) without campaign emulation →
penetration-tester - Triage SIEM/EDR alerts or SOC shift work →
soc-analyst - Proactive blue-team hunt campaigns (non-simulation) →
threat-hunter - Declare incidents, lead containment, or regulatory comms →
incident-responder - Define enterprise security strategy or GRC roadmaps →
cybersecurity - Implement SIEM rules, IAM, or guardrails from findings →
information-security-engineer
Related skills
| Need | Skill |
|---|---|
| LLM/agent adversarial testing and safety eval | ai-redteam |
| Multi-domain pentest under one ROE (execution) | penetration-tester |
| Web/API OWASP and proxy methodology | web-pentester |
| Network, AD, lateral movement, segmentation | network-pentester |
| Security program, pentest/red team governance | cybersecurity |
| SOC triage, alert enrichment, playbook execution | soc-analyst |
| Follow-on threat hunts from purple-team gaps | threat-hunter |
| Live incident command and stakeholder IR comms | incident-responder |
| Implement detections, IAM, SIEM content from gaps | information-security-engineer |
| Risk register updates from campaign findings | security-risk-analyst |
| Threat actor profiles, sector campaigns, IOC/TTP intel products | cti-analyst |
Core Workflows
1. Scope, authorization, and OPSEC
Do not operate without written authorization and defined scope.
1. Confirm signed SOW/ROE: assets, methods, windows, contacts, legal constraints 2. Define objectives (crown jewels, scenarios, kill-chain depth) and success criteria 3. Agree out-of-scope (third parties, prod PII, physical access, ransomware simulation unless approved) 4. Establish OPSEC: infrastructure, attribution, comms, artifact handling 5. Document emergency stop, escalation, and purple-team visibility rules
See `references/red_team_scope.md` and `references/scoping_roe_and_opsec.md`.
2. Campaign planning and objectives
1. Map threat actors or threat intelligence to relevant TTPs 2. Build campaign timeline (phases, injects, decision points) 3. Align objectives to detection validation or business narrative needs 4. Reserve execution slots for specialist testers where needed
See `references/campaign_planning_and_objectives.md`.
3. TTP selection and execution coordination
objectives → ATT&CK mapping → playbooks → specialist execution → evidence + timeline- Delegate in-scope technical work to
penetration-tester,web-pentester, ornetwork-pentesteras appropriate - Maintain operator log: UTC timestamps, technique ID, host/account, outcome, detection observed (Y/N/unknown)
- Stop at agreed impact; remove persistence and test artifacts per ROE
See `references/ttp_selection_and_execution_coordination.md`.
4. Purple team and detection validation
1. Pre-brief blue team on expected telemetry and safe observation windows 2. Run inject schedule with optional blind vs collaborative modes 3. Document detection gaps (missed stage, delayed alert, wrong severity) 4. Hand off detection engineering recommendations to information-security-engineer / SOC
See `references/purple_team_and_detection_validation.md`.
5. Reporting and remediation handoff
Deliver: executive summary (risk story), technical timeline, ATT&CK heatmap, detection matrix, prioritized remediations, and blue-team actions. Schedule retest or purple re-run for critical gaps.
See `references/reporting_and_remediation_handoff.md`.
When to load references
| Topic | Reference |
|---|---|
| Role boundaries | references/red_team_scope.md |
| Authorization, ROE, OPSEC | references/scoping_roe_and_opsec.md |
| Campaign planning | references/campaign_planning_and_objectives.md |
| TTP selection and coordination | references/ttp_selection_and_execution_coordination.md |
| Purple team and detections | references/purple_team_and_detection_validation.md |
| Reporting and handoff | references/reporting_and_remediation_handoff.md |
Campaign Planning and Objectives
Planning flow
threat context → objectives → scenarios → phases → resources → metricsThreat context
1. Identify relevant threat actors (industry, geography, capability) 2. Pull recent threat intelligence (reports, ISAC, internal incidents) 3. Select ATT&CK tactics that match actor behavior for this organization 4. Note defender maturity (SIEM, EDR, MFA, segmentation) from discovery or prior assessments
Objectives (SMART + measurable)
| Objective type | Example |
|---|---|
| Access | Obtain privileged access to {system} without triggering P1 |
| Data | Demonstrate read access to {dataset} with audit trail only |
| Detection | Validate alert within {N} minutes for {technique} |
| Process | Exercise escalation from SOC to CSIRT with timeline |
Write objectives so success/failure is auditable from logs and operator notes.
