
Analyzing Active Directory Acl Abuse
- 438 installs
- 27.3k repo stars
- Updated August 2, 2026
- mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills
analyzing-active-directory-acl-abuse is a cybersecurity agent skill (version 1.0) that uses ldap3 to query Domain Controllers, parse nTSecurityDescriptor SDDL, and flag GenericAll, WriteDACL, and WriteOwner abuse paths.
About
analyzing-active-directory-acl-abuse is an Apache-2.0 cybersecurity skill (version 1.0) from mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills that guides agents through defensive Active Directory ACL auditing. It uses the ldap3 Python library to connect to a Domain Controller, query users, groups, computers, and OUs with nTSecurityDescriptor, convert binary security descriptors to SDDL, and parse DACL access control entries for trustee SIDs and access masks. The skill flags dangerous permissions—GenericAll (0x10000000), WriteDACL (0x00040000), WriteOwner (0x00080000), GenericWrite (0x40000000), and WriteProperty extended rights—held by non-administrative principals on sensitive objects. Findings feed JSON remediation reports with object DNs, trustee identities, permission types, and attack-chain notes comparable to BloodHound ACL paths. Security engineers reach for analyzing-active-directory-acl-abuse during internal audits, purple-team assessments, or hardening sprints on enterprise AD estates. The parent library ships 817 skills across 29 security domains with NIST CSF 2.0 mappings including PR.AA-01, PR.AA-05, and PR.AA-06.
- Focuses on Active Directory ACL abuse paths relevant to red-team and blue-team assessments
- Fits Anthropic cybersecurity skills collection for structured agent-led security analysis
- Supports reasoning over dangerous ACE combinations and delegation chains in AD
- Intended for enterprise identity attack-surface review, not general app linting
- Apache 2.0 licensed skill package from the community cybersecurity repo
Analyzing Active Directory Acl Abuse by the numbers
- 438 all-time installs (skills.sh)
- +26 installs in the week ending Aug 4, 2026 (Skillselion tracking)
- Ranked #527 of 2,203 Security skills by installs in the Skillselion catalog
- Security screen: LOW risk (skills.sh audit)
- Data as of Aug 5, 2026 (Skillselion catalog sync)
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| Installs | 438 |
|---|---|
| repo stars | ★ 27.3k |
| Security audit | 2 / 3 scanners passed |
| Last updated | August 2, 2026 |
| Repository | mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills ↗ |
How do you detect dangerous Active Directory ACL misconfigurations?
Guide an agent through analyzing Active Directory ACL misconfigurations that enable privilege-escalation and lateral-movement abuse paths.
Who is it for?
Security engineers and identity admins auditing enterprise Active Directory for ACL-based privilege-escalation paths before remediation or BloodHound correlation.
Skip if: Cloud-only IAM environments without on-prem Active Directory, or teams lacking domain read credentials and ldap3 Python runtime access to a Domain Controller.
When should I use this skill?
An AD security review must find non-admin principals with GenericAll, WriteDACL, WriteOwner, or GenericWrite on sensitive users, groups, computers, or GPOs.
What you get
A JSON remediation report listing dangerous ACEs, affected object DNs, non-admin trustee SIDs, permission bitmasks, and documented privilege-escalation attack chains.
- JSON ACL remediation report
- SDDL-parsed ACE findings
- Documented privilege-escalation attack chains
By the numbers
- Skill version 1.0 with Apache-2.0 license in a library of 817 cybersecurity skills across 29 domains
- Checks 5 dangerous AD permission bitmasks including GenericAll (0x10000000) and WriteDACL (0x00040000)
- Maps to NIST CSF 2.0 categories PR.AA-01, PR.AA-05, and PR.AA-06
Files
Analyzing Active Directory ACL Abuse
Overview
Active Directory Access Control Lists (ACLs) define permissions on AD objects through Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs) containing Access Control Entries (ACEs). Misconfigured ACEs can grant non-privileged users dangerous permissions such as GenericAll (full control), WriteDACL (modify permissions), WriteOwner (take ownership), and GenericWrite (modify attributes) on sensitive objects like Domain Admins groups, domain controllers, or GPOs.
