
Analyzing Office365 Audit Logs For Compromise
- 254 installs
- 27.3k repo stars
- Updated August 2, 2026
- mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills
Analyzing Office365 Audit Logs For Compromise is an agent skill that guides structured Microsoft 365 audit-log review to detect and scope tenant compromise.
About
Analyzing Office365 Audit Logs For Compromise is an agent skill aimed at solo builders and small teams who run on Microsoft 365 and need a repeatable way to read audit logs when something looks wrong. Instead of ad-hoc searching in the compliance center, the skill frames how to pull relevant Unified Audit Log activity, correlate risky patterns such as impossible travel, privilege escalation, suspicious inbox rules, and mass downloads, and turn raw events into a short incident narrative you can act on. It fits the Operate phase when you are responding to alerts, validating a phishing aftermath, or doing periodic tenant hygiene—not when you are shipping application code. Expect procedural security knowledge rather than a turnkey SIEM integration; you still need appropriate Microsoft admin roles and export access. Use it when cloud identity compromise is plausible and you want structured questions and interpretation steps rather than guessing which cmdlet or portal view to open first.
- Structured approach to Office 365 / Microsoft 365 Unified Audit Log review for breach indicators
- Maps common compromise TTPs to observable sign-in, mailbox, and admin-action events
- Supports incident scoping and timeline reconstruction from cloud audit exports
- Oriented to security operators and solo builders defending their own Microsoft tenant
- Pairs with broader cybersecurity skill packs from the same repository family
Analyzing Office365 Audit Logs For Compromise by the numbers
- 254 all-time installs (skills.sh)
- +17 installs in the week ending Aug 4, 2026 (Skillselion tracking)
- Ranked #680 of 2,203 Security skills by installs in the Skillselion catalog
- Security screen: LOW risk (skills.sh audit)
- Data as of Aug 5, 2026 (Skillselion catalog sync)
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| Installs | 254 |
|---|---|
| repo stars | ★ 27.3k |
| Security audit | 3 / 3 scanners passed |
| Last updated | August 2, 2026 |
| Repository | mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills ↗ |
What it does
Investigate suspected Microsoft 365 tenant compromise by querying and interpreting Unified Audit Log signals with an agent-guided workflow.
Who is it for?
Best when you administer your own Microsoft 365 tenant and need guided log interpretation after an alert or account takeover worry.
Skip if: Skip if you're without Microsoft audit-log access, pure app-level OWASP reviews, or organizations that already run a mature SOC with standardized playbooks and do not need agent-assisted triage.
When should I use this skill?
When Microsoft 365 audit activity suggests account takeover, suspicious admin actions, or you need structured compromise analysis on Unified Audit Log data.
What you get
After the skill runs you have a prioritized timeline of suspicious audit events, likely attack paths, and concrete next checks to contain and remediate the tenant.
- Prioritized list of suspicious audit events with rationale
- Incident timeline draft and recommended containment checks
Files
Analyzing Office 365 Audit Logs for Compromise
Overview
Business Email Compromise (BEC) attacks often leave traces in Office 365 audit logs: suspicious inbox rule creation, email forwarding to external addresses, mailbox delegation changes, and unauthorized OAuth application consent grants. This skill uses the Microsoft Graph API to query the Unified Audit Log, enumerate inbox rules across mailboxes, detect forwarding configurations, and identify compromised account indicators.