Scenario design
Build 1–3 scenarios per campaign; avoid scope creep.
| Element | Define |
|---|---|
| Entry | Phish, external exploit, stolen creds, supply chain (if in ROE) |
| Path | Expected kill-chain stages and decision branches |
| Crown jewels | Ultimate goal aligned to business risk |
| Constraints | Time box, geography, cloud vs on-prem |
Campaign phases (template)
| Phase | Activities |
|---|---|
| Prepare | ROE, infra, tooling, purple brief, blocklists |
| Initial access | Per scenario; coordinate specialists |
| Establish foothold | Persistence only if ROE allows; document artifacts |
| Privilege / lateral | Map paths; stop at ROE limits |
| Objective | Demonstrate impact; capture evidence |
| Closeout | Cleanup, hotwash, reporting |
Resource coordination
| Need | Route to |
|---|---|
| Web/API exploitation | web-pentester |
| Network/AD/lateral | network-pentester |
| Cross-domain pentest execution | penetration-tester |
| Detection content after gaps | information-security-engineer |
Red team lead owns timeline, OPSEC, and narrative—not every technical step.
Metrics
Track during campaign:
- Techniques executed (ATT&CK ID)
- Time per stage (dwell, lateral, objective)
- Detections: none / alert / human / blocked
- Mean time to detect (if purple windows defined)
- Open findings by severity
Risk register
| Risk | Mitigation |
|---|---|
| Scope creep | Change control via ROE amendment |
| Production impact | Staging, rate limits, approved tools |
| False IR | Deconfliction tokens, purple channel |
| Credential exposure | Vault, rotation, minimal retention |
Purple Team and Detection Validation
Modes
| Mode | Blue visibility | Use for |
|---|---|---|
| Collaborative purple | Real-time or same-day sync | Detection tuning, training |
| Semi-blind | SOC unaware; leadership aware | Process test |
| Blind | Minimal pre-brief | Realistic detection/response |
Document mode in ROE and kickoff slides.
Pre-exercise brief (purple)
Share with blue team / SOC (as agreed):
- UTC windows for injects
- High-level tactic list (not always exact timing)
- Deconfliction tokens (accounts, domains, file hashes)
- Escalation channel for false positives vs real chain
- No surprise destructive actions
Detection validation matrix
| Technique ID | Data source expected | Detection expected | Observed? | Latency | Gap notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| T1078 | IdP / VPN logs | Impossible travel rule | Y/N | mm:ss | |
| T1059.001 | EDR process | PowerShell block/alert |
Score each executed technique:
- Detected — alert or analyst within SLA
- Missed — no timely detection
- Blocked — control prevented technique (note if objective still met another way)
- Unknown — insufficient logging
Working with SOC
- Do not ask
soc-analystto run the campaign; they consume telemetry - Provide after-action IOC list and timeline for alert tuning
- Escalate to
incident-responderonly if a real incident occurs outside ROE
Detection engineering handoff
For each gap, specify:
| Field | Content |
|---|---|
| Technique | ATT&CK ID + name |
| Log source | Windows Security, CloudTrail, proxy, etc. |
| Proposed detection | Sigma/KQL/rule concept (not full implementation unless scoped) |
| Priority | Based on objective criticality |
| Owner | SOC, detection engineering, platform team |
Route implementation to information-security-engineer when building pipelines or content.
Hotwash (within 48h)
1. Timeline walkthrough (red + blue) 2. Top 3 detection wins and top 3 gaps 3. Process issues (escalation, comms, tooling) 4. Agreed actions with owners and dates 5. Optional: re-run selected TTPs after fixes
Metrics for leadership
- % techniques detected within SLA
- Critical path stages missed
- Time to contain (if exercise includes response)
- Trend vs prior purple exercises
Red Team Scope
Purpose
Define what enterprise adversary simulation covers in this skill versus adjacent roles.