This skill uses the ldap3 Python library to connect to a Domain Controller, query objects with their nTSecurityDescriptor attribute, parse the binary security descriptor into SDDL (Security Descriptor Definition Language) format, and identify ACEs that grant dangerous permissions to non-administrative principals. These misconfigurations are the basis for ACL-based attack paths discovered by tools like BloodHound.
When to Use
- When investigating security incidents that require analyzing active directory acl abuse
- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques
Prerequisites
- Python 3.9 or later with ldap3 library (
pip install ldap3) - Domain user credentials with read access to AD objects
- Network connectivity to Domain Controller on port 389 (LDAP) or 636 (LDAPS)
- Understanding of Active Directory security model and SDDL format
Steps
1. Connect to Domain Controller: Establish an LDAP connection using ldap3 with NTLM or simple authentication. Use LDAPS (port 636) for encrypted connections in production.
2. Query target objects: Search the target OU or entire domain for objects including users, groups, computers, and OUs. Request the nTSecurityDescriptor, distinguishedName, objectClass, and sAMAccountName attributes.
3. Parse security descriptors: Convert the binary nTSecurityDescriptor into its SDDL string representation. Parse each ACE in the DACL to extract the trustee SID, access mask, and ACE type (allow/deny).
4. Resolve SIDs to principals: Map security identifiers (SIDs) to human-readable account names using LDAP lookups against the domain. Identify well-known SIDs for built-in groups.
5. Check for dangerous permissions: Compare each ACE's access mask against dangerous permission bitmasks: GenericAll (0x10000000), WriteDACL (0x00040000), WriteOwner (0x00080000), GenericWrite (0x40000000), and WriteProperty for specific extended rights.
6. Filter non-admin trustees: Exclude expected administrative trustees (Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, SYSTEM, Administrators) and flag ACEs where non-privileged users or groups hold dangerous permissions.
7. Map attack paths: For each finding, document the potential attack chain (e.g., GenericAll on user allows password reset, WriteDACL on group allows adding self to group).
8. Generate remediation report: Output a JSON report with all dangerous ACEs, affected objects, non-admin trustees, and recommended remediation steps.
Expected Output
{
"domain": "corp.example.com",
"objects_scanned": 1247,
"dangerous_aces_found": 8,
"findings": [
{
"severity": "critical",
"target_object": "CN=Domain Admins,CN=Users,DC=corp,DC=example,DC=com",
"target_type": "group",
"trustee": "CORP\\helpdesk-team",
"permission": "GenericAll",
"access_mask": "0x10000000",
"ace_type": "ACCESS_ALLOWED",
"attack_path": "GenericAll on Domain Admins group allows adding arbitrary members",
"remediation": "Remove GenericAll ACE for helpdesk-team on Domain Admins"
}
]
}
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Active Directory ACL Abuse API Reference
ldap3 Python Connection
from ldap3 import Server, Connection, ALL, NTLM, SUBTREE
server = Server("192.168.1.10", get_info=ALL, use_ssl=False)
conn = Connection(server, user="DOMAIN\\user", password="pass",
authentication=NTLM, auto_bind=True)
# Search with nTSecurityDescriptor
conn.search(
"DC=corp,DC=example,DC=com",
"(objectClass=group)",
search_scope=SUBTREE,