When to Use
- When investigating security incidents that require analyzing office365 audit logs for compromise
- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques
Prerequisites
- Azure AD app registration with
AuditLog.Read.All,MailboxSettings.Read,Mail.Read(application permissions) - Python 3.9+ with
msal,requests - Client secret or certificate for authentication
- Global Reader or Security Reader role
Steps
1. Authenticate to Microsoft Graph using MSAL client credentials flow 2. Query Unified Audit Log for suspicious operations (Set-Mailbox, New-InboxRule) 3. Enumerate inbox rules across mailboxes and flag forwarding rules 4. Detect mailbox delegation changes (Add-MailboxPermission) 5. Identify OAuth consent grants to suspicious applications 6. Check for suspicious sign-in patterns from audit logs 7. Generate compromise indicator report with timeline
Expected Output
- JSON report listing forwarding rules, delegation changes, OAuth grants, and suspicious audit events with risk scores
- Timeline of compromise indicators with affected mailboxes
Apache License
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API Reference — Analyzing Office 365 Audit Logs for Compromise
Libraries Used
- msal: Microsoft Authentication Library — client credentials flow for Graph API
- requests: HTTP client for Graph API calls with pagination
CLI Interface
python agent.py --tenant-id T --client-id C --client-secret S audit-logs --days 7
python agent.py --tenant-id T --client-id C --client-secret S inbox-rules --user user@domain.com
python agent.py --tenant-id T --client-id C --client-secret S forwarding --user user@domain.com
python agent.py --tenant-id T --client-id C --client-secret S oauth
python agent.py --tenant-id T --client-id C --client-secret S full --users user1@d.com user2@d.com --days 7Core Functions
get_access_token(tenant_id, client_id, client_secret) — MSAL auth
Uses ConfidentialClientApplication.acquire_token_for_client() with https://graph.microsoft.com/.default scope.
query_audit_logs(token, days) — Suspicious operation detection
Queries /auditLogs/directoryAudits for 11 suspicious operations: New-InboxRule, Set-InboxRule, Set-Mailbox, Add-MailboxPermission, UpdateInboxRules, New-TransportRule, etc.
check_inbox_rules(token, user_id) — Forwarding rule detection
GET /users/{id}/mailFolders/inbox/messageRules. Checks actions for forwardTo, forwardAsAttachmentTo, redirectTo. Flags external forwards and delete-after-forward patterns.
check_mailbox_forwarding(token, user_id) — SMTP forwarding check
GET /users/{id}/mailboxSettings. Checks auto-reply status and external audience.
check_oauth_grants(token) — OAuth consent audit
GET /oauth2PermissionGrants. Flags grants with Mail.Read, Mail.ReadWrite, Mail.Send, Files.ReadWrite.All, MailboxSettings.ReadWrite.
full_audit(token, users, days) — Comprehensive compromise analysis
Microsoft Graph Endpoints
| Endpoint | Method | Permission |
|---|---|---|
/auditLogs/directoryAudits | GET | AuditLog.Read.All |
/users/{id}/mailFolders/inbox/messageRules | GET | MailboxSettings.Read |
/users/{id}/mailboxSettings | GET | MailboxSettings.Read |
/oauth2PermissionGrants | GET | Directory.Read.All |
Inbox Rule Risk Scoring
| Factor | Points |
|---|---|
| Forwarding rule present | +40 |
| Delete after forward | +25 |
| External forward address | +20 |
| Mark as read + forward | +15 |
Suspicious Operations Monitored
New-InboxRule, Set-InboxRule, Set-Mailbox, Add-MailboxPermission, Set-MailboxJunkEmailConfiguration, Set-OwaMailboxPolicy, New-TransportRule, Add-RecipientPermission, Set-TransportRule, UpdateInboxRules, Set-MailboxAutoReplyConfiguration
Dependencies
msal>= 1.24.0requests>= 2.28.0- Azure AD app with
AuditLog.Read.All,MailboxSettings.Read,Mail.Read
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Agent for analyzing Office 365 audit logs for compromise indicators via Microsoft Graph."""
import json
import argparse
from datetime import datetime, timedelta
try:
import msal
except ImportError:
msal = None
try:
import requests
except ImportError:
requests = None
GRAPH_BASE = "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0"
SUSPICIOUS_OPERATIONS = [
"New-InboxRule", "Set-InboxRule", "Set-Mailbox",
"Add-MailboxPermission", "Set-MailboxJunkEmailConfiguration",
"Set-OwaMailboxPolicy", "New-TransportRule",
"Add-RecipientPermission", "Set-TransportRule",
"UpdateInboxRules", "Set-MailboxAutoReplyConfiguration",
]
def get_access_token(tenant_id, client_id, client_secret):
"""Authenticate via MSAL client credentials flow."""
if not msal:
return None
authority = f"https://login.microsoftonline.com/{tenant_id}"
app = msal.ConfidentialClientApplication(
client_id, authority=authority, client_credential=client_secret
)
result = app.acquire_token_for_client(scopes=["https://graph.microsoft.com/.default"])
if "access_token" in result:
return result["access_token"]
raise RuntimeError(f"Auth failed: {result.get('error_description', result.get('error'))}")
def graph_get(token, endpoint, params=None):
"""Paginated GET against Microsoft Graph API."""
headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}", "Content-Type": "application/json"}
url = f"{GRAPH_BASE}{endpoint}"
all_items = []
while url:
resp = requests.get(url, headers=headers, params=params, timeout=30)
resp.raise_for_status()
data = resp.json()
all_items.extend(data.get("value", []))
url = data.get("@odata.nextLink")
params = None
return all_items
def query_audit_logs(token, days=7):
"""Query Unified Audit Log for suspicious mail operations."""
since = (datetime.utcnow() - timedelta(days=days)).strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")
events = []
for operation in SUSPICIOUS_OPERATIONS:
filter_str = (
f"activityDisplayName eq '{operation}' "
f"and activityDateTime ge {since}"
)
try:
logs = graph_get(token, "/auditLogs/directoryAudits",
params={"$filter": filter_str, "$top": "100"})
for log in logs:
initiated = log.get("initiatedBy", {}).get("user", {})
events.append({
"operation": operation,
"timestamp": log.get("activityDateTime"),
"result": log.get("result"),
"user": initiated.get("userPrincipalName"),
"ip_address": initiated.get("ipAddress"),
"target": [t.get("displayName") for t in log.get("targetResources", [])],
"details": log.get("additionalDetails"),
})
except Exception:
pass
events.sort(key=lambda x: x.get("timestamp", ""), reverse=True)
return events
def check_inbox_rules(token, user_id):
"""List inbox rules for a specific mailbox and flag forwarding rules."""
rules = graph_get(token, f"/users/{user_id}/mailFolders/inbox/messageRules")
findings = []
for rule in rules:
is_forwarding = False
forward_to = []
actions = rule.get("actions", {})
if actions.get("forwardTo"):
is_forwarding = True
forward_to = [r.get("emailAddress", {}).get("address", "")
for r in actions["forwardTo"]]
if actions.get("forwardAsAttachmentTo"):
is_forwarding = True
forward_to += [r.get("emailAddress", {}).get("address", "")
for r in actions["forwardAsAttachmentTo"]]
if actions.get("redirectTo"):
is_forwarding = True
forward_to += [r.get("emailAddress", {}).get("address", "")
for r in actions["redirectTo"]]
delete_after = actions.get("delete", False)
mark_read = actions.get("markAsRead", False)
risk = 0
if is_forwarding:
risk += 40
if delete_after:
risk += 25
if mark_read and is_forwarding:
risk += 15
external = [f for f in forward_to if f and not f.endswith(user_id.split("@")[-1])]
if external:
risk += 20
findings.append({
"rule_id": rule.get("id"),
"display_name": rule.get("displayName"),
"enabled": rule.get("isEnabled"),
"is_forwarding": is_forwarding,
"forward_to": forward_to,
"external_forwards": external,
"delete_after_forward": delete_after,
"mark_as_read": mark_read,
"conditions": rule.get("conditions"),
"risk_score": min(risk, 100),
"risk_level": "CRITICAL" if risk >= 70 else "HIGH" if risk >= 50 else "MEDIUM" if risk >= 25 else "LOW",
})
return findings
def check_mailbox_forwarding(token, user_id):
"""Check mailbox-level SMTP forwarding configuration."""
try:
headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"}
resp = requests.get(
f"{GRAPH_BASE}/users/{user_id}/mailboxSettings",
headers=headers, timeout=30
)
resp.raise_for_status()
settings = resp.json()
auto_reply = settings.get("automaticRepliesSetting", {})
return {
"user": user_id,
"auto_reply_enabled": auto_reply.get("status") != "disabled",
"auto_reply_external_audience": auto_reply.get("externalAudience"),
"language": settings.get("language", {}).get("locale"),
"timezone": settings.get("timeZone"),
}
except Exception as e:
return {"user": user_id, "error": str(e)}
def check_oauth_grants(token):
"""Check for suspicious OAuth application consent grants."""