In scope
| Activity | Notes |
|---|---|
| Campaign design | Multi-phase objectives, timelines, injects |
| Threat-informed emulation | Actor/TTP selection from intel or frameworks |
| MITRE ATT&CK framing | Technique mapping, coverage heatmaps |
| Purple team | Collaborative or semi-blind detection exercises |
| Detection validation | Was the stage observed? SLA? quality? |
| Executive storytelling | Business risk, attack paths, lessons for leadership |
| Blue-team handoff | Actionable detection and control improvements |
Out of scope (route elsewhere)
| Activity | Skill |
|---|---|
| LLM jailbreaks, prompt injection, agent tool abuse | ai-redteam |
| Primary web/API OWASP testing | web-pentester |
| Primary network/AD/infra pentest | network-pentester |
| Standard pentest without campaign emulation | penetration-tester |
| SOC queue triage | soc-analyst |
| Live IR command, containment, regulatory comms | incident-responder |
| Security strategy, GRC, policy | cybersecurity |
| Building SIEM rules, IAM, guardrails | information-security-engineer |
Engagement types
| Type | Description |
|---|---|
| Assumed breach | Start from compromised workstation or creds; test detect/response |
| Full red team | Stealth objective-driven campaign; broader scope and OPSEC |
| Purple team | Coordinated TTP execution with blue observation |
| Detection gap assessment | Repeat known TTPs; score coverage and latency |
| Tabletop + live inject | Narrative exercise with optional technical injects |
Success criteria (examples)
- Demonstrate path to objective (e.g., domain admin, sensitive data access) within ROE
- Document detection coverage per ATT&CK stage
- Deliver prioritized remediations with owners
- No unauthorized targeting, no out-of-scope systems touched
Deliverables
- Signed ROE and scope appendix
- Campaign plan and operator log
- ATT&CK technique matrix (executed vs detected)
- Executive summary + technical appendix
- Purple-team / blue-team readout and tracked actions
Reporting and Remediation Handoff
Report structure
Executive summary (1–2 pages)
- Engagement type, dates, authorization reference
- Risk narrative: what an adversary could achieve in scope
- Top 3 business-relevant findings (plain language)
- Detection program strengths and gaps (summary)
- Recommended strategic investments (people, process, technology)
Technical appendix
- Scope and ROE summary
- Campaign timeline (UTC)
- ATT&CK heatmap: executed vs detected
- Attack paths (diagram or ordered steps)
- Operator log excerpts (redacted)
- Evidence index (hashes, queries, screenshots)
Purple-team / blue-team section
- Detection validation matrix
- SOC process observations (escalation, tuning, noise)
- Tabletop or comms gaps if applicable
Finding format
| Field | Guidance |
|---|---|
| Title | Outcome-focused (e.g., "Domain admin without MFA challenge") |
| Severity | Impact × likelihood; align to client rubric |
| ATT&CK | Technique IDs used |
| Path | Preconditions → steps → result |
| Detection | What fired / missed / blocked |
| Remediation | Specific, actionable (owner-agnostic if unknown) |
| Retest | Criteria for purple re-run or automated test |
Remediation handoff
| Audience | Deliverable |
|---|---|
| Blue / SOC | Detection gaps, suggested data sources, IOC cleanup list |
| Engineering | Control fixes (patch, config, IAM) via tickets |
| Leadership | Prioritized roadmap items from executive summary |
| GRC | Map to frameworks if requested (cybersecurity, compliance-engineer) |
Do not assign legal or regulatory conclusions—flag for legal/compliance review.