attributes=["distinguishedName", "sAMAccountName",
"objectClass", "nTSecurityDescriptor"],
)SDDL ACE Format
ACE String: (ace_type;ace_flags;rights;object_guid;inherit_guid;trustee_sid)
Example: (A;;GA;;;S-1-5-21-xxx-512)| Component | Description |
|---|---|
A | Access Allowed |
D | Access Denied |
OA | Object Access Allowed |
GA | Generic All |
GW | Generic Write |
WD | Write DACL |
WO | Write Owner |
Dangerous Permission Bitmasks
| Permission | Hex Mask | Risk |
|---|---|---|
| GenericAll | 0x10000000 | Full control over object |
| GenericWrite | 0x40000000 | Modify all writable attributes |
| WriteDACL | 0x00040000 | Modify object permissions |
| WriteOwner | 0x00080000 | Take object ownership |
| WriteProperty | 0x00000020 | Write specific properties |
| ExtendedRight | 0x00000100 | Extended rights (password reset, etc.) |
| Self | 0x00000008 | Self-membership modification |
| Delete | 0x00010000 | Delete the object |
BloodHound Cypher Queries for ACL Paths
-- Find all users with GenericAll on Domain Admins
MATCH p=(n:User)-[r:GenericAll]->(g:Group {name:"DOMAIN ADMINS@CORP.COM"})
RETURN p
-- Find WriteDACL paths from non-admins to high-value targets
MATCH (n:User {admincount:false})
MATCH p=allShortestPaths((n)-[r:WriteDacl|WriteOwner|GenericAll*1..]->(m:Group))
WHERE m.highvalue = true
RETURN p
-- Find GenericWrite on computers for RBCD attacks
MATCH p=(n:User)-[r:GenericWrite]->(c:Computer)
WHERE NOT n.admincount
RETURN n.name, c.name
-- Enumerate all outbound ACL edges for a principal
MATCH p=(n {name:"HELPDESK@CORP.COM"})-[r:GenericAll|GenericWrite|WriteDacl|WriteOwner|Owns]->(m)
RETURN type(r), m.name, labels(m)
-- Find shortest ACL abuse path to Domain Admin
MATCH (n:User {name:"JSMITH@CORP.COM"})
MATCH (da:Group {name:"DOMAIN ADMINS@CORP.COM"})
MATCH p=shortestPath((n)-[r:MemberOf|GenericAll|GenericWrite|WriteDacl|WriteOwner|Owns|ForceChangePassword*1..]->(da))
RETURN pPowerView Commands for ACL Enumeration
# Get ACL for Domain Admins group
Get-DomainObjectAcl -Identity "Domain Admins" -ResolveGUIDs
# Find interesting ACEs for non-admin users
Find-InterestingDomainAcl -ResolveGUIDs | Where-Object {
$_.ActiveDirectoryRights -match "GenericAll|WriteDacl|WriteOwner"
}
# Get ACL for specific OU
Get-DomainObjectAcl -SearchBase "OU=Servers,DC=corp,DC=com" -ResolveGUIDs#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Active Directory ACL abuse detection using ldap3 to find dangerous permissions."""
import argparse
import json
import struct
from ldap3 import Server, Connection, ALL, NTLM, SUBTREE
DANGEROUS_MASKS = {
"GenericAll": 0x10000000,
"GenericWrite": 0x40000000,
"WriteDACL": 0x00040000,
"WriteOwner": 0x00080000,
"WriteProperty": 0x00000020,
"Self": 0x00000008,
"ExtendedRight": 0x00000100,
"DeleteChild": 0x00000002,
"Delete": 0x00010000,
}
ADMIN_SIDS = {
"S-1-5-18",
"S-1-5-32-544",
"S-1-5-9",
}
ADMIN_RID_SUFFIXES = {
"-500",
"-512",
"-516",
"-518",
"-519",
"-498",
}
ATTACK_PATHS = {
"GenericAll": {
"user": "Full control allows password reset, Kerberoasting via SPN, or shadow credential attack",
"group": "Full control allows adding arbitrary members to the group",
"computer": "Full control allows resource-based constrained delegation attack",
"organizationalUnit": "Full control allows linking malicious GPO or moving objects",
},
"WriteDACL": {
"user": "Can modify DACL to grant self GenericAll, then reset password",
"group": "Can modify DACL to grant self write membership, then add self",