grants = graph_get(token, "/oauth2PermissionGrants")
high_risk_scopes = {"Mail.Read", "Mail.ReadWrite", "Mail.Send",
"Files.ReadWrite.All", "MailboxSettings.ReadWrite"}
suspicious = []
for g in grants:
scopes = g.get("scope", "").split()
risky = [s for s in scopes if s in high_risk_scopes]
if risky:
suspicious.append({
"client_id": g.get("clientId"),
"consent_type": g.get("consentType"),
"principal_id": g.get("principalId"),
"high_risk_scopes": risky,
"all_scopes": scopes,
"risk_score": min(len(risky) * 20, 100),
})
suspicious.sort(key=lambda x: x["risk_score"], reverse=True)
return suspicious
def full_audit(token, users=None, days=7):
"""Run comprehensive O365 compromise audit."""
audit_events = query_audit_logs(token, days)
oauth_findings = check_oauth_grants(token)
inbox_findings = []
forwarding_findings = []
if users:
for user in users:
rules = check_inbox_rules(token, user)
inbox_findings.extend([{**r, "mailbox": user} for r in rules])
fwd = check_mailbox_forwarding(token, user)
forwarding_findings.append(fwd)
suspicious_rules = [r for r in inbox_findings if r.get("is_forwarding")]
external_forwards = [r for r in inbox_findings if r.get("external_forwards")]
return {
"audit_type": "Office 365 Compromise Analysis",
"timestamp": datetime.utcnow().isoformat(),
"lookback_days": days,
"summary": {
"suspicious_audit_events": len(audit_events),
"oauth_high_risk_grants": len(oauth_findings),
"forwarding_rules_found": len(suspicious_rules),
"external_forwarding_rules": len(external_forwards),
"mailboxes_scanned": len(users) if users else 0,
},
"audit_events": audit_events[:25],
"oauth_findings": oauth_findings[:15],
"forwarding_rules": suspicious_rules[:20],
"mailbox_settings": forwarding_findings[:20],
}
def main():
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Office 365 Audit Log Compromise Analysis Agent")
parser.add_argument("--tenant-id", required=True, help="Azure AD tenant ID")
parser.add_argument("--client-id", required=True, help="App registration client ID")
parser.add_argument("--client-secret", required=True, help="App client secret")
sub = parser.add_subparsers(dest="command")
p_audit = sub.add_parser("audit-logs", help="Query suspicious audit events")
p_audit.add_argument("--days", type=int, default=7)
p_rules = sub.add_parser("inbox-rules", help="Check inbox rules for forwarding")
p_rules.add_argument("--user", required=True, help="User principal name")
p_fwd = sub.add_parser("forwarding", help="Check mailbox forwarding settings")
p_fwd.add_argument("--user", required=True)
sub.add_parser("oauth", help="Check OAuth consent grants")
p_full = sub.add_parser("full", help="Full compromise audit")
p_full.add_argument("--users", nargs="+", help="User principal names to scan")
p_full.add_argument("--days", type=int, default=7)
args = parser.parse_args()
token = get_access_token(args.tenant_id, args.client_id, args.client_secret)
if args.command == "audit-logs":
result = query_audit_logs(token, args.days)
elif args.command == "inbox-rules":
result = check_inbox_rules(token, args.user)
elif args.command == "forwarding":
result = check_mailbox_forwarding(token, args.user)
elif args.command == "oauth":
result = check_oauth_grants(token)
elif args.command == "full" or args.command is None:
result = full_audit(token, getattr(args, "users", None), getattr(args, "days", 7))
else:
parser.print_help()
return
print(json.dumps(result, indent=2, default=str))
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
Related skills
How it compares
Use for cloud identity audit triage instead of generic “debug my API” or frontend-focused agent skills.
FAQ
Who is analyzing-office365-audit-logs-for-compromise for?
Microsoft 365 administrators, SaaS operators, and security-conscious developers who must investigate tenant audit data without a full-time analyst.
When should I use analyzing-office365-audit-logs-for-compromise?
Use it in Operate when monitoring surfaces odd sign-ins, inbox rules, or admin changes; also after ship-phase security incidents when you pivot to production identity forensics.
Is analyzing-office365-audit-logs-for-compromise safe to install?
Treat it like any third-party security skill: review the Security Audits panel on this Prism page, confirm the repo source, and avoid pasting production secrets into the agent beyond what your investigation requires.