Cleanup attestation
Before final report sign-off:
- [ ] Persistence removed
- [ ] Test accounts disabled or deleted
- [ ] C2 infra torn down per schedule
- [ ] Artifacts removed from endpoints (or list exceptions)
- [ ] Blue team confirms no outstanding red-team access
Retest and continuous improvement
1. Schedule retest for critical detection gaps (30–90 days typical) 2. Track remediation tickets to closure 3. Archive operator logs per evidence retention in ROE 4. Feed lessons into next campaign plan and threat model update
What not to include
- Exploit code or weaponized payloads beyond what client needs
- Unredacted credentials or live session tokens
- Out-of-scope system data
- Attribution of real threat actors as fact (use "informed by" language)
Scoping, Rules of Engagement, and OPSEC
Authorization (mandatory)
1. Obtain written authorization (SOW, letter, or signed ROE) before any activity 2. Record approver name, date, validity window, and scope identifiers 3. Confirm emergency stop contact and procedure with client/security operations 4. If scope is unclear, stop and clarify—do not probe adjacent assets
ROE checklist
| Item | Document |
|---|---|
| In-scope assets | Hostnames, IPs, CIDRs, cloud accounts, apps, identities |
| Out-of-scope | Third parties, prod customer data, physical, social eng (unless approved) |
| Allowed methods | Phishing, C2, credential spray, exploit, data exfil simulation |
| Prohibited | DoS, ransomware deploy, destructive actions, real data theft |
| Impact limits | Max accounts compromised, max hosts, data volume for exfil test |
| Windows | UTC start/end, maintenance blackouts |
| Notification | Who is informed (SOC, CISO), blind vs purple visibility |
| Evidence handling | Storage, encryption, retention, destruction date |
| Legal | Jurisdiction, data protection, contractor constraints |
OPSEC principles
- Minimize attribution to red team infrastructure when stealth is required
- Use dedicated redirectors, domains, and hosting per ROE—not personal assets
- Segregate operator accounts, keys, and logs from production admin paths
- Avoid storing client secrets on unsecured endpoints; use encrypted vaults
- Coordinate blocklist / allowlist with blue team to prevent accidental IR escalation
- Plan deconfliction identifiers (canary accounts, DNS names, file markers)
Communication
| Mode | When |
|---|---|
| Blind | SOC exercises realism; limited pre-brief |
| Purple | Pre-agreed observers; real-time or end-of-day sync |
| White card | Pause for safety or scope questions |
Document cadence: kickoff, mid-campaign check-in, hotwash, final readout.
Emergency stop
On stop signal (client or lead):
1. Cease all active operations immediately 2. Notify operators and blue team per ROE 3. Preserve logs per evidence policy; do not delete without approval 4. Document stop reason and residual access for cleanup
Safe testing defaults
- Prefer non-production or designated test tenants when available
- Use synthetic data for exfil demonstrations
- Remove persistence, scheduled tasks, and test accounts before closeout
- Validate cleanup with blue team or asset owner
TTP Selection and Execution Coordination
ATT&CK-driven selection
1. Start from campaign objectives and threat actor profile 2. Map required outcomes to tactics (e.g., Initial Access → Execution → Persistence → Lateral Movement → Collection → Exfiltration) 3. Pick techniques with technique IDs (e.g., T1566.001, T1021.001) 4. For each technique, define:
- Preconditions (access level, network position)
- Expected telemetry (process, auth, network, cloud audit)
- Detection hypothesis (rule name, data source, expected alert)
- Abort criteria if impact exceeds ROE
Prioritization
| Priority | Choose when |
|---|---|
| P0 | Directly tests stated objective or known gap |
| P1 | High realism for threat actor |
| P2 | Fills ATT&CK coverage map |
| Defer | Low risk relevance or tooling unstable |
Avoid "checklist dumping"—sequence TTPs into a coherent story.
Operator log (required fields)
| Field | Example |
|---|---|
| UTC timestamp | 2026-05-20T14:32:00Z |
| Operator | Initials or role |
| Technique ID | T1059.001 |
| Host / account | WORKSTATION01 / CORP\user |
| Action summary | PowerShell download cradle (simulated) |
| Outcome | Success / blocked / partial |
| Detection | Y / N / delayed / unknown |
| Evidence ref | Ticket, screenshot ID, log query link |
Coordinating execution specialists
| Specialist | Delegate when |
|---|---|
web-pentester | OWASP classes, API authZ, session abuse in scope |
network-pentester | AD paths, segmentation, service exploits, wireless |
penetration-tester | Multi-vector PoC under unified ROE |
Red team lead provides: objective, technique ID, OPSEC constraints, stop conditions, and log format. Specialist returns: repro steps, evidence, cleanup list.
In-scope execution rules
- Use minimal steps to prove the path; avoid gratuitous exploitation
- Prefer documented playbooks over ad-hoc tooling for repeatability
- Do not chain into out-of-scope systems—even if reachable
- Record every privilege change and persistence mechanism for cleanup
C2 and infrastructure (if allowed)
- Register domains/IPs in ROE appendix
- Use TLS profiles and redirectors per OPSEC plan
- Plan teardown dates for infra and certificates
- Never reuse production admin channels for C2
Post-execution
1. Confirm detection outcome with blue team (purple mode) 2. Update ATT&CK coverage matrix 3. Queue remediation or detection tickets with severity 4. Schedule retest for failed detections on critical techniques