"computer": "Can modify DACL to grant self full control on machine account",
"organizationalUnit": "Can modify DACL to gain control over OU child objects",
},
"WriteOwner": {
"user": "Can take ownership then modify DACL to escalate privileges",
"group": "Can take ownership of group then modify membership",
"computer": "Can take ownership then configure delegation abuse",
"organizationalUnit": "Can take ownership then control OU policies",
},
"GenericWrite": {
"user": "Can write scriptPath for logon script execution or modify SPN for Kerberoasting",
"group": "Can modify group attributes including membership",
"computer": "Can write msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity for RBCD attack",
"organizationalUnit": "Can modify OU attributes and link GPO",
},
}
def is_admin_sid(sid: str, domain_sid: str) -> bool:
if sid in ADMIN_SIDS:
return True
for suffix in ADMIN_RID_SUFFIXES:
if sid == domain_sid + suffix:
return True
return False
def parse_sid(raw: bytes) -> str:
if len(raw) < 8:
return ""
revision = raw[0]
sub_auth_count = raw[1]
authority = int.from_bytes(raw[2:8], byteorder="big")
subs = []
for i in range(sub_auth_count):
offset = 8 + i * 4
if offset + 4 > len(raw):
break
subs.append(struct.unpack("<I", raw[offset:offset + 4])[0])
return f"S-{revision}-{authority}-" + "-".join(str(s) for s in subs)
def parse_acl(descriptor_bytes: bytes) -> list:
aces = []
if len(descriptor_bytes) < 20:
return aces
revision = descriptor_bytes[0]
control = struct.unpack("<H", descriptor_bytes[2:4])[0]
dacl_offset = struct.unpack("<I", descriptor_bytes[16:20])[0]
if dacl_offset == 0 or dacl_offset >= len(descriptor_bytes):
return aces
dacl = descriptor_bytes[dacl_offset:]
if len(dacl) < 8:
return aces
acl_size = struct.unpack("<H", dacl[2:4])[0]
ace_count = struct.unpack("<H", dacl[4:6])[0]
offset = 8
for _ in range(ace_count):
if offset + 4 > len(dacl):
break
ace_type = dacl[offset]
ace_flags = dacl[offset + 1]
ace_size = struct.unpack("<H", dacl[offset + 2:offset + 4])[0]
if ace_size < 4 or offset + ace_size > len(dacl):
break
if ace_type in (0x00, 0x05):
if offset + 8 <= len(dacl):
access_mask = struct.unpack("<I", dacl[offset + 4:offset + 8])[0]
sid_offset = offset + 8
if ace_type == 0x05:
sid_offset = offset + 8 + 32
if sid_offset < offset + ace_size:
sid_bytes = dacl[sid_offset:offset + ace_size]
sid_str = parse_sid(sid_bytes)
matched_perms = []
for perm_name, mask_val in DANGEROUS_MASKS.items():
if access_mask & mask_val:
matched_perms.append(perm_name)
if matched_perms:
aces.append({
"ace_type": "ACCESS_ALLOWED" if ace_type in (0x00, 0x05) else "OTHER",
"access_mask": f"0x{access_mask:08x}",
"trustee_sid": sid_str,
"permissions": matched_perms,
})
offset += ace_size
return aces
def resolve_sid(conn: Connection, base_dn: str, sid: str) -> str:
try:
conn.search(base_dn, f"(objectSid={sid})", attributes=["sAMAccountName", "cn"])
if conn.entries:
entry = conn.entries[0]
return str(entry.sAMAccountName) if hasattr(entry, "sAMAccountName") else str(entry.cn)
except Exception:
pass
return sid
def get_domain_sid(conn: Connection, base_dn: str) -> str:
conn.search(base_dn, "(objectClass=domain)", attributes=["objectSid"])
if conn.entries:
raw = conn.entries[0].objectSid.raw_values[0]
return parse_sid(raw)
return ""
def analyze_acls(dc_ip: str, domain: str, username: str, password: str,
target_ou: str) -> dict:
server = Server(dc_ip, get_info=ALL, use_ssl=False)
domain_parts = domain.split(".")
