Now liveThe Skillselion MCP - thousands of ranked skills, loaded into your agent mid-task. No install.Get it →
mukul975 avatar

Analyzing Sbom For Supply Chain Vulnerabilities

  • 312 installs
  • 27.3k repo stars
  • Updated August 2, 2026
  • mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills

Analyzing SBOM for supply chain vulnerabilities is an agent skill that reviews SBOM component lists for dependency and supply-chain security risk.

About

Analyzing SBOM for supply chain vulnerabilities is an agent skill from a cybersecurity skills collection focused on reading a software bill of materials and surfacing dependency risks that affect what you ship. Solo and indie builders invoke it when they need to understand what libraries sit in their product, which versions are exposed, and where known weaknesses might enter the chain without hiring a dedicated AppSec team. The skill sits primarily in Ship security reviews ahead of launch, and remains useful in Operate when you refresh images or bump lockfiles after advisories. It complements automated scanners by giving agents a procedural lens for SBOM interpretation, correlation, and remediation planning. Tag confidence is moderate because ingested readme content in Prism may be license text only; placement follows the skill name and anthropic-cybersecurity-skills domain. Expect intermediate complexity—you should have an exportable SBOM (SPDX, CycloneDX, or tool-generated equivalent) and basic familiarity with semver and CVE language. Outcomes include a clearer picture of risky components and next steps to patch, pin, or replace dependencies before customers inherit them.

  • Structured workflow for interpreting SBOM formats and component inventory
  • Maps package and version entries to known supply-chain vulnerability concerns
  • Supports prioritization mindset for transitive dependency risk
  • Fits pre-release and post-incident dependency audits for small teams
  • Aligns with modern secure SDLC expectations for artifact transparency

Analyzing Sbom For Supply Chain Vulnerabilities by the numbers

  • 312 all-time installs (skills.sh)
  • +24 installs in the week ending Aug 4, 2026 (Skillselion tracking)
  • Ranked #624 of 2,203 Security skills by installs in the Skillselion catalog
  • Security screen: LOW risk (skills.sh audit)
  • Data as of Aug 5, 2026 (Skillselion catalog sync)
npx skills add https://github.com/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills --skill analyzing-sbom-for-supply-chain-vulnerabilities

Add your badge

Show developers this skill is listed on Skillselion. Paste this into your README.

Listed on Skillselion
Installs312
repo stars27.3k
Security audit3 / 3 scanners passed
Last updatedAugust 2, 2026
Repositorymukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills

What it does

Analyze a software bill of materials (SBOM) to find supply-chain vulnerabilities before you ship or operate dependencies at scale.

Who is it for?

Best when you're shipping SaaS or APIs and generate SBOMs from CI or packaging tools and need agent-guided supply-chain review.

Skip if: Skip if you're without any SBOM or inventory export, or orgs that already run fully automated gated pipelines with signed attestations and no agent review step.

When should I use this skill?

When you have an SBOM export and need to assess supply-chain and dependency vulnerabilities before release or after dependency changes.

What you get

You get an analyzed view of SBOM components with vulnerability-oriented findings and actionable dependency remediation direction before or after release.

  • Vulnerability-oriented SBOM review notes
  • Prioritized dependency risk findings
  • Remediation or upgrade recommendations

Files

SKILL.mdMarkdownGitHub ↗

Analyzing SBOM for Supply Chain Vulnerabilities

When to Use

  • A new regulatory requirement (EO 14028, EU CRA) mandates SBOM analysis for software deliveries
  • Security team needs to assess third-party risk by scanning vendor-provided SBOMs
  • CI/CD pipeline requires automated vulnerability checks against generated SBOMs
  • Incident response needs to determine if a newly disclosed CVE affects deployed software
  • Procurement team requires supply chain risk assessment for a software acquisition

Do not use for runtime vulnerability scanning of live systems; use container scanning tools (Trivy, Grype CLI) or host-based vulnerability scanners (Nessus, Qualys) instead.

Prerequisites

  • SBOM file in CycloneDX JSON (v1.4+) or SPDX JSON (v2.3+) format
  • Python 3.9+ with requests, networkx, and packaging libraries installed
  • NVD API key (free, from https://nvd.nist.gov/developers/request-an-api-key) for higher rate limits
  • Network access to NVD API (https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0)
  • Optionally: syft for SBOM generation, grype for cross-validation

Workflow

Step 1: Generate SBOM (if not provided)

Use syft to create an SBOM from a container image or project directory:

# Generate CycloneDX JSON from a container image
syft alpine:latest -o cyclonedx-json > sbom-cyclonedx.json

# Generate SPDX JSON from a project directory
syft dir:/path/to/project -o spdx-json > sbom-spdx.json

# Generate from a running container
syft docker:my-app-container -o cyclonedx-json > sbom.json

Syft supports over 30 package ecosystems including npm, PyPI, Maven, Go modules, apt, apk, and RPM. The generated SBOM includes package names, versions, licenses, CPE identifiers, and PURL (Package URL) references.

Step 2: Parse SBOM and Extract Components

Parse the SBOM to extract all software components with their identifiers:

CycloneDX JSON Structure:

{
  "bomFormat": "CycloneDX",
  "specVersion": "1.5",
  "components": [
    {
      "type": "library",
      "name": "lodash",
      "version": "4.17.20",
      "purl": "pkg:npm/lodash@4.17.20",
      "cpe": "cpe:2.3:a:lodash:lodash:4.17.20:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
      "licenses": [{"license": {"id": "MIT"}}]
    }
  ],
  "dependencies": [
    {"ref": "pkg:npm/express@4.18.2", "dependsOn": ["pkg:npm/lodash@4.17.20"]}
  ]
}

SPDX JSON Structure:

{
  "spdxVersion": "SPDX-2.3",
  "packages": [
    {
      "name": "lodash",
      "versionInfo": "4.17.20",
      "externalRefs": [
        {"referenceType": "purl", "referenceLocator": "pkg:npm/lodash@4.17.20"},
        {"referenceType": "cpe23Type", "referenceLocator": "cpe:2.3:a:lodash:lodash:4.17.20:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"}
      ],
      "licenseConcluded": "MIT"
    }
  ],
  "relationships": [
    {"spdxElementId": "SPDXRef-express", "relatedSpdxElement": "SPDXRef-lodash",
     "relationshipType": "DEPENDS_ON"}
  ]
}

Step 3: Correlate Components with NVD CVE Database

Query the NVD 2.0 API to find known vulnerabilities for each component:

import requests

NVD_API = "https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0"

def search_cves_by_cpe(cpe_name, api_key=None):
    params = {"cpeName": cpe_name, "resultsPerPage": 50}
    headers = {"apiKey": api_key} if api_key else {}
    resp = requests.get(NVD_API, params=params, headers=headers, timeout=30)
    resp.raise_for_status()
    return resp.json().get("vulnerabilities", [])

def search_cves_by_keyword(keyword, version=None, api_key=None):
    params = {"keywordSearch": keyword, "resultsPerPage": 50}
    headers = {"apiKey": api_key} if api_key else {}
    resp = requests.get(NVD_API, params=params, headers=headers, timeout=30)
    resp.raise_for_status()
    return resp.json().get("vulnerabilities", [])

The NVD API supports searching by CPE name (most precise), keyword, CVE ID, and date ranges. Rate limits: 5 requests/30 seconds without API key, 50 requests/30 seconds with key.

Step 4: Build Dependency Graph and Identify Transitive Risks

Construct a directed graph of dependencies to trace vulnerability propagation:

import networkx as nx

def build_dependency_graph(sbom):
    G = nx.DiGraph()
    # Add nodes for each component
    for comp in sbom["components"]:
        G.add_node(comp["purl"], name=comp["name"], version=comp["version"])
    # Add edges from dependency relationships
    for dep in sbom.get("dependencies", []):
        for child in dep.get("dependsOn", []):
            G.add_edge(dep["ref"], child)
    return G

Transitive dependency analysis identifies components that are not directly included but are pulled in through dependency chains. A vulnerability in a deeply nested transitive dependency (e.g., 4 levels deep) still represents risk but may be harder to remediate.

Key graph metrics for risk assessment:

  • In-degree: How many components depend on this one (high in-degree = high blast radius)
  • Shortest path to root: Distance from application entry point (closer = more exploitable)
  • Betweenness centrality: Components that sit on many dependency paths (bottleneck risk)

Step 5: Calculate Risk Scores

Aggregate vulnerability data into component and overall risk scores:

Risk Score Calculation:
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Component Risk = max(CVSS scores of all CVEs affecting the component)

Weighted Risk = Component Risk * Dependency Factor
  where Dependency Factor = 1.0 + (0.1 * in_degree)
  (more dependents = higher organizational impact)

Overall SBOM Risk = weighted average of all component risks
  weighted by dependency centrality

Risk Levels:
  CRITICAL: CVSS >= 9.0 or known exploited (CISA KEV)
  HIGH:     CVSS >= 7.0
  MEDIUM:   CVSS >= 4.0
  LOW:      CVSS < 4.0

Step 6: Cross-Validate with Grype

Use grype to independently scan the SBOM and compare findings:

# Scan CycloneDX SBOM with grype
grype sbom:sbom-cyclonedx.json -o json > grype-results.json

# Scan SPDX SBOM
grype sbom:sbom-spdx.json -o table

# Filter by severity
grype sbom:sbom-cyclonedx.json --only-fixed --fail-on critical

Grype pulls vulnerability data from NVD, GitHub Security Advisories, Alpine SecDB, Red Hat, Debian, Ubuntu, Amazon Linux, and Oracle security databases, providing broader coverage than NVD alone.

Step 7: Generate Compliance Report

Produce a structured report suitable for regulatory compliance:

SBOM VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS REPORT
====================================
SBOM File:         app-sbom-cyclonedx.json
Format:            CycloneDX v1.5
Analysis Date:     2026-03-19
Total Components:  247
Total Dependencies: 1,842 (direct: 34, transitive: 213)

VULNERABILITY SUMMARY
  Critical:  3 components / 5 CVEs
  High:      11 components / 18 CVEs
  Medium:    27 components / 41 CVEs
  Low:       8 components / 12 CVEs

CRITICAL FINDINGS
1. lodash@4.17.20
   CVE-2021-23337 (CVSS 7.2) - Command Injection via template
   CVE-2020-28500 (CVSS 5.3) - ReDoS in trimEnd
   Dependents: 14 components (high blast radius)
   Fix: Upgrade to 4.17.21+

2. log4j-core@2.14.1
   CVE-2021-44228 (CVSS 10.0) - Log4Shell RCE [CISA KEV]
   CVE-2021-45046 (CVSS 9.0) - Incomplete fix bypass
   Dependents: 8 components
   Fix: Upgrade to 2.17.1+

DEPENDENCY GRAPH RISKS
  Most depended-on: core-util@1.2.3 (47 dependents)
  Deepest chain: app -> framework -> adapter -> codec -> zlib (5 levels)
  Bottleneck components: 3 components on >50% of dependency paths

LICENSE COMPLIANCE
  Copyleft licenses found: 2 (GPL-3.0 in libxml2, AGPL-3.0 in mongodb-driver)
  Review required for commercial distribution

Key Concepts

TermDefinition
SBOMSoftware Bill of Materials; a formal inventory of all components, libraries, and dependencies in a software product
CycloneDXOWASP-maintained SBOM standard supporting JSON, XML, and protobuf formats with dependency graph and vulnerability data
SPDXLinux Foundation SBOM standard focused on license compliance with support for package, file, and snippet-level detail
PURLPackage URL; a standardized scheme for identifying software packages across ecosystems (e.g., pkg:npm/lodash@4.17.21)
CPECommon Platform Enumeration; NIST naming scheme for IT products used to correlate with NVD CVE data
NVDNational Vulnerability Database; US government repository of vulnerability data indexed by CVE identifiers
Transitive DependencyA dependency not directly declared but pulled in through the dependency chain of direct dependencies
CISA KEVCISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog; CVEs confirmed to be actively exploited in the wild

Tools & Systems

  • syft (Anchore): Open-source SBOM generator supporting 30+ package ecosystems and CycloneDX/SPDX output
  • grype (Anchore): Vulnerability scanner that accepts SBOMs as input and correlates against multiple advisory databases
  • cyclonedx-python-lib: Python library for creating, parsing, and validating CycloneDX SBOMs programmatically
  • lib4sbom: Python library for parsing both SPDX and CycloneDX format SBOMs
  • nvdlib: Python wrapper for the NVD 2.0 API supporting CVE and CPE queries with rate limit management
  • OWASP Dependency-Track: Platform for continuous SBOM analysis, vulnerability tracking, and policy enforcement

Common Scenarios

Scenario: Assessing Vendor Software After Log4Shell Disclosure

Context: After the Log4Shell (CVE-2021-44228) disclosure, the security team needs to determine which vendor-supplied applications contain vulnerable versions of log4j. Several vendors have provided SBOMs per contractual requirements.

Approach: 1. Collect all vendor SBOMs (CycloneDX or SPDX JSON format) 2. Parse each SBOM and search for log4j-core components with versions < 2.17.1 3. Query NVD API for the specific CVEs (CVE-2021-44228, CVE-2021-45046, CVE-2021-45105) 4. Build dependency graphs to identify which application components depend on log4j 5. Calculate blast radius: how many services and endpoints are exposed 6. Generate prioritized remediation report sorted by exposure and business criticality 7. Cross-validate findings with grype scan of the same SBOMs

Pitfalls:

  • Vendor SBOMs may be incomplete, missing shaded/bundled JAR files that embed log4j
  • SPDX and CycloneDX version differences may affect parser compatibility
  • NVD API rate limits can slow analysis when scanning hundreds of components without an API key
  • CPE names in SBOMs may not exactly match NVD entries, requiring fuzzy matching
  • Transitive dependencies may include log4j even when it is not a direct dependency

Related skills

How it compares

Agent-guided SBOM interpretation skill—not a hosted CVE database or continuous dependency bot by itself.

FAQ

Who is analyzing-sbom-for-supply-chain-vulnerabilities for?

Developers and small teams responsible for dependency security who want structured SBOM review inside their coding agent workflow.

When should I use analyzing-sbom-for-supply-chain-vulnerabilities?

Use it in Ship security before a release with a fresh SBOM, and in Operate infra or iterate when you rebuild images or respond to new advisory feeds.

Is analyzing-sbom-for-supply-chain-vulnerabilities safe to install?

Treat SBOMs as sensitive inventory; review the Security Audits panel on this page and avoid pasting production secrets into analysis prompts.

Securityauditappseccompliance

This week in AI coding

Five minutes, every Monday - the tools, releases and tactics for developers.

unsubscribe anytime.