base_dn = ",".join(f"DC={p}" for p in domain_parts)
search_base = target_ou if target_ou else base_dn
ntlm_user = f"{domain}\\{username}"
conn = Connection(server, user=ntlm_user, password=password,
authentication=NTLM, auto_bind=True)
domain_sid = get_domain_sid(conn, base_dn)
conn.search(
search_base,
"(|(objectClass=user)(objectClass=group)(objectClass=computer)(objectClass=organizationalUnit))",
search_scope=SUBTREE,
attributes=["distinguishedName", "sAMAccountName", "objectClass", "nTSecurityDescriptor"],
)
findings = []
objects_scanned = 0
sid_cache = {}
for entry in conn.entries:
objects_scanned += 1
dn = str(entry.distinguishedName)
obj_classes = [str(c) for c in entry.objectClass.values] if hasattr(entry, "objectClass") else []
obj_type = "unknown"
for oc in obj_classes:
if oc.lower() in ("user", "group", "computer", "organizationalunit"):
obj_type = oc.lower()
break
if not hasattr(entry, "nTSecurityDescriptor"):
continue
raw_sd = entry.nTSecurityDescriptor.raw_values
if not raw_sd:
continue
sd_bytes = raw_sd[0]
aces = parse_acl(sd_bytes)
for ace in aces:
trustee_sid = ace["trustee_sid"]
if is_admin_sid(trustee_sid, domain_sid):
continue
if trustee_sid not in sid_cache:
sid_cache[trustee_sid] = resolve_sid(conn, base_dn, trustee_sid)
trustee_name = sid_cache[trustee_sid]
for perm in ace["permissions"]:
if perm in ("Delete", "DeleteChild", "Self", "WriteProperty", "ExtendedRight"):
severity = "medium"
else:
severity = "critical"
attack = ATTACK_PATHS.get(perm, {}).get(obj_type,
f"{perm} on {obj_type} may allow privilege escalation")
findings.append({
"severity": severity,
"target_object": dn,
"target_type": obj_type,
"trustee": trustee_name,
"trustee_sid": trustee_sid,
"permission": perm,
"access_mask": ace["access_mask"],
"ace_type": ace["ace_type"],
"attack_path": attack,
"remediation": f"Remove {perm} ACE for {trustee_name} on {dn}",
})
conn.unbind()
findings.sort(key=lambda f: 0 if f["severity"] == "critical" else 1)
return {
"domain": domain,
"domain_sid": domain_sid,
"search_base": search_base,
"objects_scanned": objects_scanned,
"dangerous_aces_found": len(findings),
"findings": findings,
}
def main():
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Active Directory ACL Abuse Analyzer")
parser.add_argument("--dc-ip", required=True, help="Domain Controller IP address")
parser.add_argument("--domain", required=True, help="AD domain name (e.g., corp.example.com)")
parser.add_argument("--username", required=True, help="Domain username for LDAP bind")
parser.add_argument("--password", required=True, help="Domain user password")
parser.add_argument("--target-ou", default=None,
help="Target OU distinguished name to scope the search")
parser.add_argument("--output", default=None, help="Output JSON file path")
args = parser.parse_args()
result = analyze_acls(args.dc_ip, args.domain, args.username,
args.password, args.target_ou)
report = json.dumps(result, indent=2)
if args.output:
with open(args.output, "w") as f:
f.write(report)
print(report)
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
Related skills
How it compares
Pick analyzing-active-directory-acl-abuse over generic pentest skills when the task is LDAP-driven ACL SDDL parsing with JSON remediation output for enterprise AD objects.
FAQ
What permissions does analyzing-active-directory-acl-abuse flag?
analyzing-active-directory-acl-abuse flags GenericAll, WriteDACL, WriteOwner, GenericWrite, and WriteProperty extended rights when non-administrative principals hold them on sensitive Active Directory objects.
What library does analyzing-active-directory-acl-abuse use?
analyzing-active-directory-acl-abuse uses the ldap3 Python library to query Domain Controllers, retrieve nTSecurityDescriptor attributes, and convert binary descriptors into SDDL for ACE analysis.
What output does analyzing-active-directory-acl-abuse generate?
analyzing-active-directory-acl-abuse generates a JSON remediation report listing dangerous ACEs, affected distinguished names, non-admin trustees, permission bitmasks, and recommended attack-chain context.
Is Analyzing Active Directory Acl Abuse safe to install?
skills.sh reports 2 of 3 security scanners passed. Review the Security Audits panel on this page before installing